Counter-Cultural Perspectives of an Organic Intellectual: Selected Works of Rudolf C. Heredia

Volume X

Globalisation and Its Discontents

Volume X

GLOBALISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

written by

Rudolf C. Heredia

compiled and edited with

Priya D'Souza

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Volume X— Globalisation and Its Discontents
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO COUNTER-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES OF AN ORGANIC INTELLECTUAL: THE SELECTED WORKS OF RUDOLF C. HEREDIA

This collection brings together essays and presentations that span some five decades of my work. These are in the overall discourse of the social sciences and though I have trained as a sociologist, my perspective is more interdisciplinary. This is really the only way contemporary social issues and questions can be approached if they are to have any relevance today.

A continuing thread that runs through this collection. It represents an on-going venture to bring a critical reflection on social issues that engage activists in the field. Thus, rather than indulge in 'ad hoc' responses, they can create a praxis of action-reflection-action in the tradition of Paulo Freire. Hopefully this interaction between the 'desk and the field' will enrich both, activists to more effective action on the ground and theorists to a more critical appreciation on the underpinning ideas.

The collection is divided by common overall themes into separate volumes to provide a coherent unifying perspective to each volume. While each essay has its own specific context and topic, yet given the time span they cover, some overlap and repetition across these volumes is inevitable. However, we have tried to exclude this within the volume itself, unless there is a different nuance in the presentation that justifies its inclusion despite the overlap.

Each volume has its own brief introduction putting the theme in focus and the sequencing of the essays contained is chronological. Wherever possible each article has a by-line way by of a reference indicating its source and date. This should help to particularise its context and occasion.

The following are the subdivisions of the collection.

I. Socio-Cultural Perspectives: Pluralism and Multiple Identities
II. Socio-Political Perspectives: Contradictions and Complementarities
III. The Development Debate: Growth and Equity
IV. Religion and Society: Secularism and Its Discontent
V. Ecological Concerns: Environmental Sustainability
VI. Hermeneutics of Dialogue: Discourses on The Self and The Other
VII. Education: The Dual System
VIII. The Tribal Question
IX. Gandhiana: Essays on A Yuga Purush
X. Globalisation And Its Discontents Globalisation
XI. Jesuitica: For the Jesuit Parivar
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XIII. Book Reviews
XIV. Poems
XV. Homilies

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME X– GLOBALISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

The promise of globalisation– of creating an interconnected, interdependent world that would bring us all into the global village where the common good of each would be the common good of all. However, the interconnectedness of the process was skewed towards prioritising haves and marginalising the have-nots. This neoliberal globalisation was from the top-down and largely resulted in the dominance of the market economy, especially the financial markets. It failed to bring the promised equality between and within nations. This precipitated a broken, bruised world ridden with multiple crises and desperate, extremist responses.

The essays in this volume address the discontents of such a process. We need a globalisation from below, i.e., more open movement of labour and migrants, that would create more symmetric interdependencies and universalise the common global good for all and share the means towards this,

We need consensual universals on human rights and corresponding duties to create an incisive global community. The Gandhian metaphor of concentric circles, ever-widening and ever-reinforcing each other is an apt image of this.

GLOBALISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

1.
THE GLOBAL ECOLOGICAL CRISIS A THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE ON SOME PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Published as 'Ethical Implications of a Global Climate Change: Third World Perspective', *Mainstream*, 1994, Vol.32, No.27, 21 May 94, pp.21-26.

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INTRODUCTION: ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
1. THE BURDEN OF RISK AND THE PRICE OF CHANGE
2. EQUITY-LED ECOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
3. INTER-GENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
4. ENVIRONMENTAL AND FINANCIAL DEBT
5. ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND ECOLOGICAL DUTIES
CONCLUSION: PRESENT PERCEPTIONS, FUTURE PROMISE

Abstract

This paper will particularly deal with practical the ethical implications of the environmental issues involved in the potential fallout from anthropogenic global eco-change: the burden of risk and the price of change; equity-led ecological development; inter-generational responsibility; environmental and financial debt; and environmental rights and ecological duties. When we have a global crisis, only a global response can meet it, and for this, we need to act as a global community.

Introduction: Ethical Implications of Global Environmental Change

In the final analysis, whether Rio will turn out to be 'an environmental Munich' or 'a Normandy beachhead,'[1] may still be debated. But for the third world, there is 'no doubt the Rio Summit had not produced tangible commitments and the results had been overall disappointing.'[2] Nor has the follow-up to the summit done much to redeem this. And yet our present global eco-crisis cannot be dismissed.[3]

To address such an anthropogenic crisis of global dimensions there is an imperative need for a more than utilitarian response. The very uncertainties involved raise some 'unique questions about our responsibilities to future generations,'[4] for already now we know 'that the effects will certainly be long-lived, almost certainly large, probably bad, and possibly disastrous.'[5]

In an earlier paper, I underlined the need for an eco-ethic for an in-depth response to the present crisis, and then sketched some of the basic features of a worldview that would underpin the need for such an ethic, as also the foundational values and community norms on which it must be built, and the rituals and myths that might sustain it.[6] In this paper will more particularly deal with practical the ethical implications of the environmental issues involved in the potential fallout from anthropogenic global eco-change: the burden of risk and the price of change; equity-led ecological development; inter-generational responsibility; environmental and financial debt; and environmental rights and ecological duties.

1.. Prodito Ghosh and Akshay Jaitly, editors, *The Road From Rio: Environment and Development Policy Issues in Asia,* Tata Energy Research Institute, N. Delhi, 1993, p.ix

2.. Martin Khor, 'A year after Rio, the CSD inches forward...' *Third World Resurgence, No 36,* p.12 (12-13)

3.. Ref. Thomas Berry, *The Dream of the Earth,* Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1990.

4.. John Broome, *Counting the Cost of Global Warming,* The White Horse Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1992, p.1

5.. ibid., p .12

6 . Heredia, Rudolf C., 'Global Ecological Change: A Third World Perspective on Some Theoretical Considerations'.

The issues presented in this paper are meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. Here we are attempting a more comprehensive approach consequent on the issues raised. For we realise that when we have a global crisis, only a global response can meet it, and for this, we need to act as a global community. Ecological thinking forces us to this conclusion.

Moreover, the vantage point of this paper is that of the South. But we are quite aware that there is the South in the North as well as vice versa. The homeless shivering in the cold that one sees in New York, and the mansions gleaming in the sun in Delhi, are surely telling images of this anomaly. The discussion here could be further refined, to take cognisance of such ambiguities. However, within the limits of this presentation and at the risk of over-generalisation, we are confining ourselves here to the broader aspects of the issues involved, so that they do not get lost in fine-tuned nuances, which sometimes blunts rather than sharpens our perspectives.

1. The Burden of Risk and the Price of Change

Who should bear the burden of risk, and who should pay the price for change? If we wait for all the data to come in we are certainly not reducing the risk involved in environmental change, rather we are increasing it. If we do act now it will be so much more difficult to reduce risk later. Although we do not understand the impact of all our interventions on the environment, we do know that if we want effectively to reduce the risk, then we must limit ourselves already now.

The very complexities and uncertainties make a cost-benefit analysis of the risks involved inadequate and unfeasible. Costing much risks then becomes a matter of political priorities and not economic calculation.[7] The political resolution to risk and change, is dependent on the bargaining power of the parties involved, and usually ends up with the weakest bearing the burden of risk, and the poorest paying the price of change.

On the other hand, an ethical resolution of the question would be value-based and rather different. An ethical management of risk would require that, first risk be minimised, then redistributed equitably, if indeed we are to face risk as a community and not as

7.. Ref. Broome, op. cit., pp 19-21

isolated individuals. For a community can hardly be considered ethical if it protects the powerful to the neglect of the powerless. In reality, the most effective guarantor of equity in a community, is not how the strongest fare, but rather how the weakest are able to cope.

Furthermore, risk reduction and its equitable distribution, in the context of the global eco-systems, will obviously demand change: both in our consumption patterns, as also in our production technology. With regard to the first, for the poor this will mean an increase in consumption to meet their basic needs. Allowing these basic needs to remain at the subsistence level is not only ethically unjustifiable, it is also ecologically unsound. We shall return to this point later.

For the rich changes in their consumption pattern will mean a reduction or at least a restriction of affluent wants. This can actually lead to, or at least it has the potential for, an enhancement of their quality of life, even at the cost of a reduction in their standard of living! For as Charles Birch of the World Council of Churches has urged: 'The rich must live more simply so that the poor can simply live.'[8] Indeed, this is a crucial issue in the whole sustainability debate, but it would take us beyond the scope of this paper, though it does need to be developed elsewhere to deepen this discussion.

With regard to the second, changes in production technologies for the poor, who are surviving at subsistence levels, this must mean an increase in productivity. One can hardly in good conscience urge the South to turn back its development programmes, when this represents their only chance to escape from the grinding poverty, sometimes absolute poverty, to which they are subject. But if this is to be done in an environmentally friendly manner, without externalising the costs, as happened with the first industrial revolution that was the basis of the present development and affluence of the first world, then there must be a change towards more eco-friendly technologies. Unfortunately, at present, the South does not seem to have the resources to buy such technologies from the West, or the R and D to develop and implement them on their own.

For the rich, changes in production technology are concerned more with decreasing waste, while at the same time expanding employment and other benefits. New technologies in these directions are being developed, but the transfer of technologies to the poorer

8.. Cited by Ian G. Barbour, *Technology Environment and Human Values,* Praeger, New York, 1980. p. 289

South from the richer North, still remains a much disputed and problematic area.

Globally sustainable development will very much depend on how such questions are resolved. And once again a power-based political approach will only postpone and accentuate an already urgent and multi-dimensional crisis. To our mind what is required really is structural adjustment on a global scale, not only of the economic structures of our societies, which might affect the South more, but more particularly in our lifestyles as well, and this concerns the North most urgently.

In other words, we need to change the manner and the kind of goods and services that are provided, with regard both to the way they are produced, and also the way they are consumed. We must realise that 'ecological productivity differs from productivity in the economic sense.'[9] For 'the economic utilization of resources through extraction may, under certain conditions, undermine and destroy vital ecological processes leading to heavy but hidden diseconomies. The nature of these diseconomies can be understood only through the understanding of ecological processes operating in nature.'[10] We need to develop a 'Socratic economy', and produce goods by playing midwife to nature in the way Socrates did in philosophising with the young men of Athens![11]

In concluding this first issue, then, we realise that we cannot cope with global eco-change except as a global community bound together by a common destiny. We must act together now, lest our delay will require even more urgent and drastic action later, if indeed it is not too late by then. Is it not curious, though, that some would want scientific certainty to be established before intervening in our eco-system, while the same is never demanded of economic policy interventions, even though these are based on statistical probabilities? But then too often such interventions are dictated by the market, rather than ethically derived from commitments to fellowship and solidarity.

9.. Roy A. Rappaport' *Ecology Meaning and Religion,* North Atlantic Books, Berkeley Ca. 1979, p. 20

10.. Vandana Shiva, *Ecology and the Politics of Survival: Conflicts over Natural Resources in India,* Sage, Delhi, 1991, p.44

11.. Cf. Klaus Michael Meyer-Abich, *Revolution for Nature: From the Environment to the Connatural World,* translator, Matthew Armstrong, The White Horse Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1990. p. 95

2. Equity-Led Ecological Development

The emphasis on growth in earlier developmental strategies neglected the aspects of equity and very soon became problematic with regard to both political and economic considerations. But later policies of 'growth with equity' proved to be inadequate as well, to the realities on the ground. It is now rightly argued that in the developing world, equity is integral to sustainability. Indeed, if it is not a sufficient condition, it certainly is a necessary one, the sine qua non for sustainable development. In other words, development can only be truly sustainable, when equity is made its leading edge,[12] and it can then even go beyond to be regenerative as well.

Granted that certain kinds of development can be unecological, we still have to face the stark reality that in the struggle for survival within a resource-poor environment, poverty is one of the greatest polluters. For indeed, if the poor have no sense of projection in the future, then one can hardly expect that they will sustain and renew their environment in the present. When involuntary poverty becomes their prison, then, the poor have no tomorrow, they have only a today to survive, a struggle in which they often do not succeed! All too often they are caught in a downward spiral of marginalised people trapped into marginalised areas.

Once again, given our present capacities, technological and otherwise, we would be able already now to eradicate at least the absolute levels of poverty still prevailing, globally in our world, if only we could muster the necessary political will for this task. In these circumstances, poverty is also the greatest pollution! It is ethically unacceptable that our concerns for humans be displaced by an inequitable distribution of the goods of this world, which surely are meant to be shared by all the children of the earth. Indeed, inequality only sharpens the sense of relative deprivation that the poor feel, when they find themselves in want in the midst of plenty.

Thus, if sustainability was imposed on the South at the cost of its development then it would be nothing but a ploy to freeze the South in poverty in order to sustain the North in affluence! This kind of 'politics of sustainable development' is more a power game than an

12.. David C. Korten, *Getting to the Twenty-first Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda, Oxford Univ. Press*, N.Delhi 1992 and Kumarian Press, Conn., 1990, Ch. 8, 'Equity Led Sustainable Development', pp. 73 -90

ethical response.[13] Sound ecological development must as a minimum meet the economic challenges of basic needs, sustainability and equity and other technological challenges of increasing the efficiency resource use, and the productivity of nature and man-made processes.[14]

It is also ethically unacceptable that our concern for nature, be allowed to negate our human rights, political or economic. Indeed, a true concern for nature cannot set humans and nature in opposition. Humans must be perceived as a part of nature, the conscious, articulate part that protects and enhances all of nature. We have attempted in the earlier section of this paper to sketch such an inclusive environmental ethic, where the rights of humans and the concern for nature are not in opposition. In fact, only when they are in harmony, can both be protected and promoted.

For ecological thinking, necessarily leads to an awareness of interdependent communities, as Gandhi envisaged,[15]in ever-increasing and inclusive oceanic circles, to include the human, the biotic and the cosmic as well, and yes even the transcendent! Of course, there is a danger of becoming anthropocentric. And yet it is ironic that generally the 'anthropoi' who are at the centre, that seems to be preoccupied with such anthropocentrism, rather than the human beings on the periphery!

Ecological crises do not respect national boundaries or borders. Even if were possible to achieve unsustainable development in one nation at the cost of unsustainability in another, as happens all too often in exchange relations between the first and third world, this could do precious little for a global crisis, which will eventually engulf us all.[16] Unfortunately, national sovereignty is often used to thwart remedial action, infringe on environmental rights, and negate ecological concerns, as we witnessed at the Earth Summit at Rio. One might observe in passing, that national sovereignty was also used earlier in similar ways by some countries at Vienna in June 1993 on the issue of human rights.

13.. Ref. K.R. Nayar, 'Politics of Sustainable Development' *Economic and Political Weekly,* Vol. 29, No. 22, 28 May 1994, pp. 1327-29.

14.. Ref. Vandana Shiva, op. cit., p.52

15.. Ref. Acharaya Ramamurthy, 'Gandhian Perspective on the Reconstruction of Indian Polity', in ed., Ramashray Roy, *Contempory Crisis and Gandhi,* Discovery Pub., Delhi, 1986, pp. 146-164

16.. Ref. David Pierce, Anil Markandhya and Edward B. Barbier, Blue print for a green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989

Using national sovereignty to obfuscate ecological concerns or human rights, is not of course the prerogative of any single nation, whether of the first or the third world. But when the more powerful ones, who are least in danger of having their sovereignty threatened, indulge in such obscurantism it is all the more galling. Thus, when a national president of a superpower can say at an Earth Summit, that nothing will make him compromise his nation's way of life, when that lifestyle threatens the global environment, then such a statement may be good domestic politics, but it is from an international perspective grossly unethical, and from a third world one, even obscene! Certainly, such positions cannot be the starting point for any coping with global climatic change.

For equity demands a reduction of the gap between the rich and the poor both intra- and inter-nationally, whether such differences be measured in terms of GNP, QLI, PPP, etc.. Now if the reduction of this gap is to be done within the carrying capacity of the earth, then further problems arise. If the poor in the South, aspire to reach the same consumption levels in the North, then this cannot be contained within the earth's potential carrying capacity as we know it, or at least can responsibly project, in spite of any technological advances in or institutional changes we may realistically hope for.

It seems once again improbable, if not impossible to narrow this gap by reducing the consumption of the rich, though this would surely be fairer than restraining the development of the poor. Is it realistic to expect a person to be elected to political office in the North on the promise of reducing consumption? And yet the ecological imperative, and the demands of equity must be respected.

Some kind of redistribution, then seems to be inescapable. A more equitable distribution of consumption and production between North and South, in a manner that will allow both to grow sustainably, seems to be necessary. But just as such growth must meet the ecological necessity of containing itself within the carrying capacity of the earth, it must also meet the ethical imperative of equity between North and South. Some kind of planetary bargain, between the rich and poor nations for a more stable and sustainable world, as suggested by Harlem Cleveland would seem to be called for,[17] rather than waiting for poverty and environmental degradation in the South to pose a threat to the North before appropriate action is taken.

17.. Cited by Barbour, op. cit., p.289

Moreover, such transactions would be a matter of trade not aid. This would make for less unequal exchange between industrialised and non-industrialised countries. Indeed, until such unequal and unfair exchange between rich and poor peoples, nations, and regions, both intra- and inter-nationally, is remedied, there seems little possibility of sustainable, let alone regenerative development on the global scale we so urgently need already now.

In concluding this issue then, what the global eco-crisis seems to force on us is the need for structural adjustment both intra- and inter-nationally. For this we need to create a sense of community not just within national boundaries but also across ecological ones and over geographic space as well, to guarantee all an equitable and sustainable access to the global commons, so that as a global community we can all together develop and grow sustainably, and even reverse the environmental degradation we have caused, with regenerative development for all.

3. Inter-generational Responsibility

Our responsibility to future generations is now widely accepted, by most ecological thinking. This is what sustainable development is all about. Whether we consider this a matter of justice and the rights of future generations, or a teleological question about their wellbeing.[18] We have begun to feel acutely our responsibility to future generations, even to the seventh generation, as the Iroquois convention recommends. In the final analysis, such a responsibility must be based on a sense of bonding across generations.

Now, if we feel this bonding with the future should we not feel the same with past generations as well? If we are responsible for the future, are we not also responsible for the past? Not guilty for what our past ancestors may have done, but responsible to address the consequences of their actions that still affect us, especially when we have been advantaged by their misdeeds, can we accept the benefits left to us and not make remuneration for the harm this has done to others?

An ecological principle now gaining ground is that 'the polluter pays'. If the polluter pays for the pollution caused in the present, who pays for the pollution caused in the past, and still affecting us now?

18.. Cf. Broome, op. cit., p.132

While we may not be guilty of causing the pollution itself, can we accept the advantages obtained from such past actions without making remuneration for them? Would not this be like keeping stolen property though we have not actually been guilty of the theft? And, if as we know, some people's ancestors because of their unecological development, have in the past borrowed from our common future, can their descendants now refuse to make a return in the present to those who are being affected adversely by this?

The past is not past, as the World Resources Institute suggests.[19] It still lives in the present, for no present can escape its historical context. Indeed, there can be no inter-generational responsibility without such a context. We cannot just put paid to the burden of the past and escape into the future. The irony of course is that those nations, communities and peoples, whose prodigality in the past has degraded the environment for all of us, are now urging restraint on those who have been frugal, out of necessity perhaps, but who now aspire to the same dream of higher levels of consumption and standards of living!

In fact, the North is using 'the economic levers of aid, trade and debt,' 'to enforce environmental discipline in the South,' which has little political clout 'against the powerful agents of environmental misbehaviour' in the North.[20] Such a situation could easily 'degenerate into a new sort of imperialism, a new sort of colonialism' as the Indian finance minister has cautioned.[21]

Thus, a certain alarm has been expressed at the rapid industrialisation of some developing countries in Asia. What if every Chinese has a refrigerator, what would have happened to the ozone layer, especially if they continued to use the old technology? But when there were two cars in the American garage, often both gas-guzzlers too, adding carbon to the greenhouse effect, nobody seemed to raise the alarm then! Obviously, concern for the unecological development in Asia, can only be authenticated by an equal concern for the unecological effects of the development in other countries, not excluding their prodigal past.

19.. Cf. Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain, *Towards a Green World: Should Global Environmental Management be built on Legal Conventions or Human Rights? Centre for Science and Environment,* N. Delhi, 1992, p.28

20.. ibid. p.v

21.. Manmohan Singh, 'Valedictory Address' in Ghosh and Jaitly, ed.s, *The Road From Rio,* op. cit. p.16

We cannot build a community without coming to terms with a people's past. Unless we redeem our past we can neither regenerate the present nor save the future. But if we do redeem the past, then we can go beyond sustainable, to regenerative development, an idea whose time has now come. But again, expounding this in more detail here would exceed the constraints of this paper, though it is a theme that should be pursued elsewhere.

In concluding this issue then, as emphasised earlier we need to think and act as a global community to meet a global crisis. If, as we have stressed earlier, this global community must be extended across geographical and ecological space, then here we would now add that our sense of global community must also extend across time, to past and future generations. Only when we have such a global community that stretches across such a space-time continuum, will we be able to face our global ecological crisis effectively.

4. Environmental and Financial Debt

Financial borrowing mortgages the future of the next generation of a group by making them debtors to the creditors of this one. National financial debts are not written off if a government fails or a generation passes. The debtor pays, or their children, for such financial debts are inherited. The burden is forced onto the next generation by international financial agencies. This they often justify by the need to support the international global economic order, which they claim would otherwise collapse without such accountability. International financial bodies may reschedule payments, and make structural adjustments, but there is no reprieve from such debt. There is no free lunch!

Financial borrowing, then, is living beyond one's financial means, but there is an ecological parallel. There is an ecological borrowing, which involves living beyond one's ecological resources. That is, borrowing from the environment, externalising costs, polluting the global commons, and running up a debt to nature that future generations will have to pay for. It really amounts to 'a Faustian bargain between humanity and nature that leaves no possibility of appealing for debt relief, or rescheduling, nor default.'[22]

Now if a financial debt is taken as seriously as we do, especially by international agencies, 'the debtor must pay', why not environmental

22.. Korten, op. cit., p. 21

debts too? 'The polluter must pay'! If indeed there is no such thing as an economically free lunch for anyone, why is it that there seems to be an ecologically free dinner for some? Why not structural adjustments for past polluters to help them undo the damage done by the pollution they have caused, and thus repay the environmental debt that they owe to the global community, especially the poor who suffer most from such environmental degradation? But then the poor of this world have little bargaining power on the not-level playing field of international markets, where the financially powerful make the rules for a game they play to win.

An obvious way of paying this debt would be the transfer of technology and resources to the less developed countries from the more developed ones responsible for past pollution. This could be a feasible way of reversing the disastrous transfer of assets from the less developed to the industrialised countries, as is happening at present and perpetuating the debt crisis. This could also help the less developed countries to leap-frog over the polluting first stage in the industrialisation process, which the present industrialised countries went through, to environmentally cleaner, and ecologically more friendly technologies. Such a transfer then is not a matter of aid, with all its political implications, but rather a matter of right, of ethical demands, and ecological urgency. 'To this extent, the resource transfers could be interpreted as 'polluters dues'.[23]

Some international agencies could cost the environmental debt of the industrialised countries, and suggest how this can be written off against the financial debt of the less developed countries. When it comes to financial debt, there has been no lack of finding and setting up such international agencies, and giving them the necessary teeth to be effective. If we do want to take the ecological crisis with the seriousness that its global dimensions demand, then we need to set up such international bodies for the environmental debt as well.

Doing this, fifty years after Bretton Woods would seem to be an appropriate way of celebrating a still rather one-sided jubilee! But any new institutional arrangement must be more democratic and transparent than the present ones, with more equitable and balanced voting rights, as in the UN General Assembly, and not controlled by big power vetoes as in the Security Council.[24]

23.. Neha Khanna and Anand Prakash, 'The Economic Issues', in Ghosh and Justly, ed.s, op. cit., p.95

24.. Ref. Akshay Jaitly, 'An Overview of Post-Rio Political Economy Issues', in ed.s, Ghosh and Jaitly, op cit., p. 35

In concluding this issue, then, on environmental and financial debt, it is important to realise that as we globalise the economy, we must also globalise our response to the environmental crisis. For if there is to be a single global financial community with greater interdependence, this must in turn call for a single global ecological community with correspondingly greater reciprocity as well.

5. Environmental Rights and Ecological Duties

What is then required by way of response to the issues we have outlined in this presentation, is the need for a new global social contract, not just to enforce legal conventions between nations, but also to create a global community for the global environmental crisis, and further guarantee environmental rights for individual persons and local communities. In other words, we need action not only at the national level but also some effective support for action at the local community level as well. For the only sound way of building an effective global community is with a bottom-up process, albeit this may need some top-down facilitation.[25]

Indeed, Gandhi's decentralised logic of a 'consociational' democracy of interdependent but self-reliant local, communities makes more sound ecological sense than the centralized pyramidal model so prevalent in modern nation-states.[26] It is here that the principle of subsidiarity expressed in a participative society becomes crucial. This is to our mind the most, perhaps the only effective way of affirming a correspondence between guaranteeing environmental rights and ensuring ecological duties. The nation will then have to develop some of its authority to local communities while some of its sovereignty will be yielded to the global one.[27] For the nation-state is too large for effective local community management and too small for a global one.

Now environmental rights must include not just the right to a clean and healthy and productive environment, which is the concern of the rich, but more importantly the right of survival and subsistence with dignity for all persons and communities, which is the

25.. Cf. Norman T. Uphoff, ed., *Rural Development and Local Organization in Asia,* vol. I Introduction and South Asia, Macmillan, Delhi, 1982, p.14 and f.

26.. Ref. J.D. Sethi, 'Centralization, Decentralization and Parallel Politics', in R. Roy, ed.,op. cit., pp. 205-231

27.. Ref. Agarwal and Narain, *Towards a Green World,* op. cit, p. 143

preoccupation of the poor.[28] Further ecological duties must also include community obligations at the local, national and global levels. For this, we need to establish through a global contract our citizenship at three levels: the global, the national, and also at the local community.

Legal conventions between nations not founded on human rights and civic duties at more local levels, only legalise injustice, and institutionalise ecological vandalism, which already is creating environmental refugees, and soon perhaps may spawn ecological terrorists out of desperation. So also does administrative control which is, not really sensitive to the needs of the underrivileged and the powerless in a country, eventually only regularises privilege and power rather than addressing human rights and needs. Indeed, the question of legal liability and/or administrative regulation with regard to environmental issues remains very problematic, especially at the global level.[29]

In conclusion then, with regard to environmental rights, which in our understanding does not exclude ecological duties, we need to establish and protect these rights at the three levels of community mentioned above: the local, the national, and the global one, by establishing a corresponding citizenship at each of these three levels. There will obviously be corresponding duties as well. Only a response to all three can be effective in a global ecological crisis.

Conclusion: Present Perceptions, Future Promise

To sum up then, what the ecological crisis is forcing us to face, is this quest for community, a community that is equitable, sustainable and participative, even as it stretches across space and time, and increasingly interdependent at the local, national and global levels. This becomes so much more crucial in our anomic and alienating society, so unequally divided between the affluent and the impoverished.

28.. Ref. Ramachandra Guha,'Ideological Trends in Indian Environmentalism,' *Economics and Political Weekly,* Vol. 22, No. 49, 3 Dec 88, pp. 2578-2581

29.. Ref. Prodipto Ghosh and Akshay Jaitly 'Legal Liability versus Administrative Regulation: The Problem of Institutional Design in Global Environmental Policy', in *The Road From Rio,* op. cit. pp. 193-213

Yet the answer to poverty is not property, but rather the alternative to both is community.[30] In fact, it is community that is the answer to both the alienation of poverty and the anomie of affluence. Given our ecological interdependence in ever-widening never ascending oceanic circles, this must be done for our global community, building it up from below, and extending it through a space-time continuum, that includes the geographic and ecological dimension of space, as also the past, present and future generations in time. And further, this extensive community must also have its intensive dimensions, embracing the human, the biotic, the cosmic, and even opening to the transcendent.

Jakob von Uexküll who first introduced the concept of environment pointed out how the sense organs of a creature define its perceptions of the surroundings. Thus, the same surroundings differently perceived constitute different environments for different species, though in fact they all may occupy the same eco-system. Thus 'in the world of earthworms there exist only things which relate to earthworms.'[31] In other words, 'von Uexküll's environments show themselves to be worlds of perception in a wider sense.'[32] A degeneration of our perceptions, then, cannot but lead to a degradation of our relationship to our connatural world and its consequent destruction.[33]

As we see it, this is precisely the root of our present global environmental crisis, and hence our insistence on a sensitive eco-ethic, to regulate and organize ourselves, or we might just be reduced to the life of earthworms, or perhaps even petrified into earth fossils! The difference between a perceptive, sensitive long-term response and a pragmatic, utilitarian short-term one could be decisive for our future.

Alfred S. Romer, a zoologist who studied self-regulating and self-organizing processes showed how these are subsumed in more inclusive systems of which they are a part.[34] Some anthropologists have extended this into an evolutionary principle called 'Romer's Rule', according to which 'the initial effort of an evolutionary change

30.. Moltmann, *Creating a Just Future*, op. cit., p. 9

31.. Jacob von Uexkull, *Bedentungslehre,* 1940, cited by Meyer-Abich, op cit., p.5

32.. Meyer-Abich, op. cit. p.7

33.. ibid., p.8

34.. Alfred S. Romer, *Man and the Vertebrates*, Penguin, London, 1954

is conservative in that it makes it possible for a previously existing way of life to persist in the face of changed conditions.'[35]

But small evolutionary changes in one system can eventually end up in a breakthrough in the larger inclusive one. This is how adaptation leads to the discovery or the creation of new eco-niches that newly evolved species can occupy. However, it is also possible that short-term adaptation leads to long-term maladaptation which can only presage an eventual breakdown in the degradation and destruction of the larger supporting eco-systems. Our present response to the global eco-crisis seems to add up more to such a breakdown rather than a breakthrough!

The very flexibility of our modern industrial society makes its short-term adaptations seem adequate for the time being but blinds it to the long-term implications for its life-supporting eco-system in which it is subsumed. And sooner rather than later this must catch up with us, so that one day industrial civilization could be considered to have been a failed experiment! Indeed, our response to our global eco-crisis may well be its litmus test already now.

How we respond to this present crisis will inevitably define our future in irrevocable ways. Indeed, the present is but a parable of promise and anticipation for the future.[36]

The word 'ecology' is derived from the Greek 'oikos' meaning home or dwelling. In fact, it is all about being 'at home' in our world, but we seem to be 'homeless' neither at peace with ourselves nor in harmony with our environment. For as Barbara Ward has perceptively pointed out, as a community of nations we are not as yet a civilized world, even though we all have Only one Earth,[37] to share and care for, as we were reminded again at Rio. This must be a common home for all the earth's children,[38] and all her children, animate and inanimate; a home in which we all share the promise of *Our Common Future*,[39] together.

Unfortunately, as yet we have not many common ecological myths or rituals that could re-enact and recreate such a community of peace

35.. Rappaport, op cit., pp. 229-30

36.. Moltmann, *God in Creation,* op.cit. p. 60

37.. Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos, *Only One Earth; The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet,* Norton, New York, 1983

38.. Barbara Ward, *The Home of Man,* Norrton, New York, 1976

39.. World Commission On Environment and Development, *Our Common Future,* Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford

and harmony of hope and promise. But we do have a compelling image of our planet Earth in our space age today, one that could re-enchant our world once again: a beautiful and fragile blue sphere, floating free and precariously in the dark of empty space: this is our 'Gaia' whom we have violated and now waits to be healed, that we have degraded and now wants to be renewed, our planet that we are destroying but can still hopefully save! For as yet we have a chance to make this a place where children can play, where laughter can be heard, and where we can all dance to the music of the universe, and watch the earth rise to, not the sunset on, our promise, our future!

2.
GLOBALISATION AND RELIGION: CONTRADICTIONS AND COMPLEMENTARITIES

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Abstract

This study attempts to outline an area of concern and is a beginning rather than a conclusive statement. The inspiration for this venture has come from Gandhi, who by acting locally has challenged us to think globally, even when we think differently from him. This is not merely an intellectual 'search', but a spiritual 'quest' as well. The attempt here is to orient and focus our response to the increasing ethnification in our plural society.

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I. Globalisation and Its Ambiguities

Globalisation is an idea whose time has come, at least to judge by the way the word is bandied about. But as yet there is no cogent theory for this multidimensional process, which would comprehend intelligibly the contradictions and challenges that it presents to us. In fact there is some ambiguity in spite of 'a burgeoning academic debate as to whether globalisation, as an analytical construct, delivers any added value in the search of a coherent understanding of the historical forces, which at the dawn of a new millennium, are shaping the socio-political realities of everyday social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual'. (Held *et al* 1999:2)

1. Clarifying the Concepts

If in general, the process refers to the 'widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life' (*ibid*.. 1999:2) we may well be on our way to a 'world society as a multiplicity without unity,' (Beck 2000:4) rather than an integrated global system. Contemporary changes driven by new technologies and movements have left us with a more interconnected yet highly uncertain world.

There are several approaches to defining globalisation but even before we start to describe it, we need to clarify some of the ambiguous terminology involved. Thus, in trying then to answer the question: What is Globalisation? Ulrich Beck distinguishes 'globalisation' as a process from 'globalism' as an ideology, and 'globality' as the social reality we are actually living with. (*ibid*.. 1997:9) Similar distinctions have been made with modernity and secularity, and indeed globalisation is not unconnected with these two social phenomena.

Generally, globalism is an ideology that privileges the world market of neoliberal capitalism. But globalisation as a multi-dimensional process also generates counter-understandings as with various resistance monuments. Thus, the globalisation process does give rise to several kinds of ideologies, some more dominant than others, but all referring to the reality on the ground. The purpose of such distinctions is not just for the sake of conceptual clarity but more so 'to break up the territorial orthodoxy of the political and the social posed in absolute institutional categories.' (*ibid*.. 1997:9)

Now in attempting to place the globalisation process in a historical context, some would rather loosely trace its origins back 5,00 years, when 'through conquest, trade, and migration, the globe began to shrink.' (Mittleman 2000:18). However, world system theorists would place the origins with the development of capitalism in 16 century Western Europe, while for others the fundamental changes in the world order in the 1970s mark the origins of contemporary globalisation. Fine-tuning this further, a fourfold periodisation of the 'Historical Forms of Globalisation' (Held *et al.* 1999:414 -) has been worked out: the pre-modern up to 1500, the

early modern about 1500-1850, modern circa 1850-1945, and the contemporary period since.

Obviously, very different understandings are implied across such vast swathes of time. Hence a further elaboration of four types of globalisation can be made depending on the number of domains or facets of social life that are interconnected in a global network. This yields a fourfold typology: (*ibid.*. 1999:21-22)

1. thick: 'in which the extensive reach of global networks is matched by their high intensity, high velocity and high propensity',

2. thin', here 'the high extensity of global networks is not matched by a similar intensity, velocity or impact',

3. diffused: 'global networks which combine high extensity with high intensity and high velocity but in which impact propensity is low',

4. expansive: 'characterized by the high extensity of global interconnectedness combined low intensity, low velocity but high propensity.'

Thus, from the ancient, through the medieval and the modern to the contemporary, globalisation can be graded in a three-dimensional space from thin to thick, and diffused to expansive, from instantaneous to delayed.

In sum, precisely because there are complex and controversial issues involved, more than just being a matter of conceptual clarity, we need to situate our discourse more precisely before a meaningful discussion is possible. Here we will focus more particularly on contemporary globalisation as a multi-dimensional process that is 'thick', 'expansive' and fast-moving, though in some less connected areas it may still be 'thin' 'diffused' and deferred. However, without doubt, it is a process driven by differing and even contradictory

ideological 'globalisms' and consequently changing the social reality of our 'globality' in new and challenging ways.

2. Describing the Syndrome

Perhaps because of the ideological dominance of neoliberal capitalism today, the economic dimension is seen to be the cutting edge of globalisation. But this is to truncate the process and miss some of its most critical contradictions and crucial challenges. For as Giddens insists:

> 'globalisation is not only, or even primarily, an economic phenomenon; and it should not be equated with the emergence of a 'world system'. Globalization is really about the transformation of space and time. I define it as action at distance, and relate its intensifying over recent years to the emergence of means of instantaneous global communication and mass transportation.' (Giddens 1994:4)

The present increase in extent and impact of global inter-connectedness, its new intensity and instantaneity inevitably brings about a compression of space and time. This gives rise to 'manufactured uncertainties' or risk as 'a result of human intervention into social life and into nature,' (*ibid*.. 1994:4) which in turn has unintended and unpredictable consequences.

More in continuity with, than in contradiction to Giddens, Appadurai's approach takes media and migration 'as its two major, and connected, diacritics and explores their joint effect on the work of the imagination as a constitutive feature of modern subjectivity.' (Appadurai 1997:3) This relationship between electronic media and migrating masses makes the core link between globalisation and modernity.

Some have called this 'the second modernity' (Beck 2000:12), to distinguish it from 'the first modernity' associated with the Enlightenment, and theorised in the post-war period by Parsons, Shils, Lerner, Inkeles and others, giving rise to the mega-rhetoric of development as economic growth, high-tech, agribusiness, militarism. Rather this second modernity 'now seems more practical and less pedagogic, more experiential and less disciplinary than in the fifties and sixties', (Appadurai 1997:10)

In a similar vein, Giddens argues that 'the Enlightenment prescription of more knowledge, more control,' (Giddens 1994:4) is

no longer viable. For modernist rationality corresponds to an earlier 'simple modernisation'. It is rather misplaced with the 'reflexive modernisation' such as is precipitated by the impact of contemporary globalisation. For this is not a simple continuation but a qualitatively different and inherently ambiguous process.

By 'reflexivity' Giddens refers 'to the use of information about the condition of activity as a means of regularly reordering and redefining what that activity is.' (*ibid.*. 1994:86) At the individual level this creates a 'reflective citizenry'. Moreover, 'the growth of social reflexivity is a major factor introducing a dislocation between knowledge and control — a prime source of manufactured uncertainty.' (*ibid.*. 1994:7) Such situations precipitated by human action, have largely new and unpredictable consequences that cannot be dealt with by old remedies.

Now while the liberative potential of such reflexivity for autonomy and self-reliance is apparent, it does not automatically result in an emancipatory politics; 'equally important, however, is the fact that the growth of social reflexivity produces forms of 'double discrimination' affecting the underprivileged. To the effects of material deprivation are added a disqualification from reflexive incorporation in the wider social order,' (*ibid.*. 1994:90) through various exclusionary mechanisms that must be more directly addressed.

Hence given the ambiguities and contradictions involved, it is apparent that 'globalisation is not a single unified phenomenon, but a single syndrome of processes and activities,' and while some may consider this to be a 'pathology', 'globalisation has become normalised as a dominant set of ideals and a policy framework', albeit still 'contested as a false universal.' (Mittleman 2000:4) In fact

> 'globalization is a multilevel set of processes with built-in strictures on its power and potential for it produces resistance against itself. In other words, globalization creates discontents not merely as latent and undeclared resistance, but sometimes crystallized as open counter movements.' (*ibid.*. 2000:7)

For the promises of globalisation — of greater abundance and less poverty, of information access and release from old hierarchies ~ comes with its price -- of reduced political control and market penetration, of cultural erosion and social polarisation. Hence economic dynamism and marginalisation, upward and downward political mobility, cultural implosion and explosion, etc, is all part of

this zigzag process that races ahead at times, and even reverses itself at others.

3. Reviewing the Responses

There is now a whole spectrum of interpretations and responses to these phenomena from the 'sceptics', who exaggerate the consequences for better or worse, to the 'hyperglobalisers', who doubt both, the intensity of change and the usefulness of the concept itself.

For the sceptics, on the one hand, the reality on the ground at most is a significant 'regionalisation' into major trading blocks, as evidenced by international flows of capital and trading. Thus, Hirst and Thompson, focusing on the world economy as the cutting edge of these changes, are 'convinced that globalisation as conceived by the more extreme globalizers, is largely a myth,' (Hirst and Thompson 1996:2) that mystifies rather than explains many of the trends that 'have been reversed or interrupted as the international economy has evolved' (*ibid.*. 1994:15)

Rather what we have is 'an open world market based on trading nations and regulated to a greater or lesser degree both by the public polices of nations states and supra-national agencies.' (*ibid.*. 1994:16) This 'inter-national economy' with its financial centres must necessarily have some degree of integration, especially with regard to linkages between the OECD countries, but such 'integration' is far from being genuinely 'global' in its inclusion of the less developed ones. (*ibid.*. 1994:196)

The hyperglobalisers, on the other hand, exalt this new epoch in human history and their 'view of globalisation generally privileges an economic logic and, in its neoliberal variant, celebrates the emergence of a single global market and the principle of global competition as the harbinger of global progress.' (Held et all 999:3)

In the new borderless economy, national governments have little regulatory power and their peoples are left to cope with the global market. New categories of winners and losers evolve, as new technologies create new elites and old skills become obsolete. This further reinforces, the global division of labour. Here 'global civil society' has still to catch up with the 'global market' and as yet the structures for this are quite inadequate for any kind of effective 'global solidarity'.

Somewhere between the two ends of the spectrum, between hyperglobalisers and sceptics are the 'transformationists' for whom 'globalisation is a central driving force behind the rapid social political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and world orders.' (*ibid*.. 1999:7)

No society escapes its 'shake-out' as it recasts traditional patterns, creates new hierarchies, and most crucially 're-engineers the power, functions and authority of national

governments.' (*ibid*..:8) This results in 'an 'unbundling' of the relationship between sovereignty, territoriality, and state power.' (*ibid*.: 8) But rather than acquiesce in the 'end of the state', it needs to be 'reconstituted and restructured in response to the growing complicity of process of governance in a more interconnected world.' (*ibid*..:9). This now will pose new challenges that demand new responses.

It should be apparent from this discussion that these responses are mostly ideologically premised. For, where the hyperglobalisers celebrate the cornucopia of the global market, and the sceptics dismiss this as a myth, the transformationists perceive a more open-ended and contingent process with all the concomitant contradictions and challenges. Given that this discussion on globalisation overlaps with and carries forward the discourse of the old modernity as a second or reflexive modernity we need now to focus on the key dimensions and levels of this complex process.

4. Listing the Dimensions

At the core of any adequate comprehension of the globalisation process is the phenomenal increase in the scope and speed of cross-border flows that results in an unprecedented connectedness and dependence that makes our world a single space. But this is far from making it a simpler place. For these very flows and interactions take place across diverse dimensions and varying levels with greater or lesser complexity and speed. However, it would be a mistake to conceive of these 'flows' as linear vectors whose impact can be anticipated and contained. Rather they are vehicles of change that bring unintended consequences and unavoidable challenges.

Appadurai distinguishes 'five dimensions of global cultural flows that can be termed (a) ethnoscapes, (b) mediascapes, (c)

technoscapes, (d) financescape, (e) ideoscapes.' (Appadurai 1997:33) These 'scapes' are perspectives constructed out of the shifting flow of people information, technology, finance, ideas. They are building blocks of 'imagined worlds, that is, the multiple worlds that are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups around the world.' (Appadurai 1997:33) He calls them 'scapes' to indicate they are constructed perspectives of a ground reality that affect our response to it, very much in the manner a landscape artist affects the way we relate to our natural surroundings.

It is precisely in these 'cultural flows', in spite of their obvious capacity for homogenisation that we can find the potential for micronarratives that can fuel oppositional and counter-cultural movements, and subvert the meta-narratives of the dominant order. Thus homogenisation and heterogenisation can be seen in the same relationship as globalisation and localisation. The first precipitates the second, which in turn uses the first for its own counter-hegemonic purposes, in a kind of 'cannibalising' of one by the other! (*ibid*.. 1997:43).

5. Resisting from Below

It is precisely in the contestation and even the contradictions between the 'macro' and the 'micro', the 'homo' and the 'hetero', the similar and the different, the global and the local, that

we come to see the obverse side of globalisation as the intrinsic, yet dysfunctional counterpart of the idealised version too often uncritically projected by a neoliberal globalism.

In this connection, Giddens identifies four 'global bads' or dysfunctions that must be responded to: (Giddens 1994:100)

1. 'capitalism' that produces economic polarisation. This needs to evolve to a 'post-scarcity economy.

2. 'industrialism' that degrades the environment. Here we need to incorporate in a 'humanisation of nature' within a post-traditional order, rather than to try and defend nature in the traditional way.

3. 'surveillance' on the control of information that denies democratic rights. A 'dialogic democracy' is not merely a representative, one must counter such political control, in other words, to 'democratise democracy'.

4. 'means of violence' or the control of military power that threatens large-scale war. Structures for negotiated power must be put in place so that differences are not mediated by violence

What these responses amount to is really a bottom-up proaction to a top-down imposition. Indeed, here lies the real challenge to humanising the processes of globalisation, driven as they are by an impersonal market and bureaucratic power.

For

'as experienced from below, the dominant form of globalization means a historical transformation: in the economy, of livelihoods and modes of existence; in politics, a loss in the degree of control exercised locally —for some, however little to begin with — such that the locus of power gradually shifts in varying proportions above and below the territorial state; and in culture, a devaluation of a collectivity's achievements or perceptions of them. This structure, in turn, may engender either accommodation or resistance.' (Mittleman 2000:6)

Thus, multiple levels of interaction are involved from the global to the local. For 'a globalization framework *interrelates multiple levels of analysis* — economics, politics, society, and culture. This frame thus elucidates *a coalescence of diverse transnational and domestic structures*, allowing the economy, polity, society, and culture of one locale to penetrate another,' (*ibid*.. 2000:7) and vice versa.

6. Defining the Dilemmas

Here we can conclude this discussion with a tentative description rather than a definition of globalisation as

'a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions — assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity,

velocity and impact — generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power. ' (Held *et al*. 1999:16)

Localisation, nationalisation, regionalisation, would then be the consolidation or specification of these 'social relations and transactions' at particular levels and locales and which are therefore not unrelated to each other, but often in actuality precipitate reactions in a cascading effect from one to the other.

Our effort then must be not to obfuscate the linkages by overworking the concepts, but to specify the interactions between these levels and in different spheres: economic, political, cultural, environmental, religious, ethical. So far the chief beneficiaries of the globalisation process as fostered and advocated by a neoliberal ideology of globalism has left us with a global reality that has advantaged transnational capital and privileged a cosmopolitan elite, even as it has disposed of indigenous labour and oppressed local populations.

This has resulted in deep tensions and contradictions that cannot any more be gainsaid: the disempowerment of the nation-state and the inadequacy of civil society at the global level, the lack of accountability structures in the global marketplace and the marginalisation of the weaker players there, the diffusion of new identities and concerns that erode the old solidarities and traditions, the precipitation of a global environmental crisis without any corresponding global response, the relativising of ethical and human values with the affirmation of cultural and groups rights,... these are but some of the issues and questions we must now turn to.

We are far more sensitive today to the inherent limits of modernisation as a process not indefinitely sustainable any more. Weber saw the underlying rationalisation of such processes in the modern world as eventually ending with the 'iron cage' a syndrome that with later modernisation theorists lead to a 'largely accepted the view of the modern world as a space of shrinking religiosity (and greater scientism), less play (and increasingly regimented leisure), and inhibited spontaneity at every level.' (Appadurai 1997: 6) The second, reflexive modernity with globalisation would seem to contest this. But there are new and equally inherent contradictions in this process as well and we are still to examine its internal limits and sustainability.

II. Religion and Its Dilemmas

Here we will take up the impact of these processes of globalisation on religion. This has precipitated some critical dilemmas, which have received less attention than they would warrant. We will now attempt to address some of the more crucial of these. In attempting to clarify the ambiguities of globalisation we hope to be better able to deal with the dilemmas of religion.

1. Secular City and Global Village

Nietzsche presaged the modern world when he somewhat prematurely proclaimed the 'Death of God' 19th century. It was a message received by a few intellectual atheists but largely ignored by the common people. However, in the 1960s the death of God was once again proclaimed and celebrated in The Secular City (Cox 1966) by popularist academics, not just in the intellectual centres of the world like Harvard university, it was also celebrated in the concrete

jungle of our urban conglomerates, as also in the ever-extending marketplaces of the world. Religion, it was thought, was no longer worthy even of controversy. It was quietly relegated to the private practice of those too weak to cope with the newfound freedom and mobility of secular society in this modernised world. Here, in Bonhoeffer's phrase, 'man come of age' was celebrated in the secular city. The few who did not would have to grow up or drop out!

But very soon the re-emergence, or rather the resurgence of religion seemed to confound the pundits. It was not God who was dead, it was just that we had been a long time sick, and not quite noticing it either. And the religious response when at last it came, turned out to be strong medicine. The responses were of course as diverse as were the understandings of secularisation and its place in the broader process of modernisation.

Globalisation too has come to be considered as part of this process of modernisation, and sometimes an irresistible and irreversible one. We might have expected then that the process of secularisation would be even further advanced by globalisation. But just as the religious response to the secular city has been a re-affirmation of the 'sacred' in people's lives, so too many of the New Religious Movements (Barker 1991) religious movements spawned in the 'global village' have in fact been globalised with the very processes that were supposed to marginalise them! Thus, the responses of these movements have not only been as vigorous and diverse as the earlier ones, their reach and grasp has been vastly extended and intensified precisely because of their new global context.

Hence if we want to understand the relationship between religion and globalisation, we must see it in the context of the secularisation process as well. Obviously, the way we perceive this relationship will depend on the way we understand these processes of modernisation,

secularisation and globalisation, and how we contextualise the religious responses to them.

2. Secularisation and Disenchantment

The roots of secularisation in the modern world go back to the Enlightenment, and the triumph of reason. One can indeed see the beginnings of such a rationalisation of human life in earlier societies as well. In the West one can think of the Stoics, in India, we can think of Buddhism. Secularisation really is the rationalisation of religion that is a continuing process in society but peaks at different levels at different times. However, with, the European Enlightenment The Sacred Canopy, (Berger 1967) which once gave legitimacy to so much in human lives, is torn asunder and we are left with a 'disenchanted world'.

The process comprises three elements. It begins with the de-mythologisation of religion, and this results in the de-institutionalisation of its social expressions and consequently their privatisation.

The liberative potential of reason should never be underestimated. However, if we do not recognise the constraints and the premises within which it operates, the assumptions from which it derives, and the prejudgments that orient and bias it, we very easily overestimate its effectiveness in addressing and resolving human problems. Reason can then become an aggressive and alienating instrument. Such rationalism is but another kind of naivete. The extreme rationalist becomes the rationalist simpleton, unaware of the sensitivity of Pascal who knew that 'the heart has reasons of which reason knows not of.

Max Weber, the sociologist, saw how such a process would eventually lead to 'the iron cage', an alienation that leaves us alone and homeless in a disenchanted world. The religious response was precisely to address such an alienation and provide a haven in this heartless world. Though sometimes, such withdrawals into private group space have been cures worse than the disease!

For religion itself has not been exempt from this process of rationalisation in human society. Thus, a religious experience cannot be preserved in society unless it is institutionalised in a tradition. This represents a rationalisation that both preserves as well as mediates access to the original experience. But all too often this tradition and the institutions of organised religion, can be an obstacle rather than a

facilitation in accessing the original experience and intuition. Thus, the need of an on-going reform, an 'aggiornamento' to keep any religious tradition alive and relevant.

Moreover, institutional organisation, whether formal or otherwise, does indeed represent power in a society. And often the temptation to mobilise such power for purposes, religious or otherwise, has proven irresistible. And yet with the politicisation of religion, the alienation from the original religious experience is complete, and the door open to a religious militancy that has little to do with religion.

For politics as the exercise of pragmatic power in our ordinary everyday social lives is the very contrary of religion which intends, some would say pretends, to be an encounter with the ultimate concerns of our lives, the ultimate mystery of our existence.

Basically, then one can think of various religious responses to a secular society. These often overlap and fade into each other. Thus reform intends an adaptation to changes in society that are regarded as irreversible. Revival implies a re-affirmation of religion often against or in spite of the changes in secular society, and such revival can be one of withdrawal or of militancy.

3. Globalization and Its Ambiguities

Within the broad agreement about globalisation being a new and more advanced stage of this process of modernisation, there is the expectation that it would lead to a further secularisation of social life as well. But globalisation itself has been conceptualised from different perspectives, and each of these would have a bearing on our understanding of the relationship between religion and globalisation. (Beyer 1994)

The most commonly accepted understanding of globalisation as an extension of the capitalist economy dominated by the multinationals of the first world has led to a commodification of practically everything, as the capitalist economy penetrates into deeper and deeper areas of our lives, and integrates them into a world system. But whereas such a perspective rightly underlines the economic dependencies and exploitations that we experience,

the very 'economic monism' that is implicit in this perspective leaves little space or scope for understanding the new religious

movements within such a framework. Too easily are such movements dismissed as false consciousness.

Extending such an economic perspective to include a political dimension opens the way to a further consideration of how globalisation affects culture, how it relativises particular identities and homogenises local cultures. And it is here that we begin to have a handle on understanding the new religious movements. For the homogeneity that globalisation has surely promoted has led to a sense of loss of cultural identities, whereas religion functioning very much in the realm of such particular identities, becomes a critical factor in re-affirming such lost or threatened identities.

However, too often the relationship of these new religious movements to globalisation is ambiguous. For while they often oppose globalisation as an alien imposition and a threat to their religious and cultural life, they often at the same time attempt to influence and even co-opt the very dynamics of the globalisation process to serve their particular purpose.

Thus, while globalisation seems to structurally promote secularisation and the privatisation of religion, it also in this very act provides a fertile ground for the public influence of religion; not only because globalised privatisation implies pluralism in which a hundred flowers can bloom, but it also precipitates an alienation that longs for a collective social statement of solidarity. Now group solidarity is most easily promoted by focusing attention on the external other as a threat. But with the proximity and inclusiveness that globalisation brings, it becomes less feasible to extern the alien other, for now their evil empire, like the kingdom of God, is among us. Thus, globalisation does not lead so much to the death of God, though it certainly does obfuscate the devil! Hence the need to particularise and concretise evil, to personalise and give a face to the great Satan, who has changed our lives in ways we do not quite understand or accept. And this becomes one of the great motivating factors in some of the new religious movements.

Moreover, the very contradictions of the global system leads to inherent tensions that precipitate further discontent and alienation which these new religious movements gear up to redress. Thus, the effects of market competition and technological advantage in a globalising world are seen to promote greater inequalities within and between societies, greater insecurities especially for the weaker and less adaptable sectors; whereas the values that are apparently promoted and overtly advertised, are those of liberty, equality,

fraternity. Thus it is such residual problems in the global system, precipitated by the processes of globalisation, that new social movements, and in particular the religious ones, tend to focus on and be activated by.

4. Religious Movements and their Anomalies

This discussion would be more convincing if it was contextualised in the religious movements that we are more familiar with. Once again one can think of various religious responses to a globalised society. But each is fraught with its own dilemmas.

We might begin by noticing that when a religious movement intervenes to address specific systemic problems in a society, it must necessarily follow the logic of the problematic system itself. Thus economic problems are not solved by religious faith, nor are political conflicts resolved by theological hope, neither is the medical health of a society improved by liturgical rituals. Thus, the very involvement of a religious movement in global society begins to change it, precisely because the compartmentalization and isolation of diverse areas of social life no longer obtains. With globalisation, then, the danger for a religious movement is to fall between two stools: it might end up advocating bad social policy, or suffer from poor religious inspiration.

Thus, the liberal interventionist option in a pluriform world, can only be effective by focusing on a more inclusive community that is now being increasingly globalised. This inevitably tends to dilute its appeal by making it too broad a base. The reactionary intervention seeks not to adapt to, but to bend global processes to its particular purposes. But then it must use, and so be open to being changed by the very dynamics of the processes it opposes.

On the other hand, the conservative option while motivating specific social and cultural groups, finds that it cannot sustain such exclusivism in a globalising world, without risking a further marginalisation by the very processes from which withdrawal can offer no effective protection.

Now besides the interventionist option, which could be more liberal or reactionary, there is the separatist one, which tends to be more conservative and traditionalist. This option attempts to avoid the polluting secular ethic of society, but cannot for long. It may succeed temporarily by limiting itself to a particular social or

geographic space. But with globalisation once again such spaces are penetrated by global process. Moreover, even to defend the limited space such movements may set out for themselves, they have to interact with outside forces, and once again it is inevitable that the protagonists mutually influence and take on each other's characteristics. And generally, it is the more widely dominant global influences that will prevail over the more narrowly religious ones.

For example, in using modern technology, tele-evangelism eventually must submit to the logic of modern communication processes and is soon packaged and commodified for the tele-market. Hence even while such movements stress individual integrity and personalist holism, the new tele-market only encourages a different kind of consumerism, albeit a religious one. And inevitably one consumerism easily leads on to another, indeed it prepares the ground for the next.

Now with interventionist movements, there is always the possibility and danger of co-option and loss of religious inspiration, if the movement is too broad-based; or the possibility of isolation and failure, if the movement too narrowly appeals to a particular socio-cultural group. Similarly, with separatist movements, there is the probability and risk of the individual's alienation being compounded by the group's isolation, but these cannot indefinitely resist the penetration and corruption of global forces.

In our understanding then it should not be a surprise that militancy in religious movements gets mellowed and moderated with secularism and globalisation. In our own country, one can already see how militant religious revivals have inevitably compromised and moderated the extremists as they seek political power and social influence because they must submit to the exigencies of other systems that are quite alien and contradictory to their original inspirations.

Thus, the Hindutva of Hindu nationalism has precipitated a 'Crisis of Indian Nationalism' (Madan 1997) with its essentially an upper caste, petty bourgeois appeal. The movement has been compelled to broad base itself by accepting reservations for lower castes, which had been long resisted, and the consequent mandalisation of Indian society, which is still so much feared. And if its official ideology has not yet changed, then certainly its pragmatic political practice has. Even targeting Muslims which was the original dynamo of the remarkable mobilization of the Sangha Parivar, has been something they have retreated from in an effort to now win Muslim support. This

is but an opportunistic concession to electoral realities. Christians now provide a softer and less risky target!

Muslim fundamentalists too after the tragedy of the Babri Masjid demolition, find themselves marginalised by the very religious logic that they have used to mobilise the community with its cries of 'Islam in danger'. Now in the aftermath, the community feels betrayed by their extremist leadership that took risks, which put only their own people not themselves in danger.

In the Christian Church, the reformist success of *A Theology of Liberation* (Gutierrez 1988) in mobilizing the masses politically has brought it under suspicion of church leaders who fear losing control over the people thus mobilised and motivated in the movement. The response has been a conscious withdrawal of support and a delegitimisation of the movement under the injunction of not mixing religion and politics. But the fact that the injunction has been used more vigorously against the liberationists rather than the liberals or the conservatives, speaks volumes for where such an injunction is coming from and what its implicit objectives are. In the meanwhile, Christian fundamentalists of various hues, while claiming to be 'other-worldly', seek to impose their beliefs and practises much to the resentment and resistance of a 'this-worldly' audience.

5. Global Religion and Local Relevance

Now precisely because religion focuses on cultural particularities, it becomes an invaluable resource for mobilizing people across the divisions of class, caste, language, culture, region, etc., and thus to bridge the gap between individual alienation and group solidarity. This gives religion a critical potential to address the residual problems in a society.

It would seem to many that the moderate liberal option though less visible may in fact have a greater long-term influence on global culture. Not only is it more compatible with globalisation processes which broaden the sense of inclusion and interdependency, this culture itself is more susceptible to a reformist rather than a radical or a revivalist appeal.

But to think of the final outcome as one global civil religion, would precisely dilute the appeal and inspiration of particular religious beliefs and practices, which are best at their best when affirming local

cultures and particular peoples. The very homogenisation of a globalizing world would seem to precipitate a pluralism of religious responses. This is precisely the paradox that keeps the religious enterprise alive, and hopefully the radical, liberating and empowering possibilities in a religious tradition still relevant.

For our alienation in a world that has lost its enchantment can hardly be effectively addressed at the global level. For globalisation is part of the problem of such disenchantment not part of the solution, Rushdie's 'metropolitan experience' which brings the 'mutability of character' is not addressed by more cosmopolitanism! Nor can we be forcibly reintegrated like Camus' 'Outsider'. What we need is a 're-enchantment' of our world by a more creative and constructive localism. For this, we must think locally precisely to act globally more effectively. For globalisation and localisation as the new religious movements have demonstrated are not contradictory but complementary, whether in our secular cities or our 'global village'!

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3.
GLOBALISATION AND MINORITIES IN SOUTH ASIA: POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS

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Abstract

This essay focuses on the political, cultural and religious implications of globalisation for minorities, while being careful to avoid a reductionist approach to this complex, multidimensional process.

I. Introduction: Conceptual Clarifications

1. The Globalisation Process

As yet there is no cogent theory for globalisation as a multidimensional process, which would comprehend intelligibly the contradictions and challenges that it presents to us. If in general, the process refers to the 'widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life' (Held *et al.* 1999:2) we may well be on our way to a 'world society as a multiplicity without unity,' (Beck 2000:4) rather than an integrated global system. Contemporary changes driven by new technologies and movements have left us with a more interconnected yet highly uncertain world. This essay focuses on the political, cultural

and religious implications of globalisation for minorities while being careful to avoid a reductionist approach to this complex, multidimensional process.

Describing the Syndrome

We need a more fine-tuned understanding of globalisation if we are to understand its dynamics and respond to it constructively, enhancing the positive and minimising the negative consequences that are bound to this process as function and dysfunction. For such a situation is fraught with anxious uncertainties and ambiguous effects, more so for weaker groups and especially for minorities of various types, whether based on language, religion, caste or gender.

The present increase in extent and impact of global inter-connectedness, its new intensity and instantaneity inevitably brings about 'a compression of space and time' (Giddens 1994:4); this gives rise to 'manufactured uncertainties', or risks as 'a result of human intervention into social life and into nature,' (*ibid*..) which in turn have unintended and unpredictable consequences that old remedies cannot deal with.

More in continuity with, than in contradiction to this, Appadurai's approach takes media and migration 'as its two major, and connected, diacritics and explores their joint effect on the *work of the imagination* as a constitutive feature of modern subjectivity.' (Appadurai 1997:3) This relationship between electronic media and migrating masses makes the core link between globalisation and modernity.

Some have called this 'the second modernity' (Beck 2000:12), to distinguish it from 'the first modernity' associated with the Enlightenment, and theorised in the post-war period by Parsons, Shils, Lerner, Inkeles and others, giving rise to the mega rhetoric of development as economic growth, high-tech, agribusiness, militarism. Rather this second modernity 'now seems more practical and less pedagogic, more experiential and less disciplinary than in the fifties and sixties'. (Appadurai 1997:10)

For Giddens, the modernist rationality of the Enlightenment corresponds to an earlier 'simple modernisation'. This is now yielding to a 'reflexive modernisation' such as is precipitated by the impact of contemporary globalisation. This creates a 'reflective citizenry'. It is not a simple continuation but a qualitatively different and inherently

ambiguous process, and 'a prime source of manufactured uncertainty.' (Giddens 1994:7). Such situations are precipitated by human action and have largely new and unpredictable consequences that cannot be dealt with by old remedies. 'In other words, globalization creates discontents not merely as latent and undeclared resistance, but sometimes crystallized as open counter-movements.' (Mittleman 2000:7)

A Range of Responses

The wide range of interpretations and responses to these phenomena is inevitably ideologically premised. (Held *et al.*1999: 3-9). Thus the 'hyperglobalisers' exaggerate the consequences for better or worse; the 'sceptics' dismiss these as a myth, and the transformationists perceive a more open-ended and contingent process with all the concomitant contradictions and challenges.

In spite of the obvious capacity of 'global cultural flows' (Appadurai 1997:33) for homogenisation, there is the potential for micronarratives that can fuel oppositional and counter-cultural movements, and subvert the meta-narratives of the dominant order. Thus homogenisation and heterogenisation can be seen in the same relationship as globalisation and localisation. The first precipitates the second, which in turn uses the first for its own counter-hegemonic purposes, in a kind of 'cannibalising' of one by the other! (Appadurai 1997:43).

Now it is precisely in the contestation and even the contradictions between the 'macro' and the 'micro', the 'homo' and the 'hetero', the similar and the different, the global and the local, that we come to see the obverse side of globalisation as the intrinsic, yet dysfunctional counterpart of the idealised version too often uncritically projected by a neoliberal globalism.

More perceptively, Giddens suggests a bottom-up pro-action to a top-down imposition. (Giddens 1994:100) This was precisely the import of Karl Marx when in his *Communist* Manifesto he presciently anticipated such a globalising from below: 'The Proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, Unite!' (Marx and Engels 1952:96)

2. The Social Construction of Minorities

Here we understand 'minorities' not just as a matter of demographic numbers, but rather as groups of people differentiated by themselves and others with negative connotations. For although the Indian Constitution recognises only linguistic and religious minorities, and the courts have defined a 50 per cent limit for a group to be considered a minority in a state, the term 'minority group' as it is used today in the social sciences, does not refer to relative numbers. To quote the *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*:

> Contemporary sociologists generally define a minority as ... a group of people differentiated from others in the same society by race, nationality, religion or language who both think of themselves as a differentiated group and are thought of by others as a differentiated group with negative connotations. Further, they are relatively lacking in power and hence are subjected to certain exclusions, discriminations and other differential treatment. (Rose 1968:365)

The essential features, then, are not just some objective characteristics, but a subjective construct consisting of a set of attitudes: self-definition from within and prejudice from without; and a set of behaviours: self-segregation from within and discrimination and exclusion from without.

Imagined Communities

Minorities then are constructed like majorities both from within and from without. In this sense, both are 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983) though they could be national, sub-national or even smaller 'ethniclones'. Thus, a minority might be mobilised around a perceived group disadvantage, but it can also be a majority prejudice that stereotypes them into a single group identity. Similarly, a majority might co-opt other groups and subsume them under their own hegemony under a supposedly single identity and an apparently common interest. Or a minority might define itself against such a dominant majority and consolidate the majoritarian identity and interest further.

What happens in such circumstances is that extremism on both sides, feeds on each other, as when trade union rivalry escalates industrial conflict. Majority and minority groups can thus often get locked into a process of violent confrontation that spirals out of control. Most ethnic and religious conflicts in South Asia and elsewhere are rather obvious illustrations of this process.

Thus, Pakistan, a state founded on the two-nation theory of Hindus and Muslims in South Asia has already split into two more nations, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The ethnic and religious strife in what is left of Pakistan forcefully illustrates how this can career out of control, even within the same national collective, with Shia and Sunnis killing each other, and Sindhis and Pathans rioting in Karachi, while militant jihadis vie for control of the community. In India, caste and other ethnic groups are constantly being constructed and reconstructed depending on the prevailing political equations. Who would have thought that the 'sword arm of Hinduism', as the Sikhs were once called would generate a Khalistani movement that inspired terrorist attacks against Hindus in the Punjab and elsewhere? Or that 'Operation Blue Star', the Indian Army's attack on the Golden Temple would be the Union Government's eventual response? At present religious extremists are attempting to reconstruct Hindu and Muslim identities as antagonistic to, and in confrontation with each other. How far such 'imagined communities' and 'invented traditions' will prevail or whether they will be contained in a larger or more inclusive political identity of a common citizenship is yet to be seen.

Difference and Diversity

Thus, difference is constructed into an alienating prejudice that disadvantages the group, rather than being accepted as an enriching diversity that advantages the society as a whole. In such situations, we need to be more sensitive to the fundamental rights of human individuals and more protective of the collective rights of minority groups. Here we have the same dilemmas between the politics of universalism and the politics of particularism (Taylor 1992) reflecting the global and the local dilemma, to which we shall come back later.

However, to neglect such tensions and to leave the underlying contradictions unresolved, will precipitate a crisis that can eventually

stumble into violent resolution, or perhaps even a dissolution of our society. Minorities, then, must be an especial concern as the globalisation process penetrates their individual and group lives.

In this country, there are innumerable examples that should alert us to the precipice that we are rapidly approaching even as we stare into a chasm of chaos before us. The founding vision of this country of unity in diversity, of fundamental rights and democratic freedoms, of civil liberties and minorities rights, of secular commitment and affirmative action, of linguistic diversity and religious pluralism, … are now not just being challenged but are under serious threat. How we respond to this situation will surely define our future.

Thus, the recourse of governments to increasingly repressive measures is backed by a working consensus among the major political players in the sub-continent, even though this has been resisted by human rights activists. Thus the Terrorist Activities and Destructive Act (TADA) of the 1980s passed by a Congress government was repeatedly extended. When it finally lapsed it was replaced by the present National Democratic Alliance (NDA) by The Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (POTA), which is just more of the same, namely abridging basic human rights in order to contain terrorist violence by state violence, in the name of national security. Not surprisingly most of the arrests under these acts have been against political opponents rather than external enemies. Now the central government has set up a 'review committee' because it finds that regional parties in power are using it to settle political vendettas. Whether or not this is likely to contain the prevalent extensive abuse of this law is a very moot point. It would seem rather the 'healing touch' approach now being tried by the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) in Kashmir is a more welcome initiative, and must be given an honest chance to succeed.

II. Dimensions of Globalisation

Most often and very easily the economic dimension in the globalisation process is privileged over the others. No doubt often it represents the cutting edge of this complex process particularly when it is globalisation from above as pursued by neo-liberal globalism that emphasises the expansion of the market and free trade. Cutting across various social divides, of caste, class, gender, and ethnicity, … this creates the kind of economic inequalities that disenfranchise the

weaker and vulnerable sections the most, even as the more dominant ones are enormously advantaged by it.

Consequently, systemic problems become endemic. Unfortunately, globalisation from below based on a class-consciousness and a corresponding class-struggle often gives way to a globalisation around ethnicity and religion. Thus, identity politics replaces the politics of interest. The consequences of this for minority groups of various kinds are what we explore in this paper. Hence the economic dimension is not elaborated at great length here since its consequences are only too obvious and apparent. Here the focus will be on those dimensions, which we regard as especially relevant to the effects of globalisation on minorities, namely the political, cultural and religious ones.

1. The Political Dimension

The Diminished State

Globalisation diminishes as it transforms the nation-state even as it precipitates and activates new nationalisms of various kinds, making this task of political control and coordination so much more problematic. For with globalisation national boundaries have become endemically porous, and national sovereignty has been drastically eroded. In this second modernity the state 'appears on the international stage as a fragmented coalition of bureaucratic agencies, each pursuing its own agenda with minimal direction or control.' (McGraw 1992:89)

This is reflected in a whole new discourse. For 'if one problem now appears to be the dominant concern of the human sciences, it is that of nationalism and the nation-state.' (Appadurai 1997:188) The three crucial monopolies of the modern state are all undermined, if not broken in a post-modern globalising world: monopolies over violence, taxation and allegiance. For there are now legitimations of violence, centres of economic control and identity formations that are more effectively transnational than distinctly national.

Thus, the WTO and other multilateral organizations like the World Bank and the IMF, not to mention giant multinational corporations, can easily make ineffective a national government's monitory and

fiscal policies; independent political stands too are rendered irrelevant. Regional economic and political groupings attempt to counter this, though in South Asia SAARC has still to take off effectively. Now the focus of identity formation becomes extra national as these are mobilised at the global level, like pan-Islamism through the Muslim Umma, or the Vishwa Hindu Parishad through non-resident Indians (NRIs). One can think of pan-Arabism as a regional identity that has failed, while Europeanism as something that might come to be. The 'Akhanda Bharat' of the Hindu nationalist parties is now being used to contest and homogenise local minority identities.

Not unexpectedly the impact of globalisation on the nation-states of developing societies, still struggling to find their political equilibrium, is devastating. (Randall and Theobald 1998: 253 -) And yet it is one of the precious few instruments its citizens have to intervene on the global stage. And even with regard to internal governance 'without an effective state sustainable development, both economic and social is impossible.' (World Bank, 1997: iii)

Paradoxically then, 'globalization certainly poses new problems for the states, but it also strengthens the world cultural principle that nation-states are the primary actors charged with identifying and managing those problems on behalf of their societies.' (Meyer, *et al.*, 1997:157)

Reconstituting Civil Society

But to contest the irreversible march of neoliberal globalism we need 'a reconstituted radical politics,' (Giddens 1994:12) that goes beyond merely structural changes in the polity, and cuts deeper to demand radical ones in civil society as well. Yet whatever the character of civil society occupying the social space between kinship systems and political ones, it cannot but influence and be influenced by both sides.

However, no civil society can function without the prerequisite 'social capital' which must be created not just out of human resources at the individual level but also with social structures that make for a functioning polity. There is an obvious parallel and even an overlap between the two: civil society is the necessary social infrastructure on which the political edifice must be built; social capital stresses the non-monetary aspect of human behaviour, the social assets that are

crucial for the functioning of civil society. Vice versa political intervention in civil society may be needed to eliminate all its 'institutionalised inequality' and other forms of structural injustices, lest these compound rather than resolve issues of economic poverty and political marginalisation. For example, some of the contradictions in South Asia: are political democracy and familial patriarchy; social capital, especially in terms of trust, locked in kinship systems and not extended to the larger community, the *Gemeinschaft*, and even less so to society, the *Gesselleschaft*.

Emerging Alternatives

The democratic nation-state is caught in a dilemma by globalisation: it needs to be a strong state to be an effective player on the global stage, and yet its participation in the globalisation process weakens it by making for porous political borders, enfeebled market control and, permeable cultural identities. For, as 'states' lose their monopoly of power over their people, this becomes a contested terrain for all kinds of ethnic groups, comprador classes and traditional elites. And yet 'in most cases of counternationalism, secession, supranationalism or ethnic revival on a large scale, the common thread is self-determination rather than territorial sovereignty.' (Appadurai 1997:21)

In South Asia, this is very apparent with linguistic nationalism, the first divisive ethnic identity in the Indian subcontinent, and yet it has been contained with a certain amount of subsidiarity, that is, leaving linguistic states to run their own politics and to take responsibilities for themselves within the overarching umbrella of the central government. In India, the central government is conceived of as a 'Union of States', and here the delicate balance between subsidiarity and solidarity needs to be maintained.

Globalisation from above does not render this any the easier because it sets up a larger more transnational hegemony while undermining local resources of resistance. But for this, a globalisation from below must be premised on such a counter-hegemonic consciousness.

Civic Cosmopolitanism

Globalisation precipitates an 'incipient cultural cosmopolitanism that would challenge the idea of the nation as the primary political and cultural community and demand relocation of power in institutions other than the national state.' (Held *et al.*1999:374). However, it is still proving difficult to create an infra-national multi-culturalism, which must be prior to, and the bases of an even more illusive transnational cosmopolitanism.

It is precisely such 'cosmopolitan republicanism', founded on basic rights and cooperative procedures, which can defuse 'the clash of civilizations'. (Huntington 1993) For a viable democracy in the new millennium necessitates a 'transnational civil society' (Held *et al* 1999: 452) in which citizens would be able to 'mediate between and render accountable the social, economic and political processes and flows that cut across and transform their traditional community boundaries.' (Held *et al.* 1999:450)

The Indian freedom movement with Tagore, Gandhi and Nehru did represent such a 'cosmopolitan republicanism', which now seems a lost ideal, especially after the Partition. And yet it is still relevant, perhaps more than ever now. What we need in India is a 'manthan', a churning of differences, from which new alternates will congeal and a new synthesis crystalise, an India of Gandhi's dreams, of Nehru's visions, of Tagore's romance , a light to the world, of not just unity in diversity, but rather where diversity is celebrated in unison. We seem to be at the crossroads now of possible success or inevitable failure.

2. The Cultural Dimension

Interrogating Identities

Culture defines and structures our world, giving meaning, motivation and identity. Interrogating such identities, especially in situations of change such as is precipitated by globalisation, becomes all the more critical and any response to this interrogation in a multicultural society is so much the more complicated.

Now if 'imagined communities' can invent traditions, aided by print media among other things (Anderson 1983) then it should not

surprise us that today's 'mass-mediated solidarities have the additional complexity that, in them, diverse local experiences of taste, pleasure and politics crisscross with one another, thus creating the possibility of convergence in translocal social action that would otherwise be hard to imagine.' (Appadurai 1997:8) In contemporary globalisation this makes for a new 'power of imaging possible lives' (Beck 2000:52) fed by 'the global circulation of images and models, which (actively and passively) keeps the cultural economy going.' (Beck 2000:54)

In South Asia, mass-media entertainment translates across ethnic, linguistic even religious boundaries creating a new and more integrating popular culture! Unfortunately, this is rather a consumerist and a traditionalist one even as it pretends to be modern and progressive. But this does not as yet exclude the potential for mass mobilization inherent in such mass media. Indeed, it is not impossible for popular culture at times to be guided by opinion leaders towards more liberal and democratic goals, rather than be always pressured by commercial interests into consumerist and economistic ones.

Reproducing Culture

But if new global identities are inscribed in macro narratives, these in turn are 'punctuated, interrogated and domesticated by the micronarratives of film, television, music and other expressive forms which allow modernity to be rewritten more as a vernacular globalisation'. (Appadurai 1997:10) In this context then ethnic identity becomes 'the conscious and imaginative construction of difference as its core … differences that constitute the diacritics of identity.' (Appadurai 1997:14)

All these 'diasporic public spheres, diverse among themselves' make for a new identity politics, or 'culturalism' (Appadurai 1997:22). The apprehension that globalisation will precipitate a culturally homogeneous world, a global McDonaldisation, seems misplaced. On the contrary, if anything it provokes localisation in diverse vernacular cultures.

The reconstruction of identities necessarily implies a situation of cultural fluidity of no small proportions today. And third world countries that are being leap-frogged into the process are surely the most acutely affected. In such a situation cultural reproduction or the

transmission of a social heritage across generations becomes enormously problematic.

Alienation and violence are the inevitable consequences and are only too evident in our societies today: in the family, between genders, in ethnic cleansing and religious strife, in genocides and war. Here in fact is the dark underside of cultural globalisation: the disruption wrought by changes that it brings, and from which no society is completely immune. The 'fractal landscape' resulting from such cultural confusion needs new analytical models and a new 'chaos theory of culture'! (Appadurai 1997:46)

Implosion and Explosion

It is no surprise then that cultural globalisation would precipitate social cultural conflict of various kinds. For diversity without some overarching integrative unity cannot but be endemically conflictual, the more so as we have seen, where the situation is already one of economic inequality, and political instability, and when mass migration complicates issues and electronic media obfuscates them further.

This is especially so where there already is a cultural fragmentation, which further confuses and compounds their struggle to cope with the unprecedented changes their burgeoning populations are undergoing. Here diverse groups competing for scarce resources, for their limited place in the sun, are particularly vulnerable to such violent conflict.

However, to conceptualise such group conflict in terms of insiders versus outsiders misses the peculiarities of contemporary globalisation. Appadurai suggests a new understanding that will 'resist the inner-outer dialectic imposed on us by the primordialist way of thinking and think instead in terms of the dialectics of implosion and explosion over time as the key to the peculiar dynamics of modern ethnicity.'(Appadurai 1997:157) There is, in other words, a folding-in and a breaking-out: for instance, a claim to fundamental rights and universal principles legitimised in the global context, and an affirmation of distinctive differences and particular identities politicised in the local one. The resulting dialectic cannot but make for an explosive mix.

Universalising and Particularising

Contemporary globalisation involves a cultural paradox: on the one hand, 'central to the very idea of globalization is that subunits of the global system can constitute themselves only with reference to this encompassing whole … But conversely, the global whole becomes a social reality only as it crystallizes out of the attempts of subunits to deal with their relativising contact.' (Beyer 1994:27) Thus each society produces its own image of a world order and 'the global universal or, more precisely, the global concern about the universal only results from the interaction among these images.' (Beyer 1994:28)

Such a global-local interaction becomes a fertile site for encouraging diverse particularisms as well as diverse images of globality. This is the paradox of 'the particularization of universalism (the rendering of the world as a single place) *and* the universalization of particularism (the globalised expectation that these societies … should have distinct identities).' (Robertson 1989: 9)

3. The Religious Dimension

Secularising the Global Village

If globalisation is a further stage of modernisation, then the secularisation consequent on this must further it as well, and the religious response must be seen in this context too. For paradoxically, the religious movements spawned in the global village have in actuality become globalised with the very global processes that were expected to marginalise them. Indeed, if we accept with Paul Tillich that religion is what 'ultimately concerns man', then we can expect changes in the way we cope with such concerns, not their pre-emptory exclusion, and least of all their premature demise.

If globalisation celebrates the secular city (Cox 1966), the global village still remains a 'disenchanted' place for those whose God will not die, Nietzsche's prophecies notwithstanding. In fact, the resurgence of religion has been as vigorous and diverse as the processes of globalisation and secularisation that provoke this. For in

undermining and reconstituting the cultural values of a tradition, the institutionalised practises of a society, and the civic life of individuals, globalisation adds a pervasive breadth and an incisive depth to the secularisation process. But then inevitably localisation, as the obverse side of this situation precipitates a response that could be positive or negative, or at times a reaction that can be equal and opposite.

Situating Symbiosis

Thus, global homogeneity tends to erode particular cultural traditions, whereas religion functions very much in the realm of such localised particulars and personal solidarities and hence becomes a critical factor in re-affirming threatened identities, and re-constituting lost ones. Yet global structures and technologies can also be used not just to resist alien impositions, but also to actively promote a local collective solidarity and project this onto the global stage. Thus particular identities are universalised, as they explode on the world scene, even as universal expectations are particularised, as these implode into local situations.

Many of the new religious movements are driven by such a dynamic. Thus, particular religious discriminations are projected on to a larger universal stage where remedial action is sought, just as the universal affirmation of religious freedom is injected into a particular concrete context to raise local expectations and seek lasting redress. Fundamentalist movements can operate similarly but for the very opposite goals.

Again, the economic inequalities caused by the free market, the political insecurities consequent on the diminished nation-state, the rank individualism due to the undermining of social solidarity, all this and more belies the global promise of liberty, equality, fraternity. The inherent contradiction between promise and performance, the inevitable tension between inclusion and exclusion in global systems creates residual problems which provide fertile ground for utopian movements, especially religious ones, that promise all this and heaven too!

Globalising Movements

The anomalies in the globalisation process are reflected in the ambiguities of religious movements that respond to it. Thus when a religious movement intervenes to address specific systemic problems in a society, it must necessarily follow the logic of that very system itself. With globalisation, then, the danger for a religious movement is to fall between two stools: it might end up advocating bad social policy, or suffer from poor religious inspiration.

Moreover,

> the otherness of the other is increasingly problematic as a consequence of globalization; fundamentalism, to put it most simply, is inevitably contaminated by the culture it opposes. Just as in any pluralistic culture, the other is always already within us, we are also already in the other, even when she or he puts forth a grand display of antipluralist authenticity. In the modern world system, no fundamentalist can simply reappropriate the sacred and live by its divine lights. The very reappropriation is a modern, global phenomenon, part of the shared experience 'creolization'. To see it as such is to include the other as a full participant in a common discourse, a common society, rather than to relegate him or her to the iron cage of otherness. (Lechner 2000:341)

To imagine the final outcome as one global 'civil religion', would precisely negate the appeal and inspiration of particular religious beliefs and practices, which are at their best when affirming local cultures and particular peoples. The very homogenisation of a globalising world would seem to precipitate a pluralism of religious responses. This is precisely the paradox that keeps the religious enterprise alive, and hopefully the radical, liberating and empowering possibilities in a religious tradition still relevant as well.

III. Minorities and Globalisation

1. The Dynamics of Exclusion

In so far as globalisation erodes particularistic characteristics with more universal affinities and rational beliefs, egalitarian expectations and gender sensitivity, etc., it helps towards democratisation. But in undermining as it must, local identities and traditional securities, and introducing as it does, unfamiliar values and new opportunities, it provokes a backlash fuelled on multiple resentments and fears, the most apparent of which are the inequalities and insecurities both within and between various nation-states and societies, as also among and amidst diverse ethnic communities and groups. This has given rise to 'low-intensity democracy' which legitimates conservative regimes still founded on traditional domestic elites. (Gill and Rocamera 1992: 501-524)

Insecurities and Ambiguities

Minorities are drawn into the globalisation process, as disadvantaged subaltern groups, but they do have the possibility of initiating the globalisation from below as indicated earlier. This could amount to a reconstitution of civil society provided the minority identities are not exclusive but are inclusive and open to multi-layering. Such a reconstitution becomes feasible, if a minority group has the social capital with which to engage in this process. However, with the diminished state in contemporary globalisation, statutory support at the national level is undermined and as yet not quite replaced at the global one, leaving minorities vulnerable and insecure.

In the cultural dimension, the reproduction of minority cultures is often ambiguous. On the one hand, they are swamped by macro narratives of universalising processes at the global level, and yet precisely because of their distinct identity micronarratives facilitated by new technologies cultural reproduction can be the more effective at the local one. But these could as well facilitate reactionary revivalism unless there is a certain freeing of the imagination and even a hybridisation of culture to which minorities must be open to.

Finally, secularisation as a global process disenchants more than just the 'secular city'. It penetrates personal lives and community

identities to create lifestyles and affiliations beyond the sanction of traditional culture and religion, creating its own severe discontents, especially for those who have been in some way disadvantaged by these processes of modernisation and secularisation. This new social space is readily inhabited by a variety of discontents: perceived injustices, social insecurities, wounded memories, … that are easily mobilised by the new religious movements, which can be either projected globally or contextualised locally.

The Impact of Change

It should be obvious from this discussion that globalisation introduces new dimensions of change that directly affect this process of minority/majority construction. For the changes it precipitates are unprecedented both in scale and in scope. It affects more areas of social life and penetrates this more deeply. Further, it accelerates the pace and also escalate the price of change, both in the sense of the greater demands made to cope with and take advantage of such changes, as also the higher risk as failure to keep up with the pace of change results in even greater disadvantage and loss.

For change itself often leaves people anxious and insecure since there are no guidelines from tradition on how to respond and cope. Often this causes resentment and anger that is easily projected on to other groups who might well be in a similar situation of disorientation themselves. Problems of equity and distributive justice become increasingly problematic and inadequate or postponed responses often leave many groups of people alienated and resentful. Inevitably then, the process of globalisation will result in systemic residual problems that must be urgently addressed. And yet no matter how well planned and committed such a response, it is never quite adequate to this daunting challenge.

Conflict and Dialogue

Moreover, with globalisation such identity construction and group mobilisation is no longer limited to national boundaries. Even in a country that is predominantly Muslim, there can be a sense of being marginalised and disadvantaged on the global scene. Thus the Iranian

revolution attempted to project itself as a global movement. The fatwa against Salman Rushdie was an indication of this. Such national societies are often tempted into a pan-Islamism, which often has very little relationship to the real interests and concerns of people at the local level. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan and its encounter with jihadi Islam and the resulting Talibanisation of Pakistani society is only the latest example of this.

Dominant majority groups are also caught up in this process of globalisation. In this context, one can analyse the politics of the Sangh Parivar as attempting to universalise and globalise its appeal with such vehicles as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, even as it localises this in communal violence and riots in this country through such agencies as the Bajrang Dal.

The resulting 'clash of civilisations' (Huntington 1993) on the global scene often polarises conflict along such fault lines between such massively mobilised religious and cultural solidarities. Cultural fault lines South Asia can be aggravated, as for instance with the Talibanisation of Pakistan and its violent and divisive consequences, or the Ram Janmabhoomi movement in India and the consequent communal riots that have been precipitated. But one must note the limits of a geological metaphor, which is really set within the framework of geological time! Cultural faultlines are far less permanent since they are constructed and so can be deconstructed and bridged over or even dismantled and dismissed. This is precisely what cultural change is all about.

And yet if a dialogue between cultures is to be a real possibility, then this would demand that exclusive identities yield to multiple, layered ones, and obscurantist religious teaching be subjected to reasonable and enlightened critique. Certainly, such an expectation is not an unreal or impossible one. In fact, the member states of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) are committed to such a task. (*Mainstream* 2002:11)

2. The Minority-Majority Divide

The Minoritisation Process

Because the majority-minority syndrome is constructed both from without and from within these groups, the minority definition can be

imposed on a group by outsiders. This is precisely why no group is safe from a process of 'minoritisation', 'by which new minorities are created unbeknownst to them … And when that happens almost anybody can become the next minority for the process of minoritisation has no permanent or official favourites.' (Gupta 1999: 76-77) This is well illustrated by the minoritisation of the Sikhs that climaxed in the horrendous pogrom of 1984 in Delhi. Would anyone have anticipated such an atrocity on the Sikhs, who were the defenders of the Hindus at the time of the Partition less than four decades earlier!

In an analogous manner, majoritisation can also be constructed from within, by a dominant elite that co-opts other subaltern groups into their hegemony. Again this is well illustrated by the Hindutvawadis who are dominated by upper castes premised on a Brahminical Hinduism but yet subsumes the popular religiosity of the masses into a patriarchal caste hierarchy.

We can carry this analogy further to show how extremist leaders often precipitate situations that invite reprisals against their own minority group so as to consolidate its internal solidarity and their own sway over the group. Political terrorists and religious fundamentalists often fall back on such cruel strategies. This certainly has happened with the Tamils and the Sinhala in Sri Lanka, and with various kinds of extremist groups in India. The Gujarat riots or rather pogrom, following the tragic burning of the train at Godhra in February 2001, has been described by the state chief minister himself in terms of 'action and reaction'! The anomalies surrounding the events at Godhra and specially the political returns reaped from the state-wide violence, leave serious doubts as to who planned the action and who sustained the reaction! Gujarati Muslims were far more integrated into Gujarati society, than most other Indian Muslim communities were into their respective regional societies in other states of the Union. But now there seems to be an impenetrable divide that helps only the fundamentalists on both sides.

Global-Local Dialectic

Here we will attempt to elaborate on some of the more fine-tuned dynamics of this overall process of globalisation and localisation that impacts both majorities and minorities as indicated earlier, in

continuity with Appadurai's 'implosion-explosion' dynamic (Appadurai 1997:46) and Beyer's global-local dialectic, both explained earlier. (Beyer 1994:26-28)

More generally, what Robertson called the universalisation of the particular and vice versa the particularisation of the universal, (Robertson 1989:9) is easily illustrated when local identities are projected to a more universal level, i.e., specific national Islamic identities projected and universalised into a pan-Islamism, and vice versa, when more universal or even transnational Muslim customs and practices are enforced in a local or national Muslim community. Thus the diversity of the Islamic community in this country from Kashmir to Kerala, was once obscured by the two-nation theory into a supposedly religious national one. And now this national Islamic identity in Pakistan, after being fractured by Bangladesh, is being projected globally into a pan-Islamic movement even as it fragments into sub-nationalisms locally. Similar examples can be given of other societies where a defensive religious fundamentalism holds sway and it might be instructive to investigate the differences that account for this.

In a similar way, the diversity of religious and cultural Hinduism in this country is being semitised into a Brahminical version by the Sangh Parivar and now projected beyond the national scene as a world civilisation and at times even as the mother of other civilisations as well!

Language offers an illuminating illustration in this connection. As in India Urdu, which was really the common language, and a secular one at that, of both Hindus and Muslims in North India from the time of the Moguls into the 20th century, right up unto Partition in 1947, has since been increasingly replaced by Hindi for the Hindus, while Urdu is displacing other regional languages for Muslims in the southern states, at least according to the official census returns. A language that once provided a secular unity now represents a religious divide! And as Urdu gets Persianised and Hindi Sanskritised, this linguistic divide becomes deeper and wider, and less easily bridged.

Vice versa we see how inter- or trans- national concerns are often projected and mobilised at the national and even more at local levels. If this once happened with the Khilafat movement it is surely happening today in an exacerbated manner with the Palestinian problem that has affected the whole Middle East and is now affecting parts of South Asia. Similarly, the Tamil minority problem in Sri

Lanka is extending itself across the Palk Straits. Why this happens in some instances and not others might be a useful investigation.

In South Asia the only official Hindu nation is Nepal and that is torn apart by secular strife between the government and the Marxist. Often such class-struggle has been manipulated by a status quo elite into ethnic and religious conflict. The politics of interest is then displaced by the politics of identity to the disadvantage of the poor of all groups and communities, and the advantage of the elites from the majority community.

Down-up and Up-down Dynamics

Elaborating Appadurai's 'implosion-explosion model, Tambiah explains two opposite processes, bottom-up and top-down. For the first process, he uses the terms 'focalization' and 'transvaluation', linked processes 'in which micro events at the local level, through chain-like linkages accelerate and cumulatively build up into an avalanche, whose episodes progressively lose their local textual, circumstantial, and substantive associations'. (Tambiah, 1996:257) In the second instance, for a top-down process, he introduces the concepts of 'nationalization' and 'parochialisation', where a more general issue of conflict is projected into a local context and heightened.

To illustrate the down-up dynamic, several incidents of atrocities against a local minority can be focused and transvalued to then 'explode' into a far wider pogrom on a more universal stage. The recent Godhra train burning is an instance of this. Or again the Ram temple at Ayodhya becomes the symbol of pan-Hindu unity even for the NRIs! Examples of the up-down dynamic would be when a national issue like affirmative action, or religious conversions, becomes 'parochialised' and projected into a local community to disturb generally harmonious inter-caste or inter-religious community relations there. The anti-Mandal Commission riots in the 1980s in the North and the anti-conversion backlash in Meenakshipuram in Tamil Nadu and Manoharpur in Orissa illustrate this.

Obviously, these are not predetermined dynamics. They can be reversed by deliberate interventions and then globalisation can also have positive consequences for minorities. Thus local wrongs in

violation of rights can be globalised through various national and international human rights groups and some justice and protection sought and obtained. Or atrocities against minorities often focused on by NGOs can then be transvalued by the National Commission for Human Rights, or even by an international agency and some redress demanded, or some concrete instances of communal harmony can be transvalued and projected onto a larger social stage.

Oppositely, a national human rights' awareness can motivate a movement to contextualise itself by taking up significant local issues. Similarly, with the feminist movement, national and international concerns are often contextualised and made concrete at a more parochial level, or a particular cultural practice that advantages women in one religious group then be universalised as legitimate for other groups through various communications networks that globalisation facilitates.

But, whatever be the political-economic causes of ethnic differences, they all tend to polarise around the cultural fault lines built up on constructed histories and perceived injustices, imagined communities and invented traditions. The globalisation–localisation dialectic has the potential to heighten these into violent conflict or defuse them into an enriching complementarity. But in a globalising world there is no escape into isolation from such situations, and 'insiders' and 'outsiders' can become confused and ambiguous categories. Rather it is the implosion-explosion dialectic in which top-down and bottom-up processes work themselves out that would seem to provide a more adequate understanding.

3. Real Interests and Imagined Identities

Politics of Displacement

In a plural society, the majority-minority dialectic cannot but precipitate tensions and conflict that often run out of control. In such a situation, 'imagined' cultural and religious identities are readily constructed and mobilised for collective action to right perceived wrongs. With globalisation now, this identity politics has both been globalised and localised and often with telling consequences for all concerned. In this identity politics has followed interest politics, where transnational corporations and multilateral institutions on the

one hand, and anti-globalisation and swadeshi movements on the other, project interests across regional and national boundaries.

However, with vulnerable groups, like minorities, too easily real economic and political interests and concerns are either co-opted and subsumed in this process, and/or subordinated and marginalised in the quest for group solidarity around group identity. For minorities this might be projected as a matter of survival, for majorities, it is often a preoccupation with dominance.

Yet this displacement of the 'politics of interest' by the 'politics of identity' or what can be called the 'politics of reason' by the 'politics of passion', was far from the anticipated consequences of modernisation and development. If anything the rationalisation of politics with modernisation was to be the highway to planned development and prosperity for all.

Politics of Identity

We are not at all suggesting that identity politics can or ought to be excluded. But only that it be contained and directed by civic concerns. For we are well aware that it cannot be ignored for it will come back with a vengeance. In fact, the failure of a modernist politics and developmental economics is precisely due to an over-reliance of the rationalism of the Enlightenment. Now caste communalism and religious fundamentalism have infected our society and our polity with a disastrous vengeance. (Brass 2002)

For modernisation and secularisation 'have created new spaces for which there was no reliable guide in tradition.' (Gupta 1999:77) This readily allows religious fundamentalisms and minority identities to flourish. The very insecurities and anxieties of people precipitated by change that inevitably is both quite uneven and not quite equitable, make for such a situation. Compounding this was a secular modernist understanding of development, which focused on scientific technology and planned techniques as emphasised by Mahalanobis, and ignored various cultural aspects of institutions and their social context as pleaded for by Myrdal. (Khilnani 1997: 87)

Politics of Integration

The relationship between the politics of identity and the politics of interest is certainly a problematic one. Marx too realised that without a class-consciousness there could not be a real mobilisation for class struggle or class-based action. A class-in-itself must become a class-for-itself. Lenin too bemoaned the lack of such a class-consciousness. But class mobilisation was never an end itself, it was never to perpetuate class divisions. It was precisely to be a struggle for a classless society. Hence just as the class struggle is for a classless society, something similar must be applied to the identity politics.

Communal, religious and other identities, are readily mobilised particularly in a situation of insecurity and anxiety, deprivation, and disadvantage. And yet a reasonable politics will demand that such identities do not become static, permanent and ends in themselves. They must be subsumed into more inclusive and constructive identities if in fact the politie with its inevitable pluralism is to be viable. Caste identities must be mobilised for a casteless society, and not to perpetuate casteism. Positional change in the caste hierarchy without an attempt to eliminate the hierarchy itself fails here. So too religious identities must be mobilised in order to make possible and viable a secular society and the space in which all religious groups can operate with religious and civic freedom.

Identity politics is a powerful engine for mass mobilisation but more than once we have seen that those who ride this tiger cannot easily dismount and are often devoured by the very beast they have created. The precipitation of Sikh-Hindu communal politics in Punjab has taken its toll at the very highest level. Today other such religious ethnic and caste conflicts are cascading down in the same direction. The Gujarat pogrom was only the latest and most horrendous of this descent into barbarism. (Bhargava:2000)

Global Citizenship

What would help tip the balance from the negative to the positive and confirm an overall positive effect of globalisation on minorities, and specifically on the processes of minoritisation and majoritisation? The importance of constitutionally protecting the rights of the individual ‘citizen’ cannot be overemphasised. But beyond this civil

society must privilege this identity of 'citizen' so that other ethnic and sub-national identities are subsumed and contained by this. For 'the one factor that remains resolute and indissoluble is that of 'citizenship'. It is only in protecting the dignity of the individual as a citizen that one can mitigate the harshness of minoritization.'(Gupta 1999:84)

Further in a plural society like ours, citizens must have multiple and layered identities. This will allow mobilising identities constructively and inclusively, rather than destructively and exclusively and thus facilitate focusing on real economic interests and genuine political concerns. Paul Brass identifies issues for a more equitable politics that must be addressed in such a political economy: endemic poverty, continuing illiteracy, persistent inequality, systemic violence, pervasive corruption, diversion of scarce resources. (Brass 2002:3034) This is only a list for starters but what it points to is a real politics of authentic interests and genuine concerns.

There is a very long way for South Asia to go in this direction. We have all the means and the capacities to make giant strides on all these counts, but we lack the collective will and single-mindedness to take even small steps and stay the course and not allow ourselves to be hijacked by the short-term gains and petty electoral politics, not to mention cultural taboos and religious prejudices.

We can surely learn from the Truth and Justice Commission in South Africa and its struggle to bring together racial groups that had been in mortal conflict. (Rotberg and Thompson, 2000) There could have been a violent black backlash there as the balance of power changed. In such situations, the real necessity of reconciliation and healing even as justice is done and truth not compromised, becomes all the more compelling. For this, there must be a certain distancing from and an honest analysis of the destructive events and structures, not a justification and defensiveness about them or else communal violence and conflict will only further consolidate communal identities. In this context, a Truth and Justice Commission for Gujarat might be a really effective beginning to follow up in other states.

Seeking to address historical wrongs through self-righteous violence, is hardly the way to either justice or truth and certainly not to reconciliation and healing, because at very best it is only a half-truth which sometimes is worse than a complete lie. But then again justifying injustices is an even more disastrous lie, especially when

this is perpetrated by dominant groups who themselves perpetuate such injustices.

In our understanding, it is only when identity politics is contained and sustained by a more realistic politics of interest that there can be a positive integration of the two. Such an integrated politics must address the issues of equity and equality, since market economics does not do this simply because it cannot. But the politie must also face the question of collective wrongs and minority rights. Identity politics is a very effective mobiliser precisely because it readily arouses passions. But again precisely because of this it easily marginalises reason.

A community based on a rational politics can only happen when politics is in control, and this cannot be the politics of identity alone. Neither can the politics of interest be merely a matter of party concerns at whatever levels. It has to be premised on the involvement of the civic community as well. And if this is true at the regional and national level then it must also obtain at the global one. Unfortunately, in spite of the urgency we are very far from such a civic community, particularly at the global level, and yet without this, the inevitable conflict of interests, such as obtained in any complex society and more so in a global one, will not make for a viable and acceptable resolution.

IV. Conclusion: Mapping a New Landscape

Today we need a global socio-cultural pluralism that will allow space not just for diversity, but beyond it for a postcolonial sensitivity that will decolonise our mind and free our imagination. We need to be able to cope with multiple identities and to accept a radically new hybridisation. But for this, we must first map the new cultural landscape today. For already now it is becoming apparent that even in the West modernity is not singular or uniform but decidedly multiple and complex. (Hefner 1998:87)

Indeed, there are no simple binary choices, between the global and the local any more. What we need then is ‘a cultural Lebanonization of the mind’, which ‘occurs with multiple frames of references for action, corresponding to each subculture’. (Goonatilake, 1997:232) For in today’s world ‘multiple selves and

multiple identities are necessary to function in any viable society.' (*ibid.*: 233)

For a 'discourse that remains within the framework of binary opposition (Westernization/ orientalism, white/black, etc.) without room for interstices, lacks the resources for imagining the mixed and betwixt as a creative jostling space, of home-making in multiple worlds.' (Nederveen and Parekh 1997:15) Rather the new 'hybridization as a thematic perspective differs from previous imageries of inter-cultural mixing.' (*ibid.*.) It implies complex multiple identities that reflect the global human condition beyond a culture of submissive victimhood, or of aggressive 'people's power'; one that does not gravitate to the dominant reference group or reject the subaltern marginalized one, but rather projects a new creativity in 'the power of imaging possible lives.' (Beck 2000:52)

For our alienation in a world that has lost its enchantment can hardly be effectively addressed merely at the global level. For globalisation is part of the problem of such disenchantment not part of the solution. Rushdie's 'metropolitan experience' which brings about the 'mutability of character' is not addressed by more cosmopolitanism! Nor can one be forcibly reintegrated today like Camus's 'Outsider' of yesteryear. What we need is a 're-enchantment' of our world with a creative religious response that is both locally relevant and relevantly global.

For this, we must think locally more incisively precisely to act globally more effectively. For globalisation and localisation as the new religious movements have demonstrated are complementary processes, not contradictory ones -- whether in our secular cities, where the universal is particularised in distinct identities, or in our 'global village' where the particular is universalised as a single place. The time has come for us to abandon the passivity and hopelessness of TINA (there is no other alternative) and to proclaim with all those the World Social Forum inspires: another world is possible, let us build it together!

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4.
GLOBALISATION AND CULTURAL NATIONALISM

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Abstract

Book Review of *Globalisation, Hindu Nationalism and Christians in India*, by Lancy Lobo, Rawat Publications, Jaipur and Delhi, 2002.

This book represents the response of a Christian to the atrocities perpetuated by the Hindutvawadis, especially on Christians and particularly in Gujarat. The 'basic assumption' (p.38), or rather thesis, of this study is that the *manthan* that has begun in India with independence and the mobilisation of the subaltern classes that has resulted could no longer be contained within the old Congress model or the Nehruvian consensus. The first was defeated at the hustings, and consequently the second lost the support of the dominant groups that had held it together. The articulation of Hindu nationalism spelt out in terms of cultural nationalism and religious fundamentalism, is in fact a response by some of these dominant groups to once again re-establish the Brahminic order of caste/class dominance, and to co-opt the subaltern groups once again into their subordinate place in old hierarchy. Globalisation has accelerated this process and as a result accentuated the inherent contradictions and dilemmas.

The author attempts an exposure of strategy and tactics of these Hindutvawadis. These 'Hindu nationalists as seen in this study have two pseudo elements: pseudo-Hindu and pseudo-patriotic' ones at that. (p.171) The anti-mandal riots are but another example of this attempt to put the OBCs in place. And the most prominent strategy has been scapegoating by targeting minorities. First, it was the Muslims and when this seemed to have reached the point of diminishing returns, especially electoral ones, it is now the turn of the Christians. But, of course, there is no saying which will be the next

minority targeted, or whether there will be a reversal to the old familiar one, as it happened once again in Gujarat.

Gujarat is clearly the laboratory of the Hindutva experiment, and already we can see it run riot and in fact cause the kind of national embarrassment, that prime- and deputy- prime ministers profusely apologising abroad, while they defend their minions at home. Will this be the beginning of a reversal of at least the worst trends that seem to be inexorably moving to their logical conclusion? The ambiguities are only now coming to the fore, as one can see in the contradictions between the nationalist BJP at the centre as represented by the Prime Minister and the Gujarati 'asmita' as propagandised by the state's Chief minister.

The author adopts a rather polemic tone. This may well just encourage the Hindutvawadis to respond in kind. It might precipitate a debate, but it is unlikely to resolve with the controversies involved. For such issues of religious ideology and cultural nationalism are hardly resolved by any rational appeal to facts. However, to the author's credit he does move forward to a critique to suggest a Christian response that deserves serious consideration. For in the end, it is only such self-criticism that can really bring about some sort of reconciliation, if not with the extremists, who have a vested interest in the communal violence, at least with the vast majority of citizens who certainly are misinformed and manipulated into the kind of no-win situation that finally only benefits their fundamentalist leaders whatever hue they may be, saffron or green, red or blue.

The author is at pains to elaborate the strategy and tactics of the Hindutva forces (p.80) Five judicial commissions have painstakingly exposed the role of the RSS in the various communal riots: Ahmedabad 1969, Bhivandi 1970, Tellicheri 1971, Jamshedpur 1979, Kanyakumari 1982, Mumbai 1992-93. (p.63)

The immediate short-term response is obviously to take what protection can be had from media exposure and judicial restraint since now it is quite evident that the government and police either stand by or are themselves participants with the rioters. Gujarat is only the most recent and worst-case scenario of this trend. The author does suggest a long-term response, which is basically to promote intercultural communication and a gradual transition from patriarchal to participative religious organisations. This of course is not just for Christians but in fact can be used by all the various religious communities concerned.

But perhaps the connection between the two needs to be more clearly established for in actuality inter-cultural and inter-religious communication and dialogue are only possible when it is preceded by an intra-cultural critique and an open intra-religious conversation. This is the only way to stop the manipulations of culturally innocent and religiously naive people by political ideologues in the name of religion, who actually end up defiling it.

The author does well to establish the kind of contradictions and constraints that globalisation has accelerated in the changing social and developmental processes prevailing in this country, and to underline the response of religious fundamentalism and cultural nationalism as one effort by dominant groups to maintain their hegemony.

To this reviewer's mind, nowhere perhaps is the contradiction as clearly expressed as between, on the one hand, the national BJP trying desperately to go global with its economic liberalisation and foreign policy pretensions to global power, using its NRI base to promote its cause, and on the other, the very indigenous Brahminical RSS scheming to be truly local in co-opting the Dalits and tribals, and in sponsoring a Swadeshi Jagran Manch that is as far from Gandhi's swaraj that the inspiration of our freedom movement as RSS militancy is from our bhakti-sufi tradition that has so enriched this land.

The basic thesis of the book is sound, and while it is rather polemical it can certainly be developed further in a more dialogic direction, not of course with a view to engaging the dogmatists or the fundamentalists on either side, but rather to reach out to the vast pool of goodwill that certainly encompasses the majority of our citizens.

However, there are some points that this reviewer would contest. Thus, in referring to the Aryan conquest, the author seems to assume an invasion theory that is now questioned from many sides. A gradual migration theory of Aryan occupation is now more generally accepted, which rejects a continuity, or certainly at least an identity, between the Harrapan civilisation and the Vedic one, such as the dubious studies inspired by Hindutva compulsions attempts.

Further in putting the Shiv Sena as part of the Sangh Parivar, the author seems to show a lack of familiarity with the kinds of tensions in the state of Maharashtra that every now and then come to the fore between the Shiv Sena and the BJP, which are not exactly like quarrels in the same family. The RSS is the inspiration of the entire Sangh

Parivar, but the Shiv Sena *pramukh* certainly does not take any instructions from the RSS *sarsanghchalak*.

Furthermore, in speaking of religion as a 'primordial tie and a defining feature of one's cultural identity' (p. 166) the author is assuming an atavistic basis and an ascribed rather than a voluntary grounding for religion. This needs to be radically questioned. Religion is much more a matter of world view within which culture develops giving identity, rather than any kind of ascriptive status or predestination to the karma-dharma of one's birth.

There are some details that need to be put right. Certainly, it is very annoying to find in any work with scholarly pretensions that references are inadequately given. This does not allow a proper verification, and leaves the authenticity open to questions. There are several authors quoted in the text but no complete bibliographic details are given in the bibliography and footnotes are conspicuous by tier absence. There are some misprints that have escaped the proof reader's eye and ought to be corrected in a later edition, if there is one. But the book is tightly argued and well worth studying, though as all too often happens in such cases, it is more likely to be read by the already converted than by those in need of a change of heart.

5.
COLONIALISM TO GLOBALISATION: REFOUNDING THE CHURCH OF THE INDIES

Jesuits in India: Visions and Challenges, ed. Delio de Mendonca, Gujarat Sahitya Prakash, Anand, 2003, also in *Jesuits* 2006.,

A Disconcerting Saint
Hagiographies and Legends
Continuities and Discontinuities
Refounding and Restoration
Vatican II as a Refounding Paradigm
Refounding the Society of Jesus
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References

Abstract

The challenge is to refound the churches in the post-colonial age, to inculturate, or rather incarnate the Good News in a globalising world.

Celebrating the 450th anniversary of St. Francis Xavier's arrival in India presents us with a perplexing paradox. On the one hand, his worldview, both religious and secular, is very different from ours. And yet Francis is still a subject of a popular devotion that has enthused and inspired countless Christians in this country, in the Indies and indeed throughout the world. Thus, as we interrogate the legacy of St. Francis Xavier, this in turn interrogates us and invites us to openness to dialogue with his times so different and distant from ours.

But there are definite continuities and similarities as well. Francis was the founder of the colonial churches in the Indies. He planted or rather transplanted the Roman church of his times in the missions he founded. Our challenge today is to 'refound' the churches in the post-colonial age, to inculturate, or rather incarnate the Good News in a

globalising world. In other words, we must not just recall and do today what the founder did then and there at that time and place, but rather 'intuit' and do what these founders would do here and now in this time and space.

And yet there is now a certain 'restorationism' already at work. This is a defensive reaction that often expresses itself in religious fundamentalism and revivalism that is all too often both obscurantist and regressive, more so in a globalising world. And so, the specific challenge of the Church today is whether Vatican I must be interpreted in the light of Vatican II or vice versa.

Today we can as well speak of a refounding of the Society under the inspiration of Fr. General Pedro Arrupe. In Asia, this calls for 'Asian Jesuits', not just Jesuits in Asia.

This then is the final paradox of St. Francis, a saint from a very different time that can still be a saint for our time. This saying of Jesus so challenged and haunted Francis, that it drove him to the ends of his world: 'What does it profit a man if he gains the whole world and loses his life.' This can now be reversed for us today: What would it profit us if we saved our lives and lost the whole of our world for our God?

A Disconcerting Saint

Celebrating the 450th death anniversary of St. Francis Xavier presents us with a difficult paradox. Indeed, Francis Xavier is a disconcerting saint for our times. On the one hand, his worldview, both religious and secular, is very different from ours. We would certainly claim to have outgrown his theological vision, and distance ourselves from some of its negative expressions with regard to both believers (in the Inquisition he approved) and non-believers (in the destruction of their places of worship he encouraged). His relationship with the colonial powers even when this was a critical one, is not something we would be comfortable with today. There is thus a separation and a discontinuity between the way Francis Xavier understood and lived his mission; and the way we would ours.

And yet Francis is still a subject of popular devotion, that has enthused and inspired countless Christians in this country in the Indies and indeed throughout the world. His sense of compelling urgency and complete commitment to his mission is something that we can all identify with even today. His total dedication and sensitive devotion to the people he laboured for and with, his unremitting

perseverance in their service to the very end is still an example and challenge for us. And so even when we part company with him, we cannot but help feel a sense of gratitude for the heritage that he left us even though this is a problematic one. Thus as we interrogate the legacy of St. Francis Xavier, this in turn interrogates us, if only we will let it do so in openness to, and in dialogue with his times.

Hagiographies and Legends

Here we will not undertake the task of trying to distinguish the man from the myth, since this has been attempted before with uneven success. Earlier hagiographies of the saint are so overlaid with legendary and miraculous stories, that they strain our credibility today. Unfortunately for us, these lose the real large-as-life hero in the mirage of the plastic saint. Others have tried to separate the wheat from the chaff, but then some like Georg Schurhammer's epic research to uncover the truth, in all its factual detail, leaves the saint buried in four tomes, more daunting to the layperson than any tomb! So that Broderick rightly and wryly observes:

> 'Poor St. Francis tends to be drowned in a deluge of facts, valuable in themselves, but not really relevant to his heroic study. No saint, no man however great, and Francis was very great, could stand up to such an overwhelming cloudburst of facts and footnotes as we are given here ... '[1]

This is corroborated by another Jesuit historian, R. Villoslada:

> 'This admirable biographer (Schurhammer) of the saint from Navarre knows everything, absolutely everything that refers to the environment in which Xavier lived ... but in this immense sea of data and information, the central figure suffers shipwreck, as it were, and disappears.'[2]

Broderick's own biography is readable and empathetic. (Broderick 1952) He is quite aware of the historical limitation of the saint but does not engage the issues that would concern us today:

[1] Cited by M. Joseph Costelloe, 1973, "In Memoriam: Georg Schurmmer, S.J., 1882-1971", in Georg Schurhammer, *Francis Xavier: His Like and Times*, Vol. I. *Europe 1540–1541*, Trans. M Joseph Costelloe, Jesuit Historical Institute, Rome, p. xxvii.

[2] cited by Costelloe, ibid.

> 'Papist and Jesuit of the old Spanish vintage, Francis Xavier might not, at first sight, seem a promising subject for modern consideration. Though his dates are Renaissance he was mediaeval to the core, and confident of his world in a way difficult for us, heirs of uncertainty, even to understand. An effort is made in this book to picture him with all his limitations – which he so magically transcends.'[3]

A more contemporary attempt is made by Louis Bermejo, which is persuasive and critical. Bermejo does point out the shadows in Francis's otherwise brilliant carrier,' (Bermejo 2000: xii) but does not stop there, and his genuine admiration comes through the critique.

Continuities and Discontinuities

Here we will not engage the biographical details, but rather attempt to locate Xavier broadly in his times and sketch the parallel with ours. Hopefully, this will help us to interrogate Xavier, and in turn allow him to interrogate us, both of which make him a rather disconcerting saint, but one relevant still to our times.

For if we interrogate the legacy of St. Francis to discern what is acceptable, and fine-tune the inspiration that we can derive from his life and mission, we must at the same time allow the text of his life to speak to us, and the genius of his spirit to inspire us. We can do this only by contextualising this inspiration and interpreting it for our times.

For the world of St. Francis Xavier was very different from ours. The Reformation was gathering momentum in Europe, and a Counter-reformation was already in place in the Catholic Church. The Council of Trent had begun, and it became a paradigm of a defensive reaction to the Protestants with whom the Church was engaged in deadly mortal combat. Eventually, it crystallised into the fortress Catholicism that prevailed right up to Vatican II. The Roman Church distanced itself from the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment it brought about. Eventually, the Church alienated itself from the modern world by condemning many of the most cherished values of the age. It was a fortress in isolation, and not always splendid!

[3] Brodrick, James, 1952, Saint Francis Xavier (1506-1552), Burns Oates, London, p.vii.

But there are definite continuities and similarities too between those times and ours, which we would do well to recall. Francis lived at the beginning of a new age, when the colonial world had begun its expansion beyond the boundaries of Europe. Many would regard this as an early stage in the inexorable march of globalisation, that has overtaken our post-colonial world today.

The geographic expansion at the dawning of the colonial period brought an encounter with the very different cultural and religious traditions of the colonised peoples. This in turn led to a new awareness among the colonisers themselves. At times this was expressed in a very negative reaction such as racism, and at others in a more positive response such as pluralism.

Our world today is also pressing against new frontiers, and though these are not geographic ones, they are bringing changes even more radical than the ones that the discovery of Columbus and Vasco da Gama brought to the age of St. Francis Xavier. Genetic engineering is redesigning our biology, and virtual reality is creating new worlds in our very own private space. And there are negative consequences too: we are ever more divided between the haves and have-nots, and as yet the only final arbitrator we know is violence, for ours is still a mad world of mutually assured mass destruction. Yet there is a new sensitivity to human rights and a greater awareness of our interdependencies brought on by ecological and other crises.

Different then though our worlds are, the sense of urgency that the saint brought to his mission can certainly be ours. Francis was the founder of the colonial churches in the Indies. He planted or rather transplanted the Roman church of his times in the missions he founded. He lived by his lights, which are not ours, but his dedication and commitment were total. Francis could of course have reacted negatively to the challenges of his age. He could have stayed behind with a comfortable academic or clerical career in Europe. But he seized the day and made a difference.

Refounding and Restoration

Fidelity to the legacy he left us cannot demand that we do again today what he did then. That would be naiveté at best and atavism at worst. Our context and circumstances are different. There have been three ecumenical councils, many revolutions and even more wars that separate our times from his. Rather our challenge is to refound the

churches in the post-colonial age, to inculturate, or rather incarnate the Good News in a globalising world.

'Refounding', as we understand the term, implies not that we go back to the origins to recreate the same mission again as though we have strayed from the path, but rather that even as we find our way in new situations, we do not go backwards in history but forwards with time. For refounding requires that we allow the original inspiration, the founding charism to speak to our present, to situate the original 'text' in a new 'context'. This requires not that we read the text of Good News in its old context, but rather that we read this text into our present context, that we reinterpret it again to find new meaning and relevant motivation for our contemporary world.

In other words, we must not do today what the founders did then and there, at that time and place, but rather 'intuit' and do what these founders would do here and now, in this time and space. Refounding then is something beyond reform and renewal. It is a new beginning or a radical reorientation that expresses both continuity and discontinuity with our past. This demands that we read the signs of the times and discern continuities and discontinuities with the past honestly and critically in order to be able better to cope more constructively and creatively with the challenges and opportunities of the present, and so to grasp the promise and hope of the future the more faithfully.

Vatican II as a Refounding Paradigm

The Second Vatican Council is surely the paradigm for such a refounding of the Church. For as Karl Rahner insightfully observed it is the greatest council of the church since the very first one in Jerusalem! For as that first council in Jerusalem opened the Church to the Greco-Roman world, it is only now, with Vatican II, that the Church is opening itself to the modern world. The ecumenical councils in between were mostly directed to the internal problems, schisms and heresies within the Church. This council attempted to speak *ad extra* to our contemporary world. (Wilkins 2002)

And yet there is now a certain 'restorationism' already at work. This is a defensive reaction that often expresses itself in religious fundamentalism and revivalism that is all too often both obscurantist and regressive. (Wilkins 2002a) And so the specific challenge of the Church is well expressed thus: whether Vatican II must be interpreted

in the light of Vatican I, or Vatican I in the light of Vatican II, even as we reach out to Vatican III. And as we were surprised by joy in the Spirit with Vatican II, with the optimism of a Xavier, we can dare hope to be even more joyfully surprised, when this Spirit of God renews the face of the earth and makes all things new once again!

This ambiguity between refounding and restoration, between a Church looking back to Vatican I and one looking forward from Vatican II, is perhaps best illustrated by the present Pope. On the one hand, you have John Paul II, a parish priest to the world, whose enthusiasm and flair has endeared him so much to both the young and old. And on the other hand, you have the Pope of dicasteries, so pre-occupied with protecting the deposit of faith and enforcing institutional discipline. And so on the one hand, there is the enthusiasm and inspiration of the *Tertio Millennio Euntes*, The Coming of the Third Millennium, and on the other, *Dominus Jesus*, both under the same signature!

The commitment of John Paul II to ecumenism and dialogue, cannot be doubted. He has even confessed that his office is the biggest obstacle to such unity and has asked his brother bishops to suggest ways to overcome this. And yet this is the same person who has allowed the Vatican Curia to be filled with conservatives who carry forward their unreformed agenda in the name of the Pope, still resisting any *aggiornamento*. However, we are now certainly at the end of one papacy and at the beginning of a new one, which may belie both the pessimists and the optimists and surprise both conservatives and progressive!

Refounding the Society of Jesus

Society of Jesus in its mission cannot escape the trials and tribulations, the challenges and opportunities of the times. St. Francis was among the first and the closest companions of Ignatius of Loyola, who with them founded the Jesuits in 1540, as a response to the turbulent times they lived in then. Today so much has changed in the Society Francis knew, especially with and after Vatican II and the 32nd and the 34th General Congregations thereafter, that we can really speak of a refounding of the Society under the inspiration of Fr. General, Pedro Arrupe.

The Society of Jesus was at the beginning of an age, and it blazed a trail and broke new ground wherever it went and took root. The Jesuits were at the cutting edge, on the new frontiers of the then

known world, in all kinds of capacities in very different fora. Nothing human was alien to their mission! They were pioneers and precursors in the new worlds being opened: whether in the Americas or Asia, in the North or the South, among enemies or friends. Francis was among the first Jesuit companions so inspired by this Ignatian charism.

Later perhaps the Jesuits had overreached themselves. They seemed to have become too successful for their own good. Eventually, they could not be saved from the opposition generated even within the Church they served so generously. The suppression of the Society in 1773 was certainly a trauma and tragedy for the Society, which was difficult to come to terms with. Certainly, with its restoration in 1814, there was much greater caution and a determination to found the Society once again just as it was before. Continuity with the old Society was the main preoccupation, and so the overriding concern of the Society was restoration, not refounding, as we have defined it.

And yet the basic inspiration and charism of the Society as expressed in the *Spiritual Exercise* of St. Ignatius was irrepressible. Once again Jesuits began to reach out to new frontiers and new worlds. But there was not the same explosion of energy as experienced in the early years of its founding when Jesuits like Xavier epitomised its charism. Perhaps like every founding moment, that was a privilege one hard to recreate once again.

But with Vatican II when religious orders were once again asked to revitalise their original charism, under the leadership of Fr. Peter Arrupe, Jesuits took this with characteristics seriousness and commitment, inspired by the Ignatian '*magis*', the restlessness to do ever more for the kingdom. The 32nd General Congregation in 1974-75, gave the Society a new articulation of its mission in terms of 'the service of the faith and the promotion of justice'. This marked a turning point in contemporary Society and can easily be considered as the beginning of a re-foundation. But once again there were difficulties and opposition for disturbing the status quo, and Jesuits were accused of being overly secular and worldly.

By 1981, the Society of Jesus once again found itself under grave suspicion and the Pope imposed on it his own delegate to bring it back to the straight and narrow. But with the election of Fr. Kolvenbach in 1983, and the 34th General Congregation in 1995, which expanded the articulation of the Society's mission from 'faith and justice' to include inculturation and dialogue as well, the charism of Ignatius was revitalised and the legacy of Pedro Arrupe was reconfirmed. His cause

for canonisation has now been introduced. So we are at a turning point, and the present Fr. General already spoke of the 'refounding' of the Society to the Congregations of Procurators in 1999.

The Final Paradox

This is precisely where the courage and energy, the enthusiasm and optimism of Xavier can be an inspiration to us. The spirit of Xavier lives, even though perhaps his theology and his ideology have been laid to rest. And this is precisely the legacy of Xavier that we must cherish and that must inspire us. However, in the final analysis, there is no blueprint that spells out the details of where this refounding may take us, whether in the Church or the Society. We have only general guidelines for the Church from Vatican II, and for the Society of Jesus from its recent General Congregations. But we do have the optimism of the Spirit, who more than restores, renews, and more than renews; refounds the kingdom of God among us with each new generation.

Certainly, our challenges now are not any less than the ones that confronted Francis Xavier in his time, and this is precisely where he can enthuse and inspire us once again. He too was tempted with pessimism and despair as we may well be in our situation at times so desperate and depressing. But Francis was always a saint in a hurry at the very edge of the then-known world, and as such he urges us to explore the new frontiers and new worlds opening up in our times, with a courage and faith, with a hope and trust that was his in such large measure.

This then is the final paradox of St. Francis, a disconcerting saint from a very different time, he can still be, *mutatis mutandis*, an inspiring saint for our times. For to recognize human limitations is not to be less, but rather to be more human. And we need hardly be surprised that even saints are subject to them. To point out Xavier's limitations, then, is not to diminish his stature; rather our quest must be to transcend them and further to anticipate any escape from the challenge that his undeniable heroism poses to our lives. The beginning of Xavier's conversion is marked by the haunting words of his master: what does it profit a man to gain the whole world and forfeit his life? (Mt.16:26). The end of his life is marked by the even more urgent obverse of that: what does it profit a man to save his life and lose the whole world – not for pelf and power, but for the kingdom of God and his justice? That in the final analysis is the question

Xavier's life addresses to us as he lies dying on a little island off the coast of China, still hoping to extend yet another frontier for this kingdom.

Today so many of us live in small individualized, isolated and hostile worlds that have no new frontiers because our horizons are so narrow. Perhaps the image of Xavier continually pushing his mission east, on the very edge of the world he knew, perhaps Xavier whose letters stirred the imagination of the students of Europe in his day and moved them to follow in the trails he had blazed, perhaps this same Xavier can challenge our lives to a sense of purpose and direction, with the call of destiny – even though we may 'march to the beat of a different drummer', his dedication, commitment and sense of urgency can still inspire us today, as he did others in his times.

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6.
GLOBALISATION AND IDENTITY: MULTIPLE PROCESSES, COMPLEX ISSUES

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Abstract

Rapid social change precipitated by globalisation is dissolving older more tolerant inclusive identities and reconfiguring them into newer hostile exclusive ones. To study this we must first deconstruct the multiple processes that constitute globalisation and then, unpack the complex issues implied in the construction of an ethnic identity. Identity and dignity are constructed in the encounter of the 'self' and the other. Ethnicity refers to some kind of 'collective identity'. This is an explorative not a conclusive study, deliberately tentative and open-ended.

I. Introduction: [Conceptual Clarifications]

1. The Globalisation Process

As yet there is no cogent theory for globalisation as a multidimensional process, which would comprehend intelligibly the contradictions and challenges that it presents to us. If in general the process refers to the 'widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life' (Held *et al.* 1999:2) we may well be on our way to a 'world society as a multiplicity without unity,' (Beck 2000:4) rather than an integrated global system. Contemporary changes driven by new technologies and movements have left us with a more interconnected yet highly uncertain world. This essay focuses on the political, cultural and religious implications of globalisation for minorities while being careful to avoid a reductionist approach to this complex, multidimensional process.

2. Ethnicity Issues

Given the intractable escalation of ethnic conflicts and contradictions in so many countries today the need for a more comprehensive frame of reference stands out. The themes suggested by this paper require a vast canvas and we can make no pretence of dealing with all of them adequately. Thus beginning with ethnicity as a process we will consider the relationship of ethnic identity and group dignity, their manipulation in the dialectic of ethnic elites and social class, the resulting dilemma of developmental change and ethno-politics, the conflict precipitated by this between nation-making and state-breaking, and suggest their resolution in a 'civil-state', as distinguished from a nation-state.

Our limited purpose here will be to set a frame of reference within which inter-relationships can be explored. If this exploration is not conclusive here, it can be extended beyond our own conclusions which are somewhat tentative and open-ended. For our endeavour will be to highlight the issues rather than attempt premature resolutions. This is a less ambitious but more realistic approach to a complex and complicated subject.

II. Globalisation: Syndrome, Responses, Dilemmas, Arenas

1. Clarifying the Concepts

If in general the process refers to the 'widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life' (*ibid.*. 1999:2) we may well be on our way to a 'world society as a multiplicity without unity,' (Beck 2000:4) rather than an integrated global system. Contemporary changes driven by new technologies and movements have left us with a more interconnected yet highly uncertain world.

There are several approaches to defining globalisation but even before we start to describe it, we need to clarify some of the ambiguous terminology involved. Thus, in trying then to answer the question: What is Globalisation? Ulrich Beck distinguishes 'globalisation' as a process from 'globalism' as an ideology, and 'globality' as the social reality we are actually living with. (*ibid.*. 1997:9) Similar distinctions have been made with modernity and secularity, and indeed globalisation is not unconnected with these two social phenomena.

Generally, globalism is an ideology that privileges the world market of neoliberal capitalism. But globalisation as a multi-dimensional process also generates counter-understandings as with various resistance monuments. Thus, the globalisation process does give arise to several kinds of ideologies, some more dominant than others, but all referring to the reality on the ground. The purpose of such distinctions is not just for the sake of conceptual clarity but more so 'to break up the territorial orthodoxy of the political and the social posed in absolute institutional categories.' (*ibid.*. 1997:9)

Now in attempting to place the globalisation process in an historical context, some would rather loosely trace its origins back 5,00 years, when 'through conquest, trade, and migration, the globe began to shrink.' (Mittleman 2000:18). However, world system theorists would place the origins with the development of capitalism in 16 century Western Europe, while for others the fundamental changes in the world order in the 1970s mark the origins of contemporary globalisation. Fine-tuning this further, a fourfold periodisation of the 'Historical Forms of Globalisation' (Held *et al.* 1999:414 -) has been worked out: the pre-

modern up to 1500, the early modern about 1500-1850, modern circa 1850-1945, and the contemporary period since.

Obviously, very different understandings are implied across such vast swathes of time. Hence a further elaboration of four types of globalisation can be made depending on the number of domains or facets of social life that are interconnected in a global network. This yields a fourfold typology: (*ibid*.. 1999:21-22)

1. thick: 'in which the extensive reach of global networks is matched by their high intensity, high velocity and high propensity',

2. thin', here 'the high extensity of global networks is not matched by a similar intensity, velocity or impact',

3. diffused: 'global networks which combine high extensity with high intensity and high velocity but in which impact propensity is low',

4. expansive: 'characterized by the high extensity of global interconnectedness combined low intensity, low velocity but high propensity.'

Thus from the ancient to the medieval and the modern to the contemporary, globalisation can be graded in a three-dimensional space from thin to thick, and diffused to expansive, from instantaneous to delayed.

In sum, precisely because there are complex and controversial issues involved, more than just being a matter of conceptual clarity, we need to situate our discourse more precisely before a meaningful discussion is possible. Here we will focus more particularly on contemporary globalisation as a multi-dimensional process that is 'thick', 'expansive' and fast-moving, though in some less connected areas, it may still be 'thin', 'diffused' and deferred. However, without doubt, it is a process driven by differing and even contradictory ideological 'globalisms' and consequently changing the social reality of our 'globality' in new and challenging ways.

2. Describing the Syndrome

Perhaps because of the ideological dominance of neoliberal capitalism today, the economic dimension is seen to be the cutting edge of globalisation. But this is to truncate the process and miss some of its most critical contradictions and crucial challenges. For as Giddens insists:

> 'globalisation is not only, or even primarily, an economic phenomenon; and it should not be equated with the

> emergence of a 'world system'. Globalization is really about the transformation of space and time. I define it as action at distance, and relate its intensifying over recent years to the emergence of means of instantaneous global communication and mass transportation.' (Giddens 1994:4)

The present increase in the extent and impact of global inter-connectedness, its new intensity and instantaneity inevitably brings about a compression of space and time. This gives rise to 'manufactured uncertainties' or risk as 'a result of human intervention into social life and into nature,' (*ibid*.. 1994:4) which in turn has unintended and unpredictable consequences.

More in continuity with, than in contradiction to Giddens, Appadurai's approach takes media and migration 'as its two major, and connected, diacritics and explores their joint effect on the work of the imagination as a constitutive feature of modern subjectivity.' (Appadurai 1997:3) This relationship between electronic media and the migrating masses makes the core link between globalisation and modernity.

Some have called this 'the second modernity' (Beck 2000:12), to distinguish it from' the first modernity' associated with the Enlightenment, and theorised in the post-war period by Parsons, Shils, Lerner, Inkeles and others, giving rise to the mega rhetoric of development as economic growth, high-tech, agribusiness, militarism. Rather this second modernity 'now seems more practical and less pedagogic, more experiential and less disciplinary than in the fifties and sixties', (Appadurai 1997:10)

In a similar vein, Giddens argues that 'the Enlightenment prescription of more knowledge, more control,' (Giddens 1994:4) is no longer viable. For modernist rationality corresponds to an earlier 'simple modernisation'. It is rather misplaced with the 'reflexive modernisation' such as is precipitated by the impact of contemporary globalisation. For this is not a simple continuation but a qualitatively different and inherently ambiguous process.

By 'reflexivity' Giddens refers 'to the use of information about the condition of activity as a means of regularly reordering and redefining what that activity is.' (*ibid*.. 1994:86) At the individual level this creates a 'reflective citizenry'. Moreover, 'the growth of social reflexivity is a major factor introducing a dislocation between knowledge and control — a prime source of manufactured uncertainty.' (*ibid*.. 1994:7) Such

situations precipitated by human action, have largely new and unpredictable consequences that cannot be dealt with by old remedies.

Now while the liberative potential of such reflexivity for autonomy and self-reliance is apparent, it does not automatically result in an emancipatory politics; 'equally important, however, is the fact that the growth of social reflexivity produces forms of 'double discrimination' affecting the underprivileged. To the effects of material deprivation are added a disqualification from reflexive incorporation in the wider social order,' (*ibid*.. 1994:90) through various exclusionary mechanisms that must be more directly addressed.

Hence given the ambiguities and contradictions involved, it is apparent that 'globalisation is not a single unified phenomenon, but a single syndrome of processes and activities,' and while some may consider this to be a 'pathology', 'globalisation has become normalised as a dominant set of ideals and a policy framework', albeit still 'contested as a false universal.' (Mittleman 2000:4) In fact

> 'globalization is a multilevel set of processes with built-in strictures on its power and potential for it produces resistance against itself. In other words, globalization creates discontents not merely as latent and undeclared resistance, but sometimes crystallized as open counter movements.' (*ibid*.. 2000:7)

For the promises of globalisation — of greater abundance and less poverty, of information access and release from old hierarchies — comes with its price: of reduced political control and market penetration, of cultural erosion and social polarisation. Hence economic dynamism and marginalisation, upward and downward political mobility, cultural implosion and explosion, etc., are all part of this zigzag process that races ahead at times, and even reverses itself at others.

3. Reviewing the Responses

There is now a whole spectrum of interpretation and response to these phenomena from the 'sceptics', who exaggerate the consequences for better or worse, to the 'hyperglobalisers', who doubt both, the intensity of change and the usefulness of the concept itself.

For the sceptics, on the one hand, the reality on the ground at most is a significant 'regionalisation' into major trading blocks, as evidenced by international flows of capital and trading. Thus, Hirst and Thompson, focusing on the world economy as the cutting edge of these

changes, are 'convinced that globalisation as conceived by the more extreme globalizers, is largely a myth,' (Hirst and Thompson 1996:2) that mystifies rather than explains many of the trends that 'have been reversed or interrupted as the international economy has evolved' (*ibid*.. 1994:15)

Rather what we have is 'an open world market based on trading nations and regulated to a greater or lesser degree both by the public policies of nations states and supra-national agencies.' (*ibid*.. 1994:16) This 'inter-national economy' with its financial centres must necessarily have some degree of integration, especially with regard to linkages between the OECD countries, but such 'integration' is far from being genuinely 'global' in its inclusion of the less developed ones. (*ibid*.. 1994:196)

The hyperglobalisers, on the other hand, exalt this new epoch in human history and their 'view of globalisation generally privileges an economic logic and, in its neoliberal variant, celebrates the emergence of a single global market and the principle of global competition as the harbinger of global progress.' (Held et all 999:3)

In the new borderless economy, national governments have little regulatory power and their peoples are left to cope with the global market. New categories of winners and losers evolve, as new technologies create new elites and old skills become obsolete. This further reinforces, the global division of labour. Here 'global civil society' has still to catch up with the 'global market' and as yet the structures for this are quite inadequate for any kind of effective 'global solidarity'.

Somewhere between the two ends of the spectrum, between hyperglobalisers and sceptics are the 'transformationists' for whom 'globalisation is a central driving force behind the rapid social political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and world orders.' (*ibid*.. 1999:7)

No society escapes its 'shake-out' as it recasts traditional patterns, creates new hierarchies, and most crucially 're-engineers the power, functions and authority of national

governments.' (*ibid*..:8) This results in 'an 'unbundling' of the relationship between sovereignty, territoriality and state power.' (*ibid*.: 8) But rather than acquiesce in the 'end of the state', it needs to be 'reconstituted and restructured in response to the growing complicity of process of governance in a more interconnected world.' (*ibid*..:9). This now will pose new challenges that demand new responses.

It should be apparent from this discussion that these responses are mostly ideologically premised. For, where the hyperglobalisers celebrate the cornucopia of the global market, and the sceptics dismiss this as a myth, the transformationists perceive a more open-ended and contingent process with all the concomitant contradictions and challenges. Given that this discussion on globalisation overlaps with and carries forward the discourse of the old modernity as a second or reflexive modernity we need now to focus on the key dimensions and levels of this complex process.

4. Listing the Dimensions

At the core of any adequate comprehension of the globalisation process is the phenomenal increase in the scope and speed of cross-*border* flows that results in an unprecedented connectedness and dependence that makes our world a single space. But this is far from making it a simpler place. For these very flows and interactions take place across diverse dimensions and varying levels with greater or lesser complexity and speed. However, it would be a mistake to conceive of these 'flows' as linear vectors whose impact can be anticipated and contained. Rather they are vehicles of change that bring unintended consequences and unavoidable challenges.

Appadurai distinguishes 'five dimensions of global cultural flows that can be termed (a) ethnoscapes, (b) mediascapes, (c) technoscapes, (d) financescape, (e) ideoscapes.' (Appadurai 1997:33) These 'scapes' are perspectives constructed out of the shifting flow of people, information, technology, finance, ideas. They are building blocks of 'imagined worlds, that is, the multiple worlds that are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups around the world.' (Appadurai 1997:33) He calls them 'scapes' to indicate they are constructed perspectives of a ground reality that affect our response to it, very much in the manner a landscape artist affects the way we relate to our natural surroundings.

It is precisely in these 'cultural flows', in spite of their obvious capacity for homogenisation that we can find the potential for micronarratives that can fuel oppositional and counter-cultural movements, and subvert the meta-narratives of the dominant order. Thus homogenisation and heterogenisation can be seen in the same relationship as globalisation and localisation. The first precipitates the second, which in turn uses the first for its own counter-hegemonic

purposes, in a kind of 'cannibalising' of one by the other! (*ibid*.. 1997:43).

5. Resisting from Below

It is precisely in the contestation and even the contradictions between the 'macro' and the 'micro', the 'homo' and the 'hetero', the similar and the different, the global and the local, that

we come to see the obverse side of globalisation as the intrinsic, yet dysfunctional counterpart of the idealised version too often uncritically projected by a neoliberal globalism.

In this connection, Giddens identifies four 'global bads' or dysfunctions that must be responded to: (Giddens 1994:100)

1. 'capitalism' that produces economic polarisation. This needs to evolve into a 'post-scarcity economy.

2. 'industrialism' that degrades the environment. Here we need to incorporate a 'humanisation of nature' within a post-traditional order, rather than to try and defend nature in the traditional way.

3. 'surveillance' on the control of information that denies democratic rights. A 'dialogic democracy', not merely a representative one, must counter such political control, in other words—to 'democratise democracy'.

4. 'means of violence' or the control of military power that threatens large-scale war. Structures for negotiated power must be put in place so that differences are not mediated by violence

What these responses amount to is really a bottom-up proaction to a top-down imposition. Indeed, here lies the real challenge to humanising the processes of globalisation, driven as they are by an impersonal market and bureaucratic power.

For

> 'as experienced from below, the dominant form of globalization means a historical transformation: in the economy, of livelihoods and modes of existence; in politics, a loss in the degree of control exercised locally —for some, however little to begin with — such that the locus of power gradually shifts in varying proportions above and below the territorial state; and in culture, a devaluation of a collectivity's achievements or perceptions of them. This

> structure, in turn, may engender either accommodation or resistance.' (Mittleman 2000:6)

Thus multiple levels of interaction are involved from the global to the local. For 'a globalization framework *interrelates multiple levels of analysis* — economics, politics, society, and culture. This frame thus elucidates *a coalescence of diverse transnational and domestic structures*, allowing the economy, polity, society, and culture of one locale to penetrate another,' (*ibid*.. 2000:7) and vice versa.

6. Defining the Dilemmas

Here we can conclude this discussion with a tentative description rather than a definition of globalisation as

> 'a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions — assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity,
> velocity and impact — generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power. ' (Held el al. 1999:16)

Localisation, nationalisation, regionalisation, would then be the consolidation or specification of these 'social relations and transactions' at particular levels and locales and which are therefore not unrelated to each other, but often in actuality precipitate reactions in a cascading effect from one to the other.

Our effort then must be not to obfuscate the linkages by overworking the concepts but to specify the interactions between these levels and in different spheres: economic, political, cultural, environmental, religious, and ethical. So far the chief beneficiaries of the globalisation process as fostered and advocated by a neoliberal ideology of globalism have left us with a global reality that has advantaged transnational capital and privileged a cosmopolitan elite, even as it has disposed of indigenous labour and oppressed local populations.

This has resulted in deep tensions and contradictions that cannot any more be gainsaid: the disempowerment of the nation-state and the inadequacy of civil society at the global level, the lack of accountability structures in the global marketplace and the marginalisation of the weaker players there, the diffusion of new identities and concerns that erode the old solidarities and traditions, the precipitation of a global environmental crisis without any corresponding global response, the

relativising of ethical and human values with the affirmation of cultural and groups rights,...these are but some of the issues and questions we must now turn to.

We are far more sensitive today to the inherent limits of modernisation as a process not indefinitely sustainable any more. Weber saw the underlying rationalisation of such processes in the modern world as eventually ending with the 'iron cage' a syndrome that with later modernisation theorists led to a 'largely accepted the view of the modern world as a space of shrinking religiosity (and greater scientism), less play (and increasingly regimented leisure), and inhibited spontaneity at every level.' (Appadurai 1997: 6) The second, reflexive modernity with globalisation would seem to contest this. But there are new and equally inherent contradictions in this process as well and we are still to examine its internal limits and sustainability.

A Range of Responses

The wide range of interpretation and responses to these phenomena is inevitably ideologically premised. (Held *et al.*1999: 3-9). Thus the 'hyperglobalisers' exaggerate the consequences for better or worse; the 'sceptics' dismiss these as a myth; and the transformationists perceive a more open-ended and contingent process with all the concomitant contradictions and challenges.

In spite of the obvious capacity of 'global cultural flows' (Appadurai 1997:33) for homogenisation, there is the potential for micronarratives that can fuel oppositional and counter-cultural movements, and subvert the meta-narratives of the dominant order. Thus homogenisation and heterogenisation can be seen in the same relationship as globalisation and localisation. The first precipitates the second, which in turn uses the first for its own counter-hegemonic purposes, in a kind of 'cannibalising' of one by the other! (Appadurai 1997:43).

II. Issues of Identity

Identity and Dignity

Now it is precisely in the contestation and even the contradictions between the 'macro' and the 'micro', the 'homo' and the 'hetero', the similar and the different, the global and the local, that we come to see the obverse side of globalisation as the intrinsic, yet dysfunctional counterpart of the idealised version too often uncritically projected by a neoliberal globalism.

More perceptively, Giddens suggests a bottom-up pro-action to a top-down imposition. (Giddens 1994:100) This was precisely the import of Karl Marx when in his *Communist* Manifesto he presciently anticipated such a globalising from below: 'The Proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, Unite!' (Marx and Engels 1952:96)

The 'Self' and the 'Other'

Religious nationalism and fundamentalism have a remarkable affinity. They feed on each other, politicising and radicalising one another. Both respond to the modernising secularists but address different aspects: the religious nationalists challenge the eco-political hegemony that discounts human dignity and impoverishes people. The religious fundamentalists contest the religio-cultural dominance that disregards traditional religious identities and undermines self-respect.

Identity and dignity are intimately connected. Identity answers to, 'Who am I?'; dignity to, 'What respect am I due?'. The affirmation or the negation of one carries over to the other. The right to identity must include the right to dignity. One's identity is never developed in isolation but in interaction with significant others. However, this is never an entirely passive process. I discover myself, my horizon of meaning and value, with and through others. 'Who I am' is always reflected off, and refracted through others. 'What I am due' is always in a social context mediated by them. The denial of recognition and affirmation amounts to a negation of my human identity.

Indeed, the other is more integral to oneself than one might want to admit. The other helps to make sense of my experiences, but also interrogates my world. For the other always puts a question to one's self, and when the other is different the question can be threatening. One can

ignore the question only for a while, one may even be tempted to destroy the questioner, but the questioning cannot be so easily silenced. History bears witness to how dominant persons and groups have sought 'final solutions' to eliminate or subordinate others in genocide and ethnocide, in cultural assimilation and religious conversion. Most of these attempts have failed.

As with individuals so with groups. The individual is affirmed, or negated in the group, as the group is in society. At the individual level, this mediation is essentially through interpersonal interaction; at the social level, it is also through myth and symbol, values and norms, collective memories and popular history. (Kakar 1993: 50)

Modern development brings rapid and radical change. The strain and stress can precipitate a disorientation in personal identity. In such situations, a crumbling self can lean on group support as a dilapidated building is trussed up by a scaffolding. In a world increasingly characterised by anxiety, uncertainty and disorder, there is an urgent need for the reassurance of security, trust and a sense of solidarity in a collective identity. Such identities become 'vehicles for redressing narcissistic injuries, for righting of what are perceived as contemporary or historical wrongs.' (Kakar 1993: 52) Collective action is resorted to in order to redress individual insecurities. The group solidarity then becomes a substitute for lost attachments, a support to heal old injuries and right historical wrongs. Such collective remedies to individual trauma easily become totalising and aggressive. Confirmed in their self-righteousness, leaders manipulate and mobilise groups, disregarding the dignity of other groups as well as the dignity of their members. Thus, in any social breakdown, it is easy to see why extremist responses come into prominence.

This construction of the sense of self in the context of a hostile other is necessarily a function of the needs of the insecure individual and the group. What is unconsciously disowned and rejected in ourselves, is projected on and demonised in the other. What is desirable in the other is denied and attributed to oneself. We are non-violent, tolerant, chosen, pure; the other is violent, intolerant, polluted, damned. They may seem strong, compassionate, devout but they are aggressive, devious and fanatical.

Individual and Collective Rights

To contain and defuse such collective passions, we must recognise and guarantee both, equal dignity and unique identity for every individual person and each human community. The first is founded on human rights and is committed to enforcing equitable rights for all individuals, e.g., the right to life and liberty of conscience. The second is premised on collective rights and is responsible for ensuring the cultural identity of each group, e.g., the right to language and religion.

The dilemma between individual and community becomes evident when individual and collective rights are not in consonance. Treating all equally could lead to some becoming more equal than others in violation of the rights of more vulnerable individuals. This happens in modernising societies when the relationships between individuals are unequal, as in caste communities, where lower caste individuals are more deprived. Conceding some kinds of cultural rights to groups can be oppressive for individuals in them, as in patriarchal communities, where empowering men further disadvantages the women. However, we can and must find ways in which human rights are sensitive to the cultural specifics of a community, which in turn do not violate the fundamental rights of individuals.

In other words, a homogenizing universalism cannot be so absolute as to negate cultural and religious diversities. It must respect and even celebrate these differences within the limits set by collective rights. However, whether religious or cultural, these rights cannot be unconditional or in violation of more fundamental human rights and freedoms. The 'non-recognition', or worse the 'misrecognition' of either, becomes oppressive and distorting, projecting a negated, wounded identity. This is precisely what prejudice is all about.

What one is *not*, will tend to be exclusive and dismissive of others. This creates in-groups and out-groups, stereotypes and scapegoats. Those affirmed positively, prescinding from others in defining 'who one *is*', will tend to be inclusive and not disregarding of others. This allows for openness and receptivity. 'We *are not* like that', is less open to a broader inclusion in a larger common ground than 'this is how we *are*'. Exclusive identities emphasise differences and set up oppositions and polarities with the other.

Sudhir Kakar, the psychoanalyst, explains how they help increase the sense of narcissistic well-being and attribute to the other the disavowed aspects of one's own self. (Kakar 1992: 137) Inclusive identities are inclined to affirm similarities and complementarities with the other.

These make for tolerance and flexibility. For example, identifying with one's language or religion need not mean hostility to other languages and religions. Yet when used thus, language and religion have been among the most effective markers to divide a society into 'them' and 'us'.

Secular nationalisms have used a national language to promote a linguistic uniformity in their societies, just as religious nationalisms seek to revive and impose their religious tradition. Without a vigorous multi-lingualism and a vibrant religious pluralism, the cultural and religious diversity of a society will not survive. Linguistic nationalism was among the earliest threats to our unity-in-diversity in India, when Hindi was sought to be imposed as the national language. Allowing space for regional languages has defused this threat. Religious nationalism and fundamentalism are now a greater threat to our religious diversity and political unity.

In South Asia, the most prevalent exclusive and antagonistic collective identities are caste and/or religion-based. All claims to individual and collective rights are demands by the claimants to have their identity recognized and their dignity affirmed. The denial of one or the other, as often happens to religious groups in secularised societies, is perceived as a threat of annihilation, whether intended or not, and inevitably this generates dangerous political passions. Religious nationalism and fundamentalism thrive on such negative politics.

Devalle, (1992:16) any approach to this phenomenon must locate itself within a bewildering '*plurality of discourses'*, (*ibid*..) each with its underlying assumptions. These eventually do get articulated into explicit ideologies that orient perceptions and condition responses to this phenomenon.

Our purpose here is not to sort out the maze of theoretical constructs 'created by social theorists to catalogue phenomena and social groups,' but rather to consider 'ethnicity as it is actually lived, as a dynamic process with a specific present, entailing a particular mode of social experience.' (*ibid*.. 18) We do not want to get bogged down in the rather unhelpful controversies between the 'primordialists' and the 'instrumentalists', the 'survivalists' and the 'evolutionists', the 'maximalists' and the 'minimalists', to mention but a few. (Cf. Pathy 1988: 195) Rather we will position ourselves with those for whom

'ethnicity should be seen as a *historical phenomenon*, subordinated to existing class and centre-periphery contradictions, and as an element operating in cultural dialectics.' (Devalle 1992:16)

Obviously, ethnicity refers to some kind of 'collective identity'. But what the context of a particular identity will be, what group experiences will give rise to it, how this comes to self-awareness, ... all this must be located within the social context and material history of an ethnic group. Only then can the delicate balance, between objective features and subjective consciousness, that defines group identity and maintains group boundaries be grasped. (Barthes 1969) To assume otherwise is to imply that the ascriptive and exclusive characteristics that make for collective identities and group boundaries are ahistorical and static.

Hence, here we problematise ethnicity as a dynamic process in which a social unit produces and reproduces itself. This is crucial to identifying, which group characteristics will be activated and how the group will define and mobilize itself vis-a-vis the social structures in which it is embedded. (David 1989:1-) Emphasizing the material history of a group does not mean falling into a reductionism as some classical Marxists have done. For interpreting all ethnic strife in terms of 'class struggle' and ethnicity itself as 'false consciousness' is hardly adequate to the frequent contradictions in many ethnic movements or conflicting cleavages in so much ethno-politics.

There is more involved here than a reductionist class analysis by itself can explain. And yet to posit an autonomy for ethnicity, that negates the material basis of a group identity as it metamorphoses into a social movement, is to fall into other contradictions and conflicts no less intractable. Here again, we need to balance the sub-structural foundations of the social phenomena with their super-structural constructions.

The classical Marxist would always give a decisive priority to the former while granting a limited autonomy to the latter. Even with neo-Marxists, ethnic differences are seen to be but 'a mechanism for the recreation of hegemony and the reproduction of socio-economic inequality.' (Devalle 1993: 43) Thus Marxist approaches still

> 'leave ethnicity unexplained, or explained as a vague superstructural phenomenon serving ruling class interests... to keep the workforce divided and preclude the development of class consciousness.' (Devalle 1992: 44).

In our understanding, a political economy approach does well in identifying the 'necessary conditions' for ethnicity, but a more sensitive socio-cultural analysis is needed to deal with the 'sufficient conditions' of the phenomena involved. This is not to deny that ethnicity and class generally do reinforce each other; for better, as when ethnic consciousness mobilizes a group against its class disadvantages; or for

worse, as when the multiple disadvantages of ethnicity and class add up to a 'cumulative backwardness,' (Galanter 1984: 240) or 'a system of cumulative inequalities'. (Cf. Dahl 1961: 85-6)

For the location of ethnicity as process within the class structure is critical in distinguishing the two orientations of the phenomena involved:

'1. Ethnicity can serve as an element of support for the hegemony of the dominant classes and of the state.... In this case, ethnic strategies confirm the state, its policies and the status quo of class domination.

2. Ethnicity can also be a counter-hegemonic force in instances where ethnic ascription and economic and political subordination correlate....' (Devalle 1992: 16)

The 'definitional debate' on ethnic groups and ethnicity have yielded a 'medley of meanings' that has served more to underline the ambiguities and flexibilities of these concepts than to bring any real consensus and clarity to the discussion. (Phadnis 1990: 13)

Hence at this point, descriptions may be more useful than definitions. We can at least start with a general understanding from the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*: 'an ethnic group is a distinct category of the population in a larger society whose culture is usually different from its own.' (Morris 1968: 167) Such a category remains a mere aggregate until the group members become interrelated through interactions, i.e., 'are bound to one another by formal, institutionalized rules and characteristic, informal behaviour.' (*ibid*..: 168)

Ethnicity then is the phenomenon of an ethnic group coming to self-awareness that enables it to affirm its identity and pursue its interests. Thus 'ethnicity is the summation of its impulses and motivations for power and recognition... the driving force in the emergence of ethnic movements' (Phadnis 1990: 16). In other words 'ethnicity is to ethnic category what class consciousness is to class.' (Brass 1991: 19)

In general, three broad approaches to defining ethnic groups have been distinguished. (Phadnis 1990: 14; Brass 1991:18) Listing objective characteristics in an attempt to specify a common substantive core, often becomes arbitrary with much overlapping. Certainly, there must be some content to ethnic identity, and objective markers do have an important though limited usefulness. However, this approach is rather static, it does not specify how identities are defined and boundaries maintained. The subjective approach on the other hand, does well to

stress group consciousness, but it deals inadequately with other aspects, e.g., in relating this self-awareness to the conditions in which it arises.

Attempting to integrate these two approaches is a third one. Here

> 'it is not the pre-eminence of the subjective over the objective or vice versa but the linkage between the two, the complementarity of one with the other that facilitates an understanding of the processes of evolution and growth of an ethnic group characterized by continuity, adaptation or change.' (Phadnis 1990: 14)

In such a syncretistic or composite approach,

> 'an ethnic group is broadly defined as a social collectivity which possesses, and is aware of its distinctiveness by virtue of certain shared historical experiences as well as certain objective attributes.' (Sharma 1988: 27)

This approach is more comprehensive than the earlier two but still leaves out the crucial element of other recognition, which is critical to analyzing inter-group relations.

To our mind, then, three essential dimensions must be put together in describing an ethnic group and its ethnicity:

1. An objective foundation for its identity in the material history and existential group relations of that society.

2. A subjective construction of this in an articulation and motivation of common myths and rituals, symbols and values.

3. A contextual recognition by others of this group differentiation even if it is only to contest it.

The first provides the objective basis for defining an ethnic category, the second makes for the subjective construction of an ethnic identity, and the third situates the social context for inter-group relations.

All three dimensions are closely interrelated though in concrete situations each may have a different priority, just as the proportion and manner of their mix in particular circumstances may vary. All this will very much depend on the specific history and context of the group.

From the perspective in which we have positioned ourselves earlier, what is crucial to our understanding of an 'ethnic community' or ethnie.' (Smith 1994: 709) is not so much an identification of its substantive core, but an understanding of the dynamics of ethnicity as process: how it is founded, how it is constructed, how it interfaces with other aspects of society. It is these elements that must be integrated into any definition of an ethnic group or a description of ethnicity.

Inclusive and exclusive Identities

Identities that are defined negatively against others in terms of 'what one is *not*', will tend to be exclusive and dismissive of others. This creates in-groups and out-groups, stereotypes and scapegoats. Those affirmed positively, prescinding from others in defining 'who one *is*', will tend to be inclusive and not disregarding of others. This allows for openness and receptivity. 'We *are not* like that', is less open to a broader inclusion in a larger common ground than 'this is how we *are*'. Exclusive identities emphasise differences and set up oppositions and polarities with the other.

Sudhir Kakar, the psychoanalyst, explains how they help increase the sense of narcissistic well-being and attribute to the other the disavowed aspects of one's own self. (Kakar 1992: 137) Inclusive identities are inclined to affirm similarities and complementarities with the other. These make for tolerance and flexibility. For example, identifying with one's language or religion need not mean hostility to other languages and religions. Yet when used thus, language and religion have been among the most effective markers to divide a society into 'them' and 'us'.

Secular nationalisms have used a national language to promote a linguistic uniformity in their societies, just as religious nationalisms seek to revive and impose their religious tradition. Without a vigorous multi-lingualism and a vibrant religious pluralism, the cultural and religious diversity of a society will not survive. Linguistic nationalism was among the earliest threats to our unity-in-diversity in India, when Hindi was sought to be imposed as the national language. Allowing space for regional languages has defused this threat. Religious nationalism and fundamentalism are now a greater threat to our religious diversity and political unity.

In South Asia, the most prevalent exclusive and antagonistic collective identities are caste and/or religion-based. All claims to individual and collective rights are demands by the claimants to have their identity recognized and their dignity affirmed. The denial of one or the other, as often happens to religious groups in secularised societies, is perceived as a threat of annihilation, whether intended or not, and inevitably this generates dangerous political passions. Religious nationalism and fundamentalism thrive on such negative politics.

II. Arenas [Dimensions of Globalisation]

Most often and very easily the economic dimension in the globalisation process is privileged over the others. No doubt often it represents the cutting edge of this complex process particularly when it is globalisation from above as pursued by neo-liberal globalism that emphasises the expansion of market and free trade. Cutting across various social divides, of caste, class, gender, ethnicity, … this creates the kind of economic inequalities that disenfranchises the weaker and vulnerable sections the most, even as the more dominant ones are enormously advantaged by it.

Consequently, systemic problems become endemic. Unfortunately, globalisation from below based on a class consciousness and a corresponding struggle often gives way to a globalisation around ethnicity and religion. Thus, identity politics replaces the politics of interest. The consequences of this for minority groups of various kinds are what we explore in this paper. Hence the economic dimension is not elaborated at great length here since its consequences are only too obvious and apparent. Here the focus will be on those dimensions, which we regard as especially relevant to the effects of globalisation on minorities, namely the political, cultural and religious ones.

1. The Political Dimension

The Diminished State

Globalisation diminishes as it transforms the nation-state even as it precipitates and activates new nationalisms of various kinds, making this task of political control and coordination so much more problematic. For with globalisation national boundaries have become endemically porous, and national sovereignty has been drastically eroded. In this second modernity the state 'appears on the international stage as a fragmented coalition of bureaucratic agencies, each pursuing its own agenda with minimal direction or control.' (McGraw 1992:89)

This is reflected in a whole new discourse. For 'if one problem now appears to be the dominant concern of the human sciences, it is that of nationalism and the nation-state.' (Appadurai 1997:188) The three crucial monopolies of the modern state are all undermined, if not

broken in a post-modern globalising world: monopolies over violence, taxation and allegiance. For there are now legitimations of violence, centres of economic control and identity formations that are more effectively transnational than distinctly national.

Not unexpectedly the impact of globalisation on the nation-states of developing societies, still struggling to find their political equilibrium, is devastating. (Randall and Theobald 1998: 253 -) And yet it is one of the precious few instruments its citizens have to intervene on the global stage. And even with regard to internal governance 'without an effective state sustainable development, both economic and social is impossible.' (World Bank, 1997: iii)

Paradoxically then, 'globalization certainly poses new problems for the states, but it also strengthens the world cultural principle that nation-states are the primary actors charged with identifying and managing those problems on behalf of their societies.' (Meyer, *et al.*, 1997:157)

Reconstituting Civil Society

But to contest the irreversible march of neoliberal globalism we need 'a reconstituted radical politics,' (Giddens 1994:12) that goes beyond merely structural changes in the polity, and cuts deeper to demand radical ones in civil society as well. Yet whatever the character of civil society occupying the social space between kinship systems and political ones, it cannot but influence and be influenced by both sides.

However, no civil society can function without the prerequisite 'social capital' which must be created not just out of human resources at the individual level but also with social structures that make for a functioning polity. There is an obvious parallel and even an overlap between the two: civil society is the necessary social infrastructure on which the political edifice must be built; social capital stresses the non-monetary aspect of human behaviour, the social assets that are crucial for the functioning of civil society. Vice versa political intervention in civil society may be needed to eliminate all its 'institutionalised inequality' and other forms of structural injustices, lest these compound rather than resolve issues of economic poverty and political marginalisation.

Emerging Alternatives

The democratic nation-state is caught in a dilemma by globalisation: it needs to be a strong state to be an effective player on the global stage, and yet its participation in the globalisation process weakens it by making for porous political borders, enfeebled market control and, permeable cultural identities. For, as 'states' lose their monopoly of power over their people, this becomes a contested terrain for all kinds of ethnic groups, comprador classes and traditional elites. And yet 'in most cases of counternationalism, secession, supranationalism or ethnic revival on a large scale, the common thread is self-determination rather than territorial sovereignty.' (Appadurai 1997:21)

Globalisation from above does not render this any the easier because it sets up a larger more transnational hegemony, while undermining local resources of resistance. But for this a globalisation from below must be premised on such a counter-hegemonic consciousness.

Civic Cosmopolitanism

Globalisation precipitates an 'incipient cultural cosmopolitanism that would challenge the idea of the nation as the primary political and cultural community and demand relocation of power in institutions other than the national state.' (Held *et al.*1999:374). However, it is still proving difficult to create an infra-national multi-culturalism, which must be prior to, and the basis of an even more illusive transnational cosmopolitanism.

It is precisely such 'cosmopolitan republicanism', founded on basic rights and cooperative procedures, which can defuse 'the clash of civilizations'. (Huntington 1993) For a viable democracy in the new millennium necessitates a 'transnational civil society' (Held *et al* 1999: 452) in which citizens would be able to 'mediate between and render accountable the social, economic and political processes and flows that cut across and transform their traditional community boundaries.' (Held *et al.* 1999:450)

Ethnic Elites and Social Class

Given the complexities we have been striving to unravel, it should now be apparent that ethnicity is a multifaceted and interrelational social phenomenon. This allows many degrees of freedom in constructing an ethnic identity within a social context and underlines the crucial importance of an ethnic elite. Now when this is done by the dominant groups in a society for subordinate ones, we might find an identity that is imposed on, and internalized by them, and which supports the status quo. Thus, an official government census will ignore the processual elements involved in group formation, and freeze them into categories to suit its purpose. Eventually these became self-fulfilling prophecies. Thus 'in the end, taxonomies acquired the power of truth.' (Devalle 1992: 27)

There are other kinds of recursive reinforcement of such imposed identities and not all of these are from official sources or agencies external to the ethnie. Indeed, it is obvious that the dominant elites in a society have a vested interest in a 'divide and rule' policy even when it is not overtly endorsed. This only reproduces social divisions and inequalities. For

'in the hands of the state and the dominant classes, ethnicity serves as an element to reproduce systems of social relationships, to validate structures of inequality and to support policies of social control.' (Devalle 1992:239)

Moreover, subordinate group elites may become willing collaborators or unwitting pawns in this game and co-opt their communities to serve the prevailing hegemony. Such co-optation by elites is certainly not exceptional and not confined to subordinate groups. Often enough it is the very competition between elites, whether within an ethnie or across them in society that precipitates a situation, wherein genuine concerns are obfuscated and manipulated to be subservience to vested interests, not just in the ethnic community but in society at large as well.

However, where such elite interests are in abeyance, or at least not in conflict with those of their group, then such groups can mobilize a 'culture of protest' to counter the 'culture of oppression'. 'Ultra nationalism and community exclusionism' (*ibid.*.) apart, in such a counter-hegemonic movement, 'ethnicity may provide the subaltern sectors with a strategy to combat inequality and to cancel forms of domination.' (*ibid.*. 240)

Given the interrelationships of ethnic groups and their elites, an acceptable approach to ethnicity cannot be reductionists in either eco-political or socio-cultural terms. It must be inclusive of both class consciousness and ethnic identity in a more comprehensive and integrative perspective. That is why we have refrained from preoccupying ourselves with the substantive core of ethnicity, and emphasized its interrelatedness with other social phenomena in which it is contextualised and constructed.

A viable analysis of the multiple inter- and intra- ethnic and elite conflicts and contradictions, must consider the class factor if it is to do justice, or indeed have any relevance to the complexities involved. Thus it

> 'must comprehend how an ethnic group articulates with the wider structure of social stratification, and how the group in turn gets structured by these. For an ethnic group cannot be studied as an isolated, autonomous sub-system.' (Heredia 1994: 131)

For as with ethnicity,

> 'class consciousness develops out of the collectively experienced everyday reality. For those involved, class, more often than not, is not translated into abstract discourses. Class is lived as a process and 'handled in cultural terms' in many different ways.' (Devalle 1992: 238)

Ethnicity then is one of the ways in which a class-in-itself can become a class-for-itself, particularly where ethnic ascription and class status correspond. In unison these can provide a 'strategic axis for mobilization against inequality and domination'. (*ibid.*. 239)

Class Contradictions and Ethnic Conflicts

However, where a big ethnic community is stratified by class, or a large social class is segmented in diverse ethnic groups, contradictions between ethnic identities and class interests can develop, that allow group consciousness to be manipulated in favour of vested interests. Thus a dominant class can divide and rule subordinate ones by playing up its diverse ethnic identity just as an elite within an ethnic community can co-opt its people to alien interests by appealing to their common identity.

It is to the obvious advantage of an ethnic group with a dominant status in a society to support the status quo. Such groups generally have

a positive group identity reinforced. An ethnic group with subordinate class status is more likely to have internalized a negative group identity so that it is both eco-politically subservient and socio-culturally disadvantaged. These are what we would call 'ethnic minorities', taking the term 'minority' not as a demographic category but in the sense defined by *the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences:*

> ' a group of people, differentiated from others in the same society by race, nationality, religion or language, who think of themselves as a differentiated group and are thought of by others as a differentiated group with negative connotations. Further, they are relatively lacking in power and hence subjected to certain exclusions, discriminations and other differentiated treatment.' (Rose 1968:365).

Majority-minority definitions are relative and changing, for they are more than a numbers game. They are the result of a complex set of interactions and construction. (Phadnis 1990:20) Vertical and horizontal cleavages may develop in a cascading process of 'minoritization' in which new minorities are defined. (Gupta 1995)

It should now be obvious that ethnic identities are not monolithic organic wholes. Especially in a multi-cultural context there will be overlapping multiple identities and cross-cutting group boundaries. But as group identities get homogenized within groups, boundaries between them get sharpened and reinforced. This can make for easier internal mobilization, which is to the advantage of internal group elites, who often will manipulate such situations to promote their interests. Generally, these will organize to achieve a 'multi-symbol congruence' (Brass. 1991: 50) to broaden and strengthen their appeal and so reduce dissent and dissonance.

What specific symbols and issues are used to construct the group's ethnicity will depend on the social context and circumstances of these elites. Thus a religious elite will use religion, as the ulema have done with the Shariat for Indian Muslims, just as a more secular elite will use non-religious symbols like language, as the Dravidian movement in the south has done with Tamil. Or there may be a circulation of elites, as with Bengal, that was united by language at the turn of this century against the British, but later partitioned by religion as they left.

We cannot of course ignore the potential for greater intra group conflict, that such mobilization and competition has, as one leadership may try to displace the other, and consequently the possibilities this creates for extremism and terror. And yet imposing a dominant

homogeneity on a diversity of ethnic groups, divesting them of their identity and distinctiveness, all too often precipitates the opposite. Indeed, it frequently has mobilized these groups into resistance and violent conflict against such dominance, even to the point of secession.

A multi-ethnic society, then, will do well to encourage not only a cultural diversity between groups, but also multiple non-exclusive group memberships that network across groups and make borders more permeable. For in the final analysis ethnicity can be both mobilizing and divisive. It can be used to unite a group against discrimination; or to divide groups to exploit them. We must be sensitive to the delicate distinction between ethnicity as a uniting 'myth' and ethnicity as a dividing 'ideology'.

Only a careful consideration of the interrelated contexts, both politico-economic as well as socio-cultural, can enhance the positive potential of ethnicity in a multi-cultural society, without precipitating negative consequences in terms of intractable divisions and violent conflict. Hopefully such an analysis will help to reconstruct a more positive ethnicity, one that is neither exclusivist nor defensive, but respectful of and open to the other, as parts of a whole, in which each contributes and receives to the mutual enrichment of each group, and the overall advantage of society.

Nation-making and State-breaking

Nationalism has certainly been one of the five most powerful ideologies for mobilizing people in the modern world. (Ward 1959) So gripping has this idea been in the freedom struggle of the colonized peoples, that is it only more recently that the kind of politics it has precipitated is being critically assessed. For as long as it was a uniting force for the diverse groups and interests against their common enemy, it was vigorously promoted by the very urgency and compulsions of these independence movements.

But once the colonial enemy had withdrawn, increasingly other more ambiguous and negative aspects became more evident, so that 'the nationalism of these nation-states is found to be oppressive and paranoid,' (Kothari 1989:17) by the sub-nationalisms within, as well as to the other nations without. For the very ideology that was earlier used to unite people in a common cause, is now imposed on subordinate groups by dominant ones to assimilate them into their vested interests. Moreover, such internal aggression is all too often manipulatively justified by propagandising the danger of an external one.

For nationalism, like the idea of progress, has its roots in the modernist Enlightenment. Both were useful to motivate and mobilize peoples, and to create a collective identity and consciousness. But such homogenisation is never really complete and is often vigorously resisted. We have earlier explained how this gives rise to the kind of ethno-politics so endemic to these states, which is then further exacerbated by the kind of developmentalism they have opted for.

Now, when an ethnic group demands an autonomous political recognition and formal expression,

> 'either within an existing state or in a state of its own, it has become a nationality or a nation... an ethnic community politicized, with recognized group rights in the political system.' (Brass 1991: 20)

Thus, as an ethnic category becomes conscious of its ethnicity, it evolves into a community. When this becomes politically articulate and organized, it develops into a nation, though not all such ethnic nations will have their own sovereign state.

Hence we must distinguish 'ethnic nationalism and state- centred nationalism', though both involve a 'process of identity formation' through 'multisymbol congruence, .. whether those symbols are ethnic attributes or loyalty to a particular state.' (*ibid.*:20) This is how 'imagined communities' become nations (Anderson 1983) though 'the invention of traditions.' (Hobsbawm 1983) There are two processes at work here.

> 'one involving 'nation-making and nation-building within the physical and political co-ordinates of a colony or sovereign state, and the other involving state breaking, i.e, altering or realigning the politico-territorial base of the state for achieving nationhood or statehood.' (Phadnis 1990: 23)

The probability for nation-building spilling over into state-breaking should be obvious.

Further

> 'in multi-ethnic societies, one discerns two simultaneous and on-going processes of nation-building: (a) the formation of an inter-ethnic composite of a homogeneous personality with a secular outlook through the state apparatus and (b) the transformation of an ethnic group in a multi-ethnic society to an ethnic community to a nation.' (*ibid.*: 25)

And once again the potential for contradiction here cannot be missed.

However, neither ethnicist nor statist nationalism guarantees 'another politics' or 'another development' as we have urged earlier. On the contrary, they tend to intensify the same political lines of conflict, and extend the same economistic models of development. Both can be chauvinistic and homogenizing at their respective levels of nation and state. Neither assures distributive justice or ecological sustainability. Hence we argue that neither suppressive statism nor secessionist ethnicity by themselves address the real issues underlying ethnic integration and accommodation in a plural society.

For in a multi-ethnic state, at a more fundamental level, the issues are concerned with the affirmation of group identity and personal dignity, with the recognition of ethnic diversity and culture rights, with the pursuit of social equality and community participation. These are the issues that must be addressed and resolved in a viable consensus that sets a framework for the discourse and negotiation between groups and their elites. Otherwise, ethnic and national identity may be constructed in contradiction and ethnicity and nationalism trapped in conflict.

Nationalist Ideology and Ethnic Myth

Here too as with ethnicity we must make a decisive distinction between the dual characteristics of nationalism. For 'nationalism' signifies both an ideological doctrine and a wider symbolic universe and fund of sentiments.' (Smith 1994: 725) The ideology claims the sole source of political power for the nation and the ultimate loyalty of its citizens, preferably in their own sovereign nation-state. The wider 'culture of nationalism' is concerned with transcending narrower group loyalties for the 'ideals of autonomy, unity and identity' (*ibid.*.) in a larger more free, egalitarian and fraternal whole.

There is an inherent conflict here between an assimilating national ideology and a resistant ethnic consciousness. But in a wider weltanschauung of nationalism there need be no contradiction between the national mythology and the ethnic 'mythomoteur', the constitutive political myth of an ethnie.' (Smith 1994:716) They both can be reconciled in a larger whole, constituting a unity in diversity. We believe, such a pluralist culture of nationalism will allow for a multi-ethnic nation in a multi-nation state.

If 'empirically it would appear that the chances of survival of polyethnic nations are poor,' (Smith 1994:723) this is because we do not as yet have an appropriate political model for it, rather than the ideal

itself being unworkable. For even while nation-states are predominant on the global scene there is a marked movement to federations in larger more diverse unions. What we need is a federalism that will work within the state, even as there is a quest for confederations between them. Here the principle of 'subsidiarity' can be put to work, with its two-dimensions of devolution of authority downwards and an integration of power upwards.

To our thinking, neither the adversarial model of conventional liberal politics, nor the recently proposed 'consociational' one of elite negotiation and consensus (Lijphart 1977:25) seem adequate to this venture. These are both Western models premised on a pragmatism born of their particular history. We need to break out of such textbook models and imagine and construct our own, premised on the crucial distinction between the state and society so important for most non-Western civilizations.

In the Gandhian view the more minimalist a state and the less dependent a society was on it, the greater the space for democratic participation and national integration for a unity in diversity. (Jain 1989) For Gandhi the state was basically an instrument of violence in a concentrated and organized form, (Ramamurthi 1986: 136) and hence rather than the capturing of state power by a few, his endeavour was to generate people power for the many. This decentralisation and mass mobilization form the basis of the Gandhian concept of a moral polity and the non-violent state. (Rao 1986: 147)

The basis for this would be the older civilisational order in which the state did not order society, rather it is the order of society that the state maintained. For,

> 'the state was under the command of the society and not the other way around. Indeed, several political orders survived and competed with one another in these societies, in the past. But they were all subject to a larger civilizational order in which governance was not defined as a monopoly of the state.' (Sheth 1989: 625)

It is possible then, in this indigenous model, to consider

> 'the state not as an instrument of an ethnically defined nation, but a political entity functioning under the control of a civil society. It will be a state for and on the behalf of civil society: in brief a civil state and not a nation state' (*ibid.*: 626)

Tagore's patriotism, like Gandhi's was a rejection of a narrow nationalist agenda, even as it was anti-imperialist and non-militaristic. He refused a primacy to polities but sought rather to reconcile the contradictions and conflicts of his country in a higher cultural order, just as Gandhi did on the more basic little traditions of his peoples. (Nandy 1994:2)

For both

> 'in this ideology of patriotism rather than of nationalism, there was a built-in critique of nationalism and refusal to recognize the nation-state as the organizing principle of the Indian civilization and as the last word in the country's political life.' (*ibid*..:3)

For both, again,

> 'over time, the Indian freedom movement ceased to be an expression of only nationalist consolidation; it came to acquire a new stature as a symbol of the universal struggle for political justice and cultural dignity.' (*ibid*.: 2-3)

For both finally, such a worldview was

> 'the ultimate civilizational ambition of India: to be the cultural epitome of the world and convert all passionate self-other debates into self-self debates.' (*ibid*..:82)

In other words to convert divisive debates into integrating dialogues, to transform exclusive identities into inclusive ones, to change hostile controversy into empathetic consensus.

Perhaps there will be enough pre-nationalists in our traditional society, which still lives, and post-nationalists in our post-modern world, that is already coming to be, together to form an alliance against the aggressive nationalisms and ethnocentric fundamentalisms that are sweeping across this sub-continent, and with it sweeping away much, that was most precious in this civilization, into the dustbin of history.

The project then in a multi-ethnic society would be not nation-building or state-breaking, but building a civil society to incorporate the state within a larger civilisational matrix of coexistence and co-operation among interlocking groups. Such a civil state will defuse the conflict and contradiction between ethnicity and nationalism and reconstruct them in more constructive and creative ways. Only this will be able to resolve the conflict between exclusive ethnic divisions and homogenising national identities, in a richer diversity of civilisation and, deeper unity of civic humanism. Truly then the aggressive political nation-state will have withered away! Only then will a multi-nation state constrained in a multi-cultural society be feasible.

Indeed, the experience in constructing the reverse, a unitary nation-state out of a multi-ethnic society, has taken an awesome human cost in suppression, when it has not failed in secession. However, given their predominance today

> 'for the foreseeable future, political and social life must continue to function within the framework of the nation-state and the nationalisms that uphold and challenge that order.' (Smith 1994: 728)

2. The Cultural Dimension

Interrogating Identities

Culture defines and structures our world, giving meaning, motivation and identity, Interrogating such identities, especially in situations of change such as is precipitated by globalisation, becomes all the more critical and any response to this interrogation in a multicultural society is so much the more complicated.

Now if 'imagined communities' can invent traditions, aided by print-media among other things (Anderson 1983) then it should not surprise us that today's 'mass-mediated solidarities have the additional complexity that, in them, diverse local experiences of taste, pleasure and politics crisscross with one another, thus creating the possibility of convergence in trans-local social action that would otherwise be hard to imagine.' (Appadurai 1997:8) In contemporary globalisation this makes for a new 'power of imaging possible lives' (Beck 2000:52) fed by 'the global circulation of images and models, which (actively and passively) keeps the cultural economy going.' (Beck 2000:54)

Reproducing Culture

But if new global identities are inscribed in macro narratives, these in turn are 'punctuated, interrogated and domesticated by the micronarratives of film, television, music and other expressive forms which allow modernity to be rewritten more as a vernacular globalisation'. (Appadurai 1997:10) In this context then ethnic identity becomes 'the conscious and imaginative construction of difference as its

core … differences that constitute the diacritics of identity.' (Appadurai 1997:14)

All these 'diasporic public spheres, diverse among themselves' make for a new identity politics, or 'culturalism' (Appadurai 1997:22). The apprehension that globalisation will precipitate a culturally homogeneous world, a global McDonaldisation, seems misplaced. On the contrary, if anything it provokes localisation in diverse vernacular cultures.

The reconstruction of identities necessarily implies a situation of cultural fluidity of no small proportions today. And third-world countries that are being leap-frogged into the process are surely the most acutely affected. In such a situation cultural reproduction or the transmission of a social heritage across generations becomes enormously problematic.

Alienation and violence are the inevitable consequences and are only too evident in our societies today: in the family, between genders, in ethnic cleansing and religious strife, in genocides and war. Here in fact is the dark underside of cultural globalisation: the disruption wrought by changes that it brings, and from which no society is completely immune. The 'fractal landscape' resulting from such cultural confusion needs new analytical models and a new 'chaos theory of culture'! (Appadurai 1997:46)

Implosion and Explosion

It is no surprise, then, that cultural globalisation would precipitate social-cultural conflict of various kinds. For diversity without some overarching integrative unity cannot but be endemically conflictual, the more so as we have seen, where the situation is already one of economic inequality, and political instability, and when mass migration complicates issues and electronic media obfuscates them further.

This is especially so where there already is a cultural fragmentation, which further confuses and compounds their struggle to cope with the unprecedented changes their burgeoning populations are undergoing. Here diverse groups competing for scarce resources, for their limited place in the sun, are particularly vulnerable to such violent conflict.

However, to conceptualise such group conflict in terms of insiders versus outsiders misses the peculiarities of contemporary globalisation. Appadurai suggests a new understanding that will 'resist the inner-outer dialectic imposed on us by the primordialist way of thinking and think

instead in terms of the dialectics of implosion and explosion over time as the key to the peculiar dynamics of modern ethnicity.'(Appadurai 1997:157) There is, in other words, a folding-in and a breaking-out: for instance, a claim to fundamental rights and universal principles legitimised in the global context, and an affirmation of distinctive differences and particular identities politicised in the local one. The resulting dialectic cannot but make for an explosive mix.

Universalising and Particularising

Contemporary globalisation involves a cultural paradox: on the one hand, 'central to the very idea of globalization is that subunits of the global system can constitute themselves only with reference to this encompassing whole … But conversely, the global whole becomes a social reality only as it crystallizes out of the attempts of subunits to deal with their relativising contact.' (Beyer 1994:27) Thus each society produces its own image of a world order and 'the global universal or, more precisely, the global concern about the universal only results from the interaction among these images.' (Beyer 1994:28)

Such a global-local interaction becomes a fertile site for encouraging diverse particularisms and also diverse images of globality. This is the paradox of 'the particularization of universalism (the rendering of the world as a single place) and the universalization of particularism (the globalised expectation that these societies … should have distinct identities).' (Robertson 1989: 9)

Ethnic Identity and Social Dignity

Identity is what answers the question, 'who am I?' Now an *'individualized* identity, one that is particular to me, and what I discover in myself', (Taylor 1993:28) is formed in the intimate encounter with significant others. An ethnic identity, however, is socialized in a more public space. There is of course a relationship between the two in any ethnie, but the first is never a straightforward projection of the latter. With the collapse of stable hierarchies that once positioned people in relation to others, and the emphasis now on the essential equality of all humans, there is a consequent levelling and a disorientation, that makes

both social identity and dignity problematic and vulnerable to easy manipulation.

For, while dialogue is indeed a most fundamental condition of social life, the terms and frames of reference within which it must take place are dramatically changing. Inevitably then, those who set the terms for the dialogue can dominate it to their own advantage. Hence the importance of 'the politics of recognition' in shaping our identity, especially in a multi-cultural context. (Taylor 1992:25) Moreover, 'nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.' (*ibid.*) This is precisely what prejudice is all about. Hence, when we can speak of freedom from prejudice, we can affirm more positively 'a right, namely, that the conditions of our identity be respected.' (Taylor 1993:48)

In our understanding then, identity must provide us with 'some master value or some allegiance or some community membership', (*ibid.*.45) that constitutes 'a horizon of meaning by which to identify ourselves,' (*ibid.*.52) and so live meaningfully and fully as human subjects. Such a horizon when translated into the concrete context of a particular group or ethnie will be conditioned by time and space. It will necessarily involve 'a process of inclusion and exclusion of value and symbols defining 'we' and 'they', 'us' and 'others'.' (Shah 1994:1133) The boundaries thus defined can be more or less permeable, they may overlap and cut across other borders or they may get sharper and harder as they are politicised and contested, from without or within the ethnie.

It should now be apparent how closely related the realities of identity and dignity are, both at the individual and group levels. The negation of one will inevitably mean the negation of the other, the affirmation of one demands the affirmation of the other. Dignity without identity is not feasible, identity without dignity is not acceptable. A positive identity is a necessary constituent of one's dignity, a sense of one's self-worth and self-respect. The recognition of one's dignity by others is a necessary condition of a positive identity, since this is socially derived. And the same can be said of a social group's sense of collective dignity as well.

But there is a critical difference between the two. (Cf Taylor 1992: 37-) The affirmation of equal dignity, which implies equal rights and freedoms for all is premised on the 'politics of universalism' it goes back to the beginnings of modern democracy. On the other hand, the recognition of the uniqueness of diverse identities is based on the 'politics of difference' that is respectful of cultural rights. The first leads to similarity and homogeneity which is the quest of the nation-state.

Second accepts particularity and heterogeneity which is the aspiration of a multi-cultural society.

It is possible for one to contradict and displace the other. In actual fact this does happen. The first quest may cancel out the second aspiration. There is then a dilemma here, but if we concede a priority to the universally human over the culturally specific, then a constructive reconciliation is possible. This would mean that a homogenizing universalism cannot be allowed to be so absolute as to negate cultural and ethnic diversities, but rather to respect and even celebrate them. However, 'the right to culture' cannot be unconditional either. For cultural rights cannot contradict more fundamental human rights; rather they can only be legitimate in the context of 'a culture of rights.' (Bhargava 1991)

3. The Religious Dimension

Secularising the Global Village

If globalisation is a further stage of modernisation, then the secularisation consequent on this must further it as well, and the religious response must be seen in this context too. For paradoxically, the religious movements spawned in the global village have in actuality become globalised with the very global processes that were expected to marginalise them. Indeed, if we accept with Paul Tillich that religion is what 'ultimately concerns man', then we can expect changes in the way we cope with such concerns, not their pre-emptory exclusion, and least of all their pre-mature demise.

If globalisation celebrates the secular city (Cox 1966), the global village still remains a 'disenchanted' place for those whose God will not die, Nietzsche's prophecies notwithstanding. In fact, the resurgence of religion has been as vigorous and diverse as the processes of globalisation and secularisation that provoke this. For in undermining and reconstituting the cultural values of a tradition, the institutionalised practises of a society, and the civic life of individuals, globalisation adds a pervasive breadth and an incisive depth to the secularisation process. But then inevitably localisation, as the obverse side of this situation precipitates a response that could be positive or negative, or at times a reaction that can be equal and opposite.

Situating Symbiosis

Thus, global homogeneity tends to erode particular cultural traditions, whereas religion functions very much in the realm of such localised particulars and personal solidarities and hence becomes a critical factor in re-affirming threatened identities, and re-constituting lost ones. Yet global structures and technologies can also be used not just to resist alien impositions, but also to actively promote a local collective solidarity and project this onto the global stage. Thus, particular identities are universalised, as they explode on the world scene, even as universal expectations are particularised, as these implode into local situations.

Many of the new religious movements are driven by such a dynamic. Thus, particular religious discriminations are projected on to a larger universal stage where remedial action is sought, just as the universal affirmation of religious freedom is injected into a particular concrete context to raise local expectations and seek lasting redress. Fundamentalist movements can operate similarly but for the very opposite goals.

Again, the economic inequalities caused by the free market, the political insecurities consequent on the diminished nation-state, the rank individualism due to the undermining of social solidarity, all this and more belies the global promise of liberty, equality, fraternity. The inherent contradiction between promise and performance, the inevitable tension between inclusion and exclusion in global systems creates residual problems which provide fertile ground for utopian movements, especially religious ones, that promise all this and heaven too!

Globalising Movements

The anomalies in the globalisation process are reflected in the ambiguities of religious movements that respond to it. Thus when a religious movement intervenes to address specific systemic problems in a society, it must necessarily follow the logic of that very system itself. With globalisation, then, the danger for a religious movement is to fall between two stools: it might end up advocating bad social policy, or suffer from poor religious inspiration.

Moreover,

> 'the otherness of the other is increasingly problematic as a consequence of globalization; fundamentalism, to put it most simply, is inevitably contaminated by the culture it opposes. Just as in any pluralistic culture, the other is always already within us, we are also already in the other, even when she or he puts forth a grand display of antipluralist authenticity. In the modern world system, no fundamentalist can simply reappropriate the sacred and live by its divine lights. The very reappropriation is a modern, global phenomenon, part of the shared experience 'creolization'. To see it as such is to include the other as full participant in a common discourse, a common society, rather than to relegate him or her to the iron cage of otherness.' (Lechner 2000:341)

To imagine the final outcome as one global civil religion, would precisely negate the appeal and inspiration of particular religious beliefs and practices, which are at their best when affirming local cultures and particular peoples. The very homogenisation of a globalising world would seem to precipitate a pluralism of religious responses. This is precisely the paradox that keeps the religious enterprise alive, and hopefully the radical, liberating and empowering possibilities in a religious tradition still relevant as well.

III. Minorities and Globalisation

The Social Construction of Minorities

Here we understand 'minorities' not just as a matter of demographic numbers, but rather as groups of people differentiated by themselves and others with negative connotations. For although the Indian Constitution recognises only linguistic and religious minorities, and the courts have defined a 50 per cent limit for a group to be considered a minority in a state, the term 'minority group' as it is used today in the social sciences, does not refer to relative numbers. To quote the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*:

'Contemporary sociologists generally define a minority as ... a group of people differentiated from others in the same society by race, nationality, religion or language who both think of themselves as a differentiated group and are thought of by others as a differentiated group with negative connotations. Further, they are relatively lacking in power and hence are subjected to certain exclusions, discriminations and other differential treatment.' (Rose, 'Minorities', 1968:365)

The essential features, then, are not just some objective characteristics, but a subjective construct consisting of a set of attitudes: self-definition from within and prejudice from without; and a set of behaviours: self-segregation from within and discrimination and exclusion from without.

Imagined Communities

Minorities then are constructed like majorities both from within and from without. In this sense, they are 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983) though they could be national, sub-national or even smaller 'ethniclones'. Thus, a minority might be mobilised around a perceived group disadvantage, but it can also be a majority prejudice that stereotypes them into a single group identity. Similarly, a majority might co-opt other groups and subsume them under their own hegemony under a supposedly single identity and an apparently common interest. Or a minority might define itself against such a dominant majority and consolidate this majoritarian identity and interest further.

What happens in such circumstances is that extremism on both sides, feeds on each other, as when trade union rivalry escalates industrial conflict. Majority and minority groups can thus often get locked into a process of violent confrontation that spirals out of control. Most ethnic and religious conflicts in South Asia and elsewhere are rather obvious illustrations of this process.

Difference and Diversity

Thus, difference is constructed into an alienating prejudice that disadvantages the group, rather than being accepted as an enriching diversity that advantages the society as a whole. In such situations, we need to be more sensitive to the fundamental rights of human

individuals and more protective of the collective rights of minority groups. Here we have the same dilemmas between the politics of universalism and the politics of particularism (Taylor1992) reflecting the global and the local dilemma, to which we shall come back later.

However, to neglect such tensions and to leave the underlying contradictions unresolved, will precipitate a crisis that can eventually stumble into violent resolution, or perhaps even a dissolution of our society. Minorities, then, must be an especial concern as the globalisation process penetrates their individual and group lives.

In this country, there are innumerable examples that should alert us to the precipice that we are rapidly approaching even as we stare into a chasm of chaos before us. The founding vision of this country of unity in diversity, of fundamental rights and democratic freedoms, of civil liberties and minorities rights, of secular commitment and affirmative action, of linguistic diversity and religious pluralism, … are now not just being challenged but are under serious threat. How we respond to such a situation will surely define our future.

1. The Dynamics of Exclusion

In so far as globalisation erodes particularistic characteristics with more universal affinities and rational beliefs, egalitarian expectations and gender sensitivity, etc., it helps towards democratisation. But in undermining as it must, local identities and traditional securities, and introducing as it does, unfamiliar values and new opportunities, it provokes a backlash fuelled on multiple resentments and fears, the most apparent of which are the inequalities and insecurities both within and between various nation-states and societies, as also among and amidst diverse ethnic communities and groups. This has given rise to 'low-intensity democracy' which legitimates conservative regimes still founded on traditional domestic elites. (Gill and Rocamera 1992: 501-524)

Insecurities and Ambiguities

Minorities are drawn into the globalisation process, as disadvantaged subaltern groups, but they do have the possibility of initiating the globalisation from below as indicated earlier. This could

amount to a reconstitution of civil society provided the minority identities are not exclusive but are inclusive and open to multi-layering. Such a reconstitution becomes feasible, if a minority group has the social capital with which to engage in this process. However, with the diminished state in contemporary globalisation, statutory support at the national level is undermined and as yet not quite replaced at the global one, leaving minorities vulnerable and insecure.

In the cultural dimension, the reproduction of minority cultures is often ambiguous. For the one hand they are swamped by macro narratives of universalising processes at the global level, and yet precisely because of their distinct identity micronarratives facilitated by new technologies cultural reproduction can be more effective at the local one. But these could as well facilitate reactionary revivalism unless there is a certain freeing of the imagination and even a hybridisation of culture to which minorities must be open to.

Finally, secularisation as a global process disenchants more than just the 'secular city'. It penetrates personal lives and community identities to create lifestyles and affiliations beyond the sanction of traditional culture and religion, creating its own severe discontents, especially for those who have been in some way disadvantaged by these processes of modernisation and secularisation. This new social space is readily inhabited by a variety of discontents: perceived injustices, social insecurities, wounded memories, … that are easily mobilised by the new religious movements, which can be either projected globally or contextualised locally.

The Impact of Change

It should be obvious from this discussion that globalisation introduces new dimensions of change that directly affect this process of minority/majority construction. For the changes it precipitates are unprecedented both in scale and in scope. It affects more areas of social life and penetrates this more deeply. Further, it accelerates the pace and also escalates the price of change, both in the sense of the greater demands made to cope with and take advantage of such changes, as also the higher risk as failure to keep up with the pace of change results in even greater disadvantage and loss.

For change itself often leaves people anxious and insecure since there are no guidelines from tradition on how to respond and cope. Often this causes resentment and anger that is easily projected on to other groups who might well be in a similar situation of disorientation themselves.

Problems of equity and distributive justice become increasingly problematic and inadequate or postponed responses often leave many groups of people alienated and resentful. Inevitably then, the process of globalisation will result in systemic residual problems that must be urgently addressed. And yet no matter how well planned and committed such a response, it is never quite adequate to this daunting challenge.

Conflict and Dialogue

Moreover, with globalisation such identity construction and group mobilisation is no longer limited to national boundaries. Even in a country that is predominantly Muslim, there can be a sense of being marginalised and disadvantaged on the global scene. Thus the Iranian revolution attempted to project itself as a global movement. The fatwa against Salman Rushdie was an indication of this. Such national societies are often tempted into a pan-Islamism which often has very little relationship to the real interests and concerns of people at the local level. The Islamic republic of Pakistan and its encounter with jihadi Islam and the resulting Talibanisation of Pakistani society is only the latest example of this.

Dominant majority groups are also caught up in this process of globalisation. In this context, one can analyse the politics of the Sangh Parivar as attempting to universalise and globalise its appeal with such vehicles as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, even as it localises this in communal violence and riots in this country through such agencies as the Bajrang Dal.

The resulting 'clash of civilisations' (Huntington 1993) on the global scene often polarises conflict along such fault lines between such massively mobilised religious and cultural solidarities. And yet if a dialogue between cultures is to be a real possibility, then this would demand that exclusive identities yield to multiple, layered ones, and obscurantist religious teaching be subjected to reasonable and enlightened critique. Certainly, such an expectation is not an unreal or impossible one. In fact, the member states of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) are committed to such a task. (*Mainstream* 2002:11)

2. The Minority-Majority Dialectic

The Minoritisation Process

Because the majority-minority syndrome is constructed both from without and from within these groups, the minority definition can be imposed on a group by outsiders. This is precisely why no group is safe from a process of 'minoritisation', 'by which new minorities are created unbeknownst to them … And when that happens almost anybody can become the next minority for the process of minoritization has no permanent or official favourites.' (Gupta 1999: 76-77) This is well illustrated by the minoritisation of the Sikhs that climaxed in the horrendous pogrom of 1984 in Delhi. Would anyone have anticipated that the 'sword arm of Hinduism' at the time of the Partition would be targeted thus less than four decades later!

In an analogous manner, majoritisation can also be constructed from within, by a dominant elite that co-opts other subaltern groups into their hegemony. Again, this is well illustrated by the Hindutvawadis who are dominated by upper castes projecting a Brahminical Hinduism that subsumes the popular religiosity of the masses into a patriarchal caste hierarchy.

We can carry this analogy further to show how extremist leaders often precipitate situations that invites reprisals against their own minority group so as to consolidate its internal solidarity and their own sway over the group. Political terrorists and religious fundamentalists often fall back on such strategies. This certainly has happened with the Tamils and the Sinhala in Sri Lankan, and with various kinds of extremists' groups in India.

Global-Local Dialectic

Here we will attempt to elaborate on some of the more fine-tuned dynamics of this overall process of globalisation and localisation that impacts both majorities and minorities as indicated earlier, in continuity with Appadurai's 'implosion-explosion' dynamic (Appadurai 1997:46) and Beyer's global-local dialectic, both explained earlier. (Beyer 1994:26-28)

More generally, what Robertson called the universalisation of the particular and vice versa the particularisation of the universal, (Robertson 1989:9) is easily illustrated when local identities are

projected to more universal level, i.e., specific national Islamic identities projected and universalised into a pan-Islamism, and vice versa, when more universal or even transnational Muslim customs and practices are enforced in a local or national Muslim community. Thus, the diversity of the Islamic community in this country from Kashmir to Kerala, was once obscured by the two-nation theory into a supposedly national one. And now this national Islamic identity in Pakistan, after being fractured by Bangladesh, is being projected globally into a pan-Islamic movement even as it fragments into sub-nationalisms locally. Similar examples can be given of other societies where a defensive religious fundamentalism holds sway and it might be instructive to investigate the differences that account for this.

In a similar way the diversity of religious and cultural Hinduism in this country is being semitised into a Brahminical version by the Sangh Parivar and now projected beyond the national scene as a world civilisation and at times even as the mother of other civilisations as well!

Vice versa we see how inter- or trans- national concerns are often projected and mobilised at the national and even more at local levels. If this once happened with the Khilafat movement it is surely happening today in an exacerbated manner with the Palestinian problem that has affected the whole Middle East and is now affecting parts of South Asia. Similarly, the Tamil minority problem in Sri Lanka is extending itself across the Palk Straits. Why this happens in some instances and not others might be a useful investigation.

Down-up and Up-down Dynamics

Elaborating Appadurai's 'implosion-explosion model, Tambiah explains two opposite processes, bottom-up and top-down. For the first process, he uses the terms 'focalization' and 'transvaluation', linked processes 'in which micro-events at the local level, through chain-like linkages accelerate and cumulatively build up into an avalanche, whose episodes progressively lose their local textual, circumstantial, and substantive associations'. (Tambiah, 1996:257) In the second instance, for a top-down process, he introduces the concepts of 'nationalization' and 'parochialisation', where a more general issue of conflict is projected into a local context and heightened.

To illustrate the down-up dynamic, several incidents of atrocities against a local minority can be focused and transvalued to then 'explode'

into a far wider pogrom on a more universal stage. The recent Godhra train burning is an instance of this. Or again the Ram temple at Ayodhya becomes the symbol of pan-Hindu unity even for the NRIs! Examples of the up-down dynamic would be when a national issue like affirmative action, or religious conversions, becomes 'parochialised' and projected into a local community to disturb generally harmonious inter-caste or inter-religious community relations there. The anti-Mandal Commission riots in the 1980s in North and the anti-conversion backlash in Meenaksipuram in Tamilnadu and Manoharpur in Orissa illustrate this.

Obviously, these are not predetermined dynamics. They can be reversed by deliberate interventions and then globalisation can also have positive consequences for minorities. Thus local wrongs in violation of rights can be globalised through various national and international human rights groups and some justice and protection sought and obtained. Or atrocities against minorities often focused on by NGOs can then be transvalued by the National Commission for Human Rights, or even by an international agency and some redress demanded, or some concrete instances of communal harmony can be transvalued and projected on to a larger social stage.

Oppositely, a national human rights' awareness can motivate a movement to contextualise itself by taking up significant local issues. Similarly, with the feminist movement, national and international concerns are often contextualised and made concrete at a more parochial level, or a particular cultural practice that advantages women in one religious group then be universalised as legitimate for other groups through various communications networks that globalisation facilitates.

But, whatever be the political-economic causes of ethnic differences, they all tend to polarise around the cultural fault lines built up on constructed histories and perceived injustices, imagined communities and invented traditions. The globalisation–localisation dialectic has the potential to heighten these into violent conflict or defuse them into an enriching complementarity. But in a globalising world there is no escape into isolation from such situations, and 'insiders' and 'outsiders' can become confused and ambiguous categories. Rather it is the implosion-explosion dialectic in which top-down and bottom-up processes work themselves out that would seem to provide a more adequate understanding.

3. Real Interests and Imagined Identities

Politics of Displacement

In a plural society, the majority-minority dialectic cannot but precipitate tensions and conflict that often run out of control. In such a situation, 'imagined' cultural and religious identities are readily constructed and mobilised for collective action to right perceived wrongs. With globalisation now this identity politics has both been globalised and localised and often with telling consequences for all concerned. In this identity politics has followed interest politics, where transnational corporations and multilateral institutions on the one hand, and anti-globalisation and swadeshi movements on the other, project interests across regional and national boundaries.

However, with vulnerable groups, like minorities, too easily real economic and political interests and concerns are either co-opted and subsumed in this process and/or subordinated and marginalised in the quest for group solidarity around group identity. For minorities, this might be projected as a matter of survival, for majorities it is often a preoccupation with dominance.

Yet this displacement of the 'politics of interest' by the 'politics of identity' or what can be called the 'politics of reason' by the 'politics of passion', was far from the anticipated consequences of modernisation and development. If anything the rationalisation of politics with modernisation was to be the highway to planned development and prosperity for all.

Politics of Identity

We are not at all suggesting that identity politics can or ought to be excluded. But only that it be contained and directed by civic concerns. For we are well aware that it cannot be ignored for it will come back with a vengeance. In fact, the failure of a modernist politics and developmental economics is precisely due to an over-reliance on the rationalism of the Enlightenment. Now caste communalism and religious fundamentalism have infected out society and our polity with a disastrous vengeance. (Brass 2002)

For modernisation and secularisation 'have created new spaces for which there was no reliable guide in tradition.' (Gupta 1999:77) This readily allows religious fundamentalisms and minority identities to flourish. The very insecurities and anxieties of people precipitated by change that inevitably is both quite uneven and not quite equitable, make for such a situation. Compounding this was a secular modernist understanding of development, which focused on scientific technology and planned techniques as emphasised by Mahalanobis, and ignored various cultural aspects of institutions and their social context as pleaded for by Myrdal. (Khilnani 1997: 87)

Politics of Integration

The relationship between the politics of identity and the politics of interest is certainly a problematic one. Marx too realised that without a class consciousness, there could not be a real mobilisation for class-struggle or class-based action. A class-in-itself must become a class-for-itself. Lenin too bemoaned the lack of such a class consciousness. But class mobilisation was never an end itself, it was never to perpetuate class divisions. It was precisely to be a struggle for a classless society. Hence just as the class struggle is for a classless society, something similar must be applied to identity politics.

Communal, religious and other identities, are readily mobilised particularly in a situation of insecurity and anxiety, deprivation, and disadvantage. And yet a reasonable politics will demand that such identities do not become static, permanent and ends in themselves. They must be subsumed into more inclusive and constructive identities if in fact the politie with its inevitable pluralism is to be viable. Caste identities must be mobilised for a casteless society, and not to perpetuate casteism. Positional change in the caste hierarchy without an attempt to eliminate the hierarchy itself fails here. So too religious identities must be mobilised in order to make possible and viable a secular society and the space in which all religious groups can operate with religious and civic freedom.

Identity politics is a powerful engine for mass mobilisation but more then once we have seen that those who ride this tiger cannot easily dismount and are often devoured by the very beast they have created. The precipitation of Sikh-Hindu communal politics in Punjab has taken its toll at the very highest level. Today other such religious ethnic and caste conflicts are cascading down in the same direction.

Global Citizenship

What would help tip the balance from the negative to the positive and confirm an overall positive effect of globalisation on minorities, and specifically on the processes of minoritisation and majoritisation? The importance of constitutionally protecting the rights of individual 'citizen' cannot be overemphasised. But beyond this civil society must privilege this identity of 'citizen' so that other ethnic and sub-national identities are subsumed and contained by this. For 'the one factor that remains resolute and indissoluble is that of 'citizenship'. It is only in protecting the dignity of the individual as a citizen that one can mitigate the harshness of minoritization.'(Gupta 1999:84)

Further in a plural society like our citizens must have multiple and layered identities. This will allow mobilising identities constructively and inclusively rather than destructively and exclusively and thus facilitate focusing on real economic interests and genuine political concerns. Paul Brass identifies issues for a more equitable politics that must be addressed in such a political economy: endemic poverty, continuing illiteracy, persistent inequality, systemic violence, pervasive corruption, diversion of scarce resources. (Brass 2002:3034) This is only a list for starters but what it points to is a real politics of authentic interests and genuine concerns.

We can surely learn from the Truth and Justice Commission in South Africa and its struggle to bring together racial groups that had been in mortal conflict. There could have been a violent black backlash there as the balance of power changed. In such situations, the real necessity of reconciliation and healing even as justice is done and truth not compromised, becomes all the more compelling. For this, there must be a certain distancing from and an honest analysis of the destructive events and structures, not a justification and defensiveness about them or else communal violence and conflict will only further consolidate communal identities.

Seeking to address historical wrongs through self-righteous violence, is hardly the way to either justice or truth and certainly not to reconciliation and healing, because at very best it is only a half-truth which sometimes is worse than a complete lie. But then again justifying injustices is an even more disastrous lie, especially when this is perpetrated by dominant groups who themselves perpetuate such injustices.

In our understanding, it is only when identity politics is contained and sustained by a more realistic politics of interest that there can be a positive integration of the two. Such integrated politics must address the issues of equity and equally since market economics does not do this simply because it cannot. But the politie must also face the question of collective wrongs and minority rights. Identity politics is a very effective mobiliser precisely because it readily arouses passions. But precisely because of this it easily marginalises reason.

A community based on a rational politics can only happen when politics is in control, and this cannot be the politics of identity alone. Neither can the politics of interest be merely a matter of party concerns at whatever levels. It has to be premised on the involvement of the civic community as well. And if this is true at the regional and national level then it must also be obtained at the global one. Unfortunately, in spite of the urgency we are very far from such a civic community, particularly at the global level, and yet without this, the inevitable conflict of interests, such as obtained in any complex society and more so in a global one, will not make for a viable and acceptable resolution.

IV. Conclusion: Mapping a New Landscape

Today we need a global socio-cultural pluralism that will allow space not just for diversity, but beyond it for a postcolonial sensitivity that will decolonise our mind and free our imagination. We need to be able to cope with multiple identities and to accept a radically new hybridisation. But for this we must first map the new cultural landscape today. For already now it is becoming apparent that even in the West modernity is not singular or uniform but decidedly multiple and complex. (Hefner 1998:87)

Indeed, there are no simple binary choices, between the global and the local any more. What we need then is 'a cultural Lebanonization of the mind', which 'occurs with multiple frames of references for action, corresponding to each subculture'. (Goonatilake, 1997:232) For in today's world 'multiple selves and multiple identities are necessary to function in any viable society.' (*ibid.*: 233)

For a 'discourse that remains within the framework of binary opposition (Westernization/orientalism, white/black, etc.) without room for interstices, lacks the resources for imagining the mixed and betwixt as a creative jostling space, of home-making in multiple worlds.' (Nederveen and Parekh 1997:15) Rather the new 'hybridization as a

thematic perspective differs from previous imageries of inter-cultural mixing.' (*ibid*..) It implies complex multiple identities that reflect the global human condition beyond a culture of submissive victimhood, or of aggressive 'people's power'; one that does not gravitate to the dominant reference group or reject the subaltern marginalized one, but rather projects a new creativity in 'the power of imaging possible lives.' (Beck 2000:52)

For our alienation in a world that has lost its enchantment can hardly be effectively addressed merely at the global level. For globalisation is part of the problem of such disenchantment not part of the solution. Rushdie's 'metropolitan experience' which brings about the 'mutability of character' is not addressed by more cosmopolitanism! Nor can one be forcibly reintegrated today like Camus's 'Outsider' of yesteryear. What we need is a 're-enchantment' of our world with a creative religious response that is both locally relevant and relevantly global.

For this, we must think locally more incisively precisely to act globally more effectively. For globalisation and localisation as the new religious movements have demonstrated are complementary processes, not contradictory ones -- whether in our secular cities, where the universal is particularised in distinct identities, or in our 'global village' where the particular is universalised as a single place.

Concluding the Discussion

In concluding we will recapitulate the argument of this paper. Given a plurality of discourses, ethnicity here is problematised as a dynamic process in which a group produces and reproduces itself in the content of its material history. An eco-political approach does well in identifying the necessary conditions in this, but it must be extended to integrate a socio-cultural one to deal with the sufficient conditions of its development. Moreover, it is important to distinguish between a hegemonic and a counter-hegemonic ethnicity by locating ethnic divisions within the class structure of a society.

In describing ethnicity three dimensions have been defined; objective, subjective and contextual, as critical to understanding the construction of its identity and the recognition of its dignity. The intimate relationship between these must be considered in the context

of the politics of universalism that founds equal dignity, and the politics of difference on which unique identities are premised.

The complexities of this political dialectic allows for imposed identities and group manipulation, from within as dominant elites coopt subordinate ones and they in turn co-opt their groups; and form without as ruling classes divide and rule. Ethnicity thus is both mobilising and divisive, resulting in infra- and inter- group conflicts and contradictions. This is only accelerated as developmental change, whether state-planned or market-lead, precipitates an ethno-politics that becomes ethnocentric. Hence a new model for another development is needed.

Moreover, an ethnic group becomes an ethnic community, which in turn develops into an ethnic nation and demands its own nation-state, two nationalisms can be distinguished; ethnicist and statist. But neither of these guarantees an adequate political model to address the fundamental issues involved: issues of social pluralism and distributive justice, of group identity and personal dignity, of ethnic diversity and cultural rights, of economic equality and political participation. Hence beyond the nation-state, a civil-state embedded in a civilisational order is required, This will make possible a multi-nation state in a multi-cultural society.

It would seem that the analysis presented is rather torturous and convoluted, and the concepts somewhat flabby and flexible. But complicated realities need a corresponding complex discourse to capture the richness of connotation and nuances involved. We do not pretend that the issues we have raised here are all definitively resolved, but only that they have been addressed within a frame of reference that has yielded some insight and can be explored further.

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7.
RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM AND GLOBALISATION: ERODED IDENTITIES AND DISPLACED ELITES

Social Action, 2017, V. 67, N. 3, April-June, pp, 107 – 119

ABSTRACT
SECULAR CITY AND GLOBAL VILLAGE
SECULARISATION AND DISENCHANTMENT
MODERNITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
GLOBALISATION AND ITS CONTRADICTIONS
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS AND THEIR DILEMMAS
SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS NATIONALISMS
GLOBAL HOMOGENEITY AND LOCAL PLURALISM
REFERENCES

Abstract

Nationalism as an ideology must be at the service of the people, and not vice versa: the people to be sacrificed on the altar of nationalism. So too must religion embrace the seva-marg and not sacrifice people at the altars of false gods. Surely we can do with a surgical strike into the prejudice and hatred in our hearts and minds.

Secular City and Global Village

Nietzsche presaged the modern world when he somewhat prematurely proclaimed the 'Death of God' last century. It was a message received by a few intellectual atheists but largely ignored by the common people. However, in the 1960s the death of God was once again proclaimed and celebrated in *The Secular City* (Cox 1966) by popularist academics, not just in the intellectual centres of the world

and celebrated in our urban conglomerates, but also in the ever-extending marketplaces of the world where religion has become one more consumer item on the menu. Religion, it was thought, was no longer worthy even of controversy. It was quietly relegated to the private practice of those too weak to cope with the newfound freedom and mobility of secular society in this modernised world who would have to grow up or drop out!

But very soon the re-emergence, or rather the resurgence of religion seemed to confound the pundits. It was not God who was dead, it was just that we had been a long time sick, and not quite noticing it either. And the religious response when at last it came, turned out to be strong medicine, though not necessarily the right one. For the responses were as diverse as the understandings of secularisation and its place in the broader process of modernisation. The relation between religion and globalisation must be understood in the context of the secularisation process as well. Obviously, the way we perceive this relationship will depend on the way we understand these processes of modernisation, secularisation and globalisation, and how we contextualise the religious responses to them.

Globalisation has now come to be considered a part of this process of modernisation, and sometimes an irresistible and irreversible one. We might have expected that the process of secularisation, as intrinsic to modernisation, would be even further advanced by globalisation. But just as the religious response to the secular city has been a re-affirmation of the 'sacred' in people's lives, so too many of the religious movements spawned in the 'global village' have in fact been globalised with the very processes that were supposed to marginalise them! The responses of these religious movements have been as if not more vigorous and diverse than the earlier secular ones they were reacting too. Their reach and grasp have been vastly extended and intensified precisely because of their new global context.

Secularisation and Disenchantment

The roots of secularisation in the modern world go back to the Enlightenment, and the triumph of reason. One can indeed see the beginnings of such a rationalisation of human life in earlier societies as well. In the West one can think of the Stoics, in India we can think of Buddhism. Secularisation really is the rationalisation of religion as

a continuing process in society but it peaks at different levels at different times. The Enlightenment in Europe, in which modernity is grounded, was to liberate people from oppressive dependencies. The shibboleth, 'Man come of age', in Bonhoeffer's phrase, (Bonhoeffer: 1972: 325-29), epitomised its spirit. The reason was to be the true source of legitimacy; traditions were to be put to the test of rationality.

The European Enlightenment tore asunder the beliefs, ('Sacred Canopy' Berger 1990), which once gave legitimacy to so much in human lives, left us with a 'disenchanted world'. (Weber 1947: pp. 112-123) The process comprises three elements. It begins with the de-mythologisation of religion, which results in the de-institutionalisation of its social expressions and consequently their privatisation.

The liberative potential of reason should never be underestimated. However, if we do not recognise the constraints and the premises within which it operates, the assumptions from which it derives, and the prejudgments that orient and bias it, we very easily overestimate its effectiveness in addressing and resolving human problems. Reason can then become an aggressive and alienating instrument. (Heredia 2012) Such rationalism is but another kind of naivete. The extreme rationalist becomes the rationalist simpleton, unaware of the sensitivity of Pascal who knew that 'the heart has reasons of which reason knows nothing'. (Pascal 1958 no. 277)

Max Weber, the sociologist, saw how such a process would eventually lead to 'the iron cage', (*ibid*..) an alienation that leaves us alone and homeless in a disenchanted world. The religious response was precisely to address such an alienation and provide a *Haven in this heartless world*. (Lasch 1977) Though sometimes, such withdrawals into private group space have been cures worse than the disease!

For religion itself has not been exempt from this process of rationalisation in human society. Thus, a religious experience cannot be preserved in society unless it is institutionalised in a tradition. This represents a rationalisation that both preserves as well as mediates access to the original experience. But all too often this tradition and the institutions of organised religion can be an obstacle rather than a facilitation in accessing the original experience and intuition. Thus, the need for an on-going reform, an 'aggiornamento', to keep any religious tradition alive and relevant, lest it ossify and die.

Moreover, institutional organisation, whether formal or otherwise, does indeed represent power in a society. And often the temptation to mobilise such power for purposes, religious or otherwise, has proven irresistible, and with the consequent politicisation of religion, the alienation from the original religious experience is complete, and the door open to religious extremism and militancy that has little to do with religion. It is more a political ideology than a religious faith. (Nandy 1992: 86) For politics as the exercise of pragmatic power in our ordinary everyday social lives is the very opposite of religion as an encounter with the ultimate concerns of our lives, the ultimate mystery of our existence.

Modernity and Its Discontents

Modernity necessarily involves rapid and radical changes in traditional societies. These precipitate a volatile discontent that is easily manipulated and politicised. A failed modernity, or even a tardy or untidy one, brings new injustices and inequalities, unfamiliar dominations and exploitations, whose severity can eclipse the memories of earlier atrocities. A successful modernity inevitably brings insecurities and uncertainties, alienation and anomie, with which traditional society is unprepared to cope. It is not surprising that a modernising state becomes the target of this discontent. In the quest to redress and escape from present miseries; the past is revived and reconstructed into a 'golden age'. However, wherever it was experienced as an aggressive invasion destroying the old familiar world and replacing it with an unfamiliar modernity, it was perceived as betraying its liberating promise.

This leaves people insecure and fearful, unable to cope with the new and so longing for the old. In this anxiety and disorientation, their 'old-time religion' seemed a more reliable assurance than the promise of this 'brave new world'. As people began to mine their lost world for answers in their struggle to find their lost selves, the religious backlash against this disenchanting secular modernity could no longer be ignored.

Further, modernising societies subject their people to a growing socio-cultural homogenisation, This devalues and threatens their traditional identities. Such societies subjugate the masses to the expanding eco-political hegemony of the upwardly mobile elites. This

subordinates and excludes the older, more static ones. Eroded identities and displaced elites are a volatile, explosive mix. Moreover, the feeling of being marginalised and alienated undermines people's self-respect and violates their sense of dignity, leaving them with feelings of inferiority that give further credibility to their perceived grievances. The middle class too is disoriented by rapid modernisation in spite of being relatively advantaged, and in turn it has lent strong support to revivalist and fundamentalist developments.

In this uncertain and unforgiving world, religion becomes a place of refuge and solace. However, the remedies sought and promoted vary across a wide spectrum of responses, from passive withdrawal to aggressive assertion. For the loss of a sense of identity is readily translated into the pursuit of other-worldly promises, seeking religious remedies for secular problems. This is how religious fundamentalisms are born, whether in the form of an apolitical withdrawal or a politicised engagement. When this is compounded by resentment against one's violated dignity, it can further be transmuted into this-worldly anger and rage that does not stop at violent responses to their perceived predicament.

This encounter can be dangerously subversive for a modern secular, liberal democratic state. The coalescence of a strident religious fundamentalism and a committed religious nationalism is a serious concern today, and not just on this sub-continent. For every major religion has its share of fundamentalists, though there are obvious differences of intensity and intent. Already too many floundering nation-states have been overtaken and put to risk by this backlash of politics and religion, further compounded in our imploding global world.

Globalisation and Its Contradictions

There is now a broad agreement about globalisation being a new and contemporary stage of this process of modernisation, would lead to a further secularisation of social life as well. But globalisation itself has been conceptualised from different perspectives, and each of these would have a bearing on our understanding of the relationship between religion and globalisation.

Neoliberal globalisation as an extension of the capitalist economy is dominated by the multinationals of the first world. This has led to a

commodification of practically everything, as the capitalist economy penetrates into deeper and deeper domains of our lives, and integrates them into a world free-market system. But whereas such a perspective rightly underlines the economic dependencies and exploitations that we experience, the very 'economic monism' that is implicit in this perspective leaves little space or scope for understanding the new religious movements within such a framework. Too easily are such movements dismissed as false consciousness, even as they are exploited for their market potential.

Others have tried to extend such an economic perspective to include a political dimension, underlining how collective authority and political power can create value. This perspective opens the way to a further consideration of how globalisation affects culture, how it relativises particular identities and homogenises local cultures. And it is here that we begin to have a handle on understanding the new religious movements. The rapid and radical change in our world has led to a sense of loss of cultural identities, whereas religion functioning very much in the realm of such particular identities, becomes a critical factor in re-affirming these threatened identities and lost selves.

However, too often the relationship of these new religious movements to globalisation is ambiguous. For while they often oppose globalisation as an alien imposition and a threat to their religious and cultural life, they often at the same time attempt to influence and even co-opt the very dynamics of the globalisation process to serve their particular purpose. Thus, while globalisation seems to structurally promote secularisation and the privatisation of religion, it also in this very act provides a fertile ground for the public influence of religion; not only because globalised privatisation implies pluralism in which a hundred flowers can bloom, but also because it precipitates an alienation that longs for a collective social expression of solidarity.

Group solidarity is most easily promoted by focusing attention on the external other as a threat, but with the proximity and inclusion that globalisation brings, it becomes less feasible to extern the alien other. For now, their evil empire, like the kingdom of God, is among us. Thus, globalisation does not lead so much to the death of God, though it certainly does obfuscate the devil! Hence the need to particularise and concretise evil, to personalise and give a face to the great Satan, who has changed our lives in ways we do not quite

understand or accept. And this becomes one of the great motivating factors in some of the new religious movements, to find or create and demonise an out-group enemy, who becomes a scapegoat victim.

Moreover, the very contradictions of the global system leads to inherent tensions that precipitate further discontent and alienation which these new religious movements gear up to redress. Thus, the effects of market competition and technological advantage in a globalising world are seen to betray their promise of progress and promote greater inequalities within and between societies, and greater insecurities especially for the weaker and less adaptable sectors; whereas the values that are apparently promoted and overtly advertised, are those of liberty, equality, fraternity. Such residual problems in the global system, precipitated by the processes of globalisation that new social movements, and in particular the religious ones, tend to focus on and be activated by.

Religious Movements and their Dilemmas

Basically, then one can think of various religious responses to a secular society. These often overlap and fade into each other. Thus, reform intends an adaptation to changes in society that are regarded as beyond one's control and even irreversible; revival implies a re-affirmation of religion often against and in spite of the changes in secular society, and such revival can be one of withdrawal or of militancy.

The liberal interventionist option in a pluriform world can only be effective by focusing on a more inclusive community that is now being increasingly globalised. This inevitably tends to dilute its appeal by making it too broad-based. The reactionary intervention seeks not to adapt to, but to bend global processes to its particular purposes. But then it must use, and so be open to being changed by the very dynamics of the processes it opposes. On the other hand, the conservative option while motivating specific social and cultural groups, finds that it cannot sustain such exclusivism in a globalising world, without risking a further marginalisation by the very processes from which withdrawal can offer no effective protection.

When a religious movement. Whether reformist or revivalist, intervenes to address specific systemic problems in a society, it must necessarily follow the logic of the problematic system itself. Thus, economic problems are not solved only by religious faith, nor are

political conflicts resolved simply by religious piety, neither is the medical health of a society improved by mere religious rituals. Thus, the very involvement of a religious movement in global society begins to change it, precisely because the compartmentalisation and isolation of diverse areas of social life no longer obtains. The danger for a religious movement is to fall between two stools: it might end up advocating bad social policy, or suffer from poor religious inspiration.

Secular and Religious Nationalisms

Nationalism is surely one of the most powerful ideas to have moulded our modern world and a much-abused one too. Religion now adds another more compelling dimension. However, in the wake of modernising nationalisms, secularism was expected to displace religion into the private domain. As an ideology, nationalism originated in the West with the nation-state. It has been a powerful mobiliser for state-making as well as for state-breaking. The 20th century has been witness to the murderous clashes of nationalisms in Europe that engulfed the world in two horrendous Armageddons. Yet the new nations in the postcolonial age have striven to mobilise their masses with a nationalist ideology. As the political projection of a people's right to self-rule, nationalism has become the legitimising creed of the modern state's claims to authority.

Secular nationalisms have used a national language to promote a linguistic uniformity in their societies, just as religious nationalisms seek to revive and impose their religious tradition. Without a vigorous multi-lingualism and a vibrant religious pluralism, the cultural and religious diversity of a society will not survive. Linguistic nationalism was among the earliest threats to our unity-in-diversity in India, when Hindi was sought to be imposed as the national language. Allowing space for regional languages has defused this threat. Religious nationalism and fundamentalism are now a greater threat to our religious diversity and political unity.

Unique identities pertain to the cultural domain. When these are aggregated from the individual to the group, they can become more intractable and uncompromising than ever. This is precisely what happens with exclusive and total identities. They subsume all other individual identities into a group one, and oppose this to the identities of other groups. It is the death knell of any kind of multiculturalism

or religious pluralism in society. Religious nationalisms and fundamentalisms are prone to this.

A people often use religion to identify themselves as distinct from others, but when such a religious community seeks political expression in a nation-state, religion functions as a political ideology rather than a spiritual faith. When these two compelling motivators coalesce in a religious nationalism, it has a doubly compounded potential, for better or for worse.

The compulsion to create a national identity has been murderously homogenising. Religion can become a part of this compulsion. Religious revivalism quite naturally follows, since religion is so much an intrinsic part of these traditions, overlapping with and reinforcing other divisions, whether ethnic, racial, linguistic or tribal. Once these are politicised, disaffected people readily attempt to subvert and seize state power in pursuit of their own interests with communal riots and religious pogroms.

Religion is among the most common and most effective of the many identity markers that characterise such movements, providing an explosive mix of religion and politics in religious nationalism. It produces and reproduces the enemy because it survives best on politicising differences, not in reconciling them. It flourishes on heightening hurtful and hurt feelings, not in calming passions and healing memories.

Religious nationalism politicises religion but it seldom democratises society. It puts a premium on religious homogeneity in its quest for a national identity. Dominant groups exploit this to establish their hegemony over others in the name of national unity. Tolerance is perceived as weakness, if not a betrayal of national interests and religious concerns. It then becomes an authoritarian 'tyranny of the majority'. This is happening all through South Asia and elsewhere too.

Religious nationalism remains intrinsically discordant with modern values and institutions. This is really the core-contradiction between religious nationalism and secular modernity. Modernity thrives best in an atmosphere of diversity and openness. Religious tolerance is best supported by a social pluralism and secularism, which opens spaces for diverse religious traditions in society. Eventually, religious nationalism may use modern means and technologies rather effectively.

Secular nationalism strives for a political hegemony: one ideology, one party, one nation. Religious nationalism thrives on religious homogeneity: one creed, one code, one cult. However, the inherent diversity, cultural, linguistic and religious, among states like India has proven extremely resilient to any externally imposed uniformity. In India this obtains even among Hindus, differences of caste and tribe, of language and region, of gods and sages, Moreover, the endemic hierarchies of caste and insoluble inequalities of class need serious commitment to affirmative action for the last and the least for an egalitarian liberal democracy.

Religious nationalisms use political hegemonies to impose religious homogeneity. This is easily mobilised by fundamentalists and extremists of all kinds in the game of competitive politics that diverts attention from the internal contradictions of a community to an external scapegoat victim. This sharpens the resentment, making it more strident and even violent. The old hierarchy is replaced with a new stratification, which cunningly legitimates itself in a hybrid of the old religion and the new politics. It is not premised on the basic values and common beliefs that must underpin the diversity of a society but rather uses the power an electorate invests in numbers to reconstruct society into majorities and minorities, into dominant and subservient communities.

Global Homogeneity and Local Pluralism

Now precisely because religion focuses on cultural particularities, it becomes an invaluable resource to mobilise and thus to bridge the gap between individual alienation and group solidarity. However, the moderate liberal option though less visible is in fact be more compatible with globalisation processes which broaden the sense of inclusion and interdependency. This culture is more susceptible to a reformist rather than a radical or a revivalist appeal. But to think of the final outcome as one global civil religion, would precisely dilute the appeal and inspiration of religion that is at its best when affirming particular cultures and local peoples.

The state must allow religion a civic/social space, that is respected with a 'principled distance' towards all of them (Bhargava 2013: 84) would allow for an equal respect for all religions (*sarvadharma sambhava*), thus creating a neutral secular space in the public domain

for exchange and dialogue. Oppositely, the very homogenisation of a globalising world would seem to precipitate a pluralism of religious blowback responses. This is precisely the paradox that keeps the religious enterprise alive, and hopefully the radical, liberating and empowering possibilities in a religious tradition still relevant.

Our alienation in a world that has lost its enchantment can hardly be effectively addressed at the global level. For globalisation, as also modernity and secularism are part of the problem of such disenchantment not part of the solution. For these processes may help to think globally, they do not have the inspirational power to motivate people to act locally. What we need is a 're-enchantment' of our world by a more creative and constructive localism. For this we must think locally precisely to act globally more effectively. For globalisation and localisation are not antinomies but complementarities, whether in our secular cities or our 'global village'!

Religious nationalism epitomises this global-local tension. It is accentuated not resolved by nationalising religion or religionising politics, as some extremists want. For then religion becomes an ideology at the cost of religion as faith. A religious tradition that marries a political system in one generation becomes a widow in the next. For traditions have a far longer life span over generations, political systems and more so political parties, are not so long-lived. Moreover, a constructive religious faith is essentially premised on a universal global vision, while nationalist ideology is intrinsically localised by the 'nation' and its territory.

Religion as an ideology is easily co-opted by nationalism, making the two ideologies more dangerous together. Religion as faith would rather bring an ethical/moral dimension to national politics and redeem it somewhat from the seduction of power. What we are witnessing today is a power politics, where the ethical dimension is exiled to the private domain and religious ideologies take centre stage.

Neoliberal Globalisation sits comfortably with such religious nationalisms except when their violence disrupts free markets. In fact, it sharpens inequalities in a diverse but imploding world and then attempts to contain the spill-over violence with counter-violence in an escalating spiral, where leaders profit and people lose, the few enriched and the majority impoverished. We need a new social order to resolve such differences and contain the underlying antagonisms and not exploit them. But there will be no new social order without a new social ethic. A religious vision of cosmic inclusiveness lived out in

an open-ended spirituality. Saints and mystics in the sufi-bhakti tradition exemplify this. And leaders like Gandhi, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Martin Luther King Jr., and others have placed this ethical imperative at the heart of their political projects.

With Gandhi, 'overtime, the Indian freedom movement ceased to be an expression of only nationalist consolidation; it came to acquire a new stature as a symbol of the universal struggle for political justice and cultural dignity.' (Nandy 1994: 2-3) For in Gandhi's patriotism, 'there was a built-in critique of nationalism and refusal to recognize the nation-state as the organizing principle of the Indian civilization and as the last word in the country's political life.' (Nandy 1994: 3) Already in 1921, he insisted that 'Indian nationalism, if it is to remain non-violent, cannot be exclusive.' (CWMH, 22, p. 27) By 1924, he even more emphatically urged 'non-violent nationalism' as a 'necessary condition of corporate or civilized life'. (CWMG, 25, p.369)

Indeed, for Gandhi, as with Tagore, this was 'the ultimate civilisational ambition of India: 'to be the cultural epitome of the world and convert all passionate self-other debates into self-self debates.' (Nandy 1994: 82) Both these rejected a narrow aggressive nationalism, for a broad inclusive patriotism: 'in this ideology of patriotism rather than of nationalism, there was a built-in critique of nationalism and refusal to recognize the nation-state as the organizing principle of the Indian civilization and as the last word in the country's political life.' (Nandy 1994:2) Under Gandhi's leadership, the Indian freedom struggled to convert divisive debates into integrating dialogues, to transform exclusive identities into inclusive ones, to change hostile controversy into empathetic consensus. Religious nationalism on the subcontinent betrayed this ideal in 1947 and it still has to be effectively recovered even today.

In the Indian Subcontinent, the two-nation theory used religion as a political instrument for partisan gains. Gandhi's adamant resistance to this perverse ideology ultimately failed and the consequent tragedy of the Partition of 1947 is something we are still playing out with continuing communal violence and the violent tensions and wars between the two states. Interestingly, Gandhi rather spoke of *praja* not *rastra,* of the people, not the nation/state. (Parel 1991: 262) Nationalism as an ideology must be at the service of the people, and not vice versa: the people to be sacrificed on the altar of nationalism. So too must religion embrace the seva-marg and not sacrifice people

at the altars of false gods. Surely, we can do with a surgical strike into the prejudice and hatred in our hearts and minds.

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LIST OF ARTICLES WITH ABSTRACTS

1. THE GLOBAL ECOLOGICAL CRISIS: A THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE ON SOME PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Abstract: This paper will particularly deal with practical the ethical implications of the environmental issues involved in the potential fallout from anthropogenic global eco-change: the burden of risk and the price of change; equity-led ecological development; inter-generational responsibility; environmental and financial debt; and environmental rights and ecological duties. When we have a global crisis, only a global response can meet it, and for this, we need to act as a global community.

2. GLOBALISATION AND RELIGION: CONTRADICTIONS AND COMPLEMENTARITIES

Abstract: This study attempts to outline an area of concern and is a beginning rather than a conclusive statement. The inspiration for this venture has come from Gandhi, who by acting locally has challenged us to think globally, even when we think differently from him. This is not merely an intellectual 'search', but a spiritual 'quest' as well. The attempt here is to orient and focus our response to the increasing ethnification in our plural society.

3. GLOBALISATION AND MINORITIES IN SOUTH ASIA: POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS

Abstract: This essay focuses on the political, cultural and religious implications of globalisation for minorities, while being careful to avoid a reductionist approach to this complex, multidimensional process.

4. GLOBALISATION AND CULTURAL NATIONALISM

Abstract: Book Review of *Globalisation, Hindu Nationalism and Christians in India*, by Lancy Lobo, Rawat Publications, Jaipur and Delhi, 2002.

5. COLONIALISM TO GLOBALISATION: REFOUNDING THE CHURCH OF THE INDIES

Abstract: The challenge is to refound the churches in the post-colonial age, to inculturate, or rather incarnate the Good News in a globalising world.

6. GLOBALISATION AND IDENTITY: MULTIPLE PROCESSES, COMPLEX ISSUES

Abstract: Rapid social change precipitated by globalisation is dissolving older more tolerant inclusive identities and reconfiguring them into newer hostile exclusive ones. To study this, we must first deconstruct the multiple processes that constitute globalisation and then, unpack the complex issues implied in the construction of an ethnic identity. Identity and dignity are constructed in the encounter of the 'self' and the other. Ethnicity refers to some kind of 'collective identity'.This is an explorative not a conclusive study, deliberately tentative and open-ended.

7. RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM AND GLOBALISATION: ERODED IDENTITIES AND DISPLACED ELITES

Abstract: Nationalism as an ideology must be at the service of the people, and not vice versa: the people to be sacrificed on the altar of nationalism. So too must religion embrace the *seva-marg* and not sacrifice people at the altars of false gods. Surely, we can do with a surgical strike into the prejudice and hatred in our hearts and minds.